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THE STORY OF THE PHILIPPINES.

A NEW YORK paper, of the date March 4th, embodied its ideas of the Philippines and their people in a cartoon. A naked negro savage was being pinned to a rock by an American bayonet, from which fluttered a scrap of paper marked "liberty and civilization." The legend below explained this novel performance by the words "he won't take it any other way." Apart from its brutality, this cartoon of "Judge" shows the strange ignorance of a very large part of the American public in regard to the islands lately seized by our Administration. It is but one example of many. The race, the religion, the degree of civilization, and the form of government of the Philippines are misrepresented daily in the Press of this country in a way that would be grotesque if it did not threaten the destruction of thousands of human beings against whom the people of the United States have not the shadow of a grievance. A sketch of the circumstances under which the group originally became a part of the Spanish dominions and its history since that time seem necessary to make us comprehend what place its population now occupies among the nations of the civilized world.

The establishment of the Spaniards in these islands of the Chinese Sea was part of that great movement of colonial expansion which, in the Sixteenth Century, spread European settlement and civilization over the larger part of this American Continent. Magellan raised the Spanish flag in Cebu in 1521, the same year that Cortez captured Mexico from the Aztecs. Forty years later, when

Legaspi made the first Spanish settlement in the same island, it was from Mexico not from Europe that his expedition started. All through the duration of the Spanish Colonial Empire, the relations of the Philippines were much closer with Mexico than with Spain itself. Nevertheless the colonization of Spanish America was not reproduced in the Asiatic islands. In Mexico, in Peru, the West Indies, and La Plata, men of European race formed an important part of the colonial population. The whites, whether born in Europe or on American soil, constituted a landed aristocracy in most of the American vice royalties, and in some they formed a large part of the working population also. It was never so in the Philippines. There was no conquest, no division of lands, no grants of vassals, as in Mexico or Peru, no slavery, and no considerable immigration of Spaniards, still less of negroes or American Indians. The mines of Mexico and Peru furnished, for many years, the chief revenues of the Spanish Government but the latter never drew any financial profit from the Philippines. The policy of the Spanish sovereigns there only aimed at making the natives loyal subjects of Spain, and as like Spaniards in civilization as it was possible to make them without change of country. The result has been a wide difference between the Filipinos and the races of Spanish America whether native or mixed.

The date of the settlement of the Philippines accounts for this difference of policy on the part of the Spanish Government. When Columbus opened America to European colonization, the consequences of a meeting between civilized and uncivilized races were not realised by any one. Columbus himself and the rulers of Spain were full of good will towards the native Americans. As sincere Catholics, they believed that the Christian Faith was the greatest possible good for men of any race, and they felt it a solemn duty to bring that faith to the Indians. At the same time, they, and especially Isabella, fully recognized the natural rights of the heathen Indians to their lives, liberty and property. The letters of Ferdinand and Isabella to Columbus and other officials are convincing on this point. In the rush of adventurers to the new lands these rights were disregarded by a large number of the colonists, as in our own century they have been disregarded by American and English settlers among weaker races. The difference was that in the course of Spanish colonization the spirit of Catholic morality raised a body of defenders of the rights of the weak natives, unknown in the history of Protestant colonization, be it English, Dutch, or American. For over a century the history of Spanish America and Spanish colonial legislation is mainly that of a struggle between the armed conquerors who sought to reduce the

natives to slavery and the conscientious men, priests and laymen, who maintained the right of the Indians to liberty and equal justice before the law. The military conquerors were willing that the natives should be made Christians, as the public conscience of the nation demanded, but they wanted to keep them slaves. The Franciscans and Dominicans and their allies, many of them soldiers or officials, insisted on the right of personal freedom for the natives. Las Casas, Montesinos, Zumarraga and Betanzos stand out as conspicuously in Spanish colonial history as Cortez or Alvarado.

The policy of the Home Government was evolved from these contending forces during the seventy years that elapsed between the occupation of Santo Domingo by Columbus and that of the Philippines by Legaspi. Ferdinand, Ximenes, and Charles V, in succession passed laws for the abolition of Indian slavery and the protection of the native races. The suppression of vassalage in Peru, by the "New Laws" brought on the revolt of the Pizarros and nearly separated that country from Spain in 1540. The next Governor, Gasca, had to admit a modified peonage of the Indians, accompanied by numerous legal securities against oppression. The Spanish monarchs, however, to their credit be it said, never abandoned the policy of ultimate freedom for the Indians, and it was finally secured in the last century.

The more zealous members of the religious orders did not confine themselves to appeals to the Government on behalf of the Indians. They undertook, in many districts, to convert the wild tribes and form them into civilized communities, by persuasion alone, on condition that their converts should be guaranteed against oppression by the Spanish colonists or officials. The earliest enterprise of this kind was undertaken by the famous Las Casas in Guatemala in 1535. A certain province was inhabited by independent tribes, who had driven back two or three bands of Spanish soldiers. Las Casas made a formal agreement with the Government to convert these warriors and make them live in peace with the Spaniards, on condition that if he succeeded, they should be left free to govern themselves in their own lands. He even required that no Europeans should be allowed to enter the Indian district without special permit except of course the priests engaged in their instruction. The principles laid down by Las Casas for intercourse between a Christian people of higher civilization and power and heathens in a savage state, were embodied in a Latin treatise, "*De Unico Modo Conversionis*," which appeared in 1535. In it he lays down as the true Catholic teaching, that men can only be made Christians with their own consent, and that it is a crime to make war on, or injure in any way, non Christians, on the plea

of converting or civilizing them. With regard to civilization he gave his opinion that personal liberty and social organization were its essentials. He, therefore, urged the necessity of gathering wandering savages, when converted, into villages where they might receive constant instruction both in Christian morality and such material civilization as would increase their comfort, develop their minds and give them habits of settled industry. For a Catholic missionary, persuasion was the only means to attain this end that could be lawfully used, and accordingly familiar acquaintance with the language and customs of the natives was laid down as an indispensable requisite for such a missionary's work. Las Casas himself, when over sixty, studied the Guatemalan language thoroughly before beginning his mission. It was entirely successful and for three hundred years the province of Vera Pas has continued to be the most prosperous Indian population in Central America.

The teaching and practical success of the great Dominican made a deep impression in Spain. Missions on his plan were multiplied in Mexico, in Florida, and other parts of America in subsequent years. Charles V absolutely abolished personal slavery among his Indian subjects for any cause, including war or cannibalism, in 1538, and his laws were confirmed repeatedly by Philip II and his successors. The principles which ruled Spanish settlement and missionary work were then very different in the middle of the Sixteenth Century from those prevalent at its beginning.

Though discovered by Magellan in 1521 the Spaniards made no attempt at settlement in the Philippines for many years. Several expeditions were sent across the Pacific both from Spain and Mexico, but their object was not the Philippines but the Moluccas, whose spices formed a valuable object of trade, and where the Portuguese had already several factories. None of these Spanish expeditions succeeded in establishing posts in the coveted spice islands, though a good deal was learned of the islands of the Pacific. For many years after Magellan's voyage it was considered impossible to cross the Pacific in an eastwardly direction owing to the direction of the prevalent trade winds. An expedition sent out by Cortez from Acapulco made its way to Spain finally, being unable to return to Mexico for that reason. Mendana, in 1540, discovered the Solomon Islands and other groups, but he too made no permanent settlement there, and for some years there was a lull in discoveries.

It was mainly the desire of converting the natives that suggested the settlement of the Philippines. They had neither spices nor gold to any amount, the population was barbarian, and there was

ample field in America for all the colonists that Spain could furnish without seeking distant tropical lands. The missionary spirit, however, then so vigorous in Catholic Spain turned the thoughts of some of the most zealous of the Dominicans and Franciscans in Mexico towards these islands. St. Francis Xavier's career of conversion and miracles from Africa to Japan excited lively emulation among some of the most notable men of the Mexican clergy. Father Betanzos, the head of the Dominicans in that city, and Zumarraga, its first Bishop, both petitioned for leave to pass to the Philippines in 1547, as a step towards the conversion of China. Though their request was refused, it excited fresh interest in the archipelago in Mexico and in Spain. Father Urdaneta, a distinguished geographer, who had passed many years in naval service on the Pacific, before becoming an Augustinian friar, also urged the importance of occupying the Philippines on the Spanish Government. As he had been in Spain with the expedition sent out by Cortez, and had afterwards declined the command of the fleet sent by Mendoza in 1542, on account of his intention to become a priest, his advice had much weight with Philip II. The chief political object to be gained by a Spanish occupation of the islands, was to secure the Pacific Ocean against incursions from European buccaneers, who, it was said, might settle there to prey on the defenceless Spanish settlements of Mexico and Peru. There was little prospect of revenue and the expense would be considerable so politicians looked unfavorably on the project. The desire of extending the Faith among heathens, strange as such a motive must appear for governmental action in our day, was however a paramount motive with the much reviled Philip. He declared with emphasis that to save one soul he was ready to spend the wealth of the Indies, and to prove his sincerity he ordered the Viceroy of Mexico, in 1560, to fit out a fleet and found a post in the Philippines.

The expedition sailed in 1564 from Acapulco after the death of the Viceroy, Velasco, who had prepared it. It consisted of two ships of four hundred tons each with two smaller vessels, pataches. The whole force was two hundred soldiers and fifty civilians besides the crews, who numbered a hundred and fifty. As, up to that time, it had been found impossible for vessels to cross the Pacific from Asia to America, it was expected that at least three years must pass before any news could return of the fate of the expedition. Instructions however were given that an attempt should be made, by ascending to more northern latitudes to discover a practical sailing course eastward. Father Urdaneta, at the special order of Philip, was to accompany the fleet and superintend the navi-

gation and exploration, in consideration of his former experience in the Pacific. Four other Augustinians went with him as chaplains for the Spaniards and missionaries for the heathen Malays. The commander, Legaspi, was a veteran soldier of the type of the Canadian Jacques Cartier, and was himself a member of the Third Order of San Francis. Very strict orders were given against aggression or ill treatment of the Indians such as had too often occurred in the early discoveries of America. Other vessels were to follow in two years for the reinforcement of the settlement which would naturally need them.

The fleet arrived at the Island of Cebu, where Magellan had been killed forty years earlier. The natives were not disposed to receive them, whether through fear of reprisals for the death of their former visitor or other causes. As provisions were necessary for the Spaniards an armed party went to the native village after fruitless negotiations, and took what supplies they could find, leaving however compensation. The natives attacked them but were scared off by the artillery from the ships, which Legaspi humanely ordered to be fired high so that no loss of life should occur. The savage warriors burned the village, but after a few days came to terms and made no opposition to the erection of a stockade, the first Spanish settlement in these lands. Legaspi made a formal proclamation that the death of Magellan was absolutely forgiven, and that nothing was asked of the natives by their visitors beyond provisions, for which they were ready to pay, and that they should not molest either the Spanish soldiers or priests. A comparison between this first settlement in the Philippines and the mowing down of the Filipinos by modern gunnery in the present year does not suggest any improvement in the spirit of humanity between the Sixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.

The great object of introducing Christianity was not neglected. The friars commenced a study of the Malay languages immediately, and through an interpreter they began explaining their mission to the Chiefs from the moment that friendly relations were established. It was a long time, however, before they deemed it right to admit any one to baptism. On Magellan's voyage his chaplain had baptized several hundred with ill instructed zeal, but the requirements of genuine missionary work were far more clearly comprehended by the Augustinians. It was by slow degrees that the wild natives were admitted to baptism and when it was given to some, every effort was made to gather them into settlements to receive further instruction in religion and training in Christian ways. The original chiefs were not interfered with in the government of their people, but the old superstitions and barbarities were

gradually abolished. The same system was continued in Luzon, when Legaspi founded Manila in 1571. By the end of the century the native converts settled in villages amounted to between two and three hundred thousand according to the Augustinian chronicler Medina.

Having founded his settlement Legaspi sent one of his two large vessels to find a course for reaching Mexico. His nephew was the commander, but as he was only a boy Father Urdaneta was sent with him as guardian, with practically supreme authority. Urdaneta's experience now stood him in good stead. He ascended northward to the latitude of forty degrees, recorded the direction of the prevalent winds and finally solved the problem of reaching America from Asia. He reached Acapulco in 1566, after a voyage of four months. From Mexico he was sent to Spain, where his sailing directions were embodied in valuable charts which for over a century continued to be the guide of navigation in the Pacific. He was not to see the Philippines himself again, as he died in Mexico in 1568 at the age of seventy. From his work as explorer and missionary Andres Urdaneta may be called the Marquette of the Pacific Ocean.

Legaspi, in his isolated post, had a full share of the difficulties that beset most of the early settlements. The Portuguese traders of the Moluccas sent vessels to harass the Spaniards and claim that they were intruding on Portuguese territory. The pirates who abounded on both the Chinese coasts and the Malay islands came to plunder, and even the Spanish vessels which followed from Mexico were nearly captured by mutineers among their own crews. Legaspi held his post bravely and made explorations among the other islands for some years. Cebu, where the first settlement was made, was not suitable for a capital, and in 1571, the Spaniards established themselves in Luzon, on the site of the present city of Manila. There was a rather large native population there under a chief of some power whose name is given as Rajah Matanda. This Hindoo title is curious, though it does not appear to have implied any communication with the natives of India. Matanda received the Spaniards peacefully and became a Christian after a couple of years. Explorations were pushed through Panay, Negros and Mindanao. The Mahometans of the Sulu islands were the only enemies that gave any serious trouble, and they were defeated and obliged to make peace. Within twenty-five years the Spanish dominion was recognized through the whole archipelago and it was not subsequently extended to any material extent.

The social, religious, and intellectual condition of the natives, when the Spaniards settled among them, has been very fully de-

scribed in the various chronicles of the religious orders. The keeping of records was practised by the missionaries and the accuracy of their description of the natives receives remarkable confirmation from the accounts of other Pacific Islanders since given by Cook and other explorers, French, English and Dutch. In the Philippines, in the Sixteenth Century, the coasts were occupied by tribes of the Malay race, in much the same stage of civilization as the Hawaiians or Taheetans of Cook's voyages. There was no central government. Chiefs ruled limited districts with more or less absolute power. Some were hereditary and the people were divided into nobles, common freemen and slaves, the last mostly prisoners taken in war or enslaved for debts or crimes. The law was traditional and variable. Wars were as common as they are to-day in Samoa, but there was little of wars of conquest. A tribe fought another for some grievance, or on a point of honor, and after some battles peace was made again. They cultivated the land and raised rice, bananas and other fruits and roots; they fished and hunted; and they also traded among one another. Their boats and canoes were much the same as in the South seas two centuries later and piracy at sea and head hunting on land were common practices for making the reputation of aspiring warriors. Their religion was chiefly confined to certain practices of witchcraft and dances and feasts in honor of numerous spirits recognized as either benevolent or dangerous. There were neither temples nor public worship. The sorcerers, styled Babylanes, were the only priests. The natives did not work metals, though acquainted with them through trade with the Chinese and Japanese. All belonged to the Malay races of which three principal branches, based chiefly on language, were recognized by the Spaniards. These were the Tagals, the Visayas, who inhabit the Southern islands and the Pampangas, who occupy a part of Luzon to the north of Manila. The Pampangas, according to the Spanish records, were always held the most intelligent, and also the most loyal Indians of the group. It was from them that the workmen of the Royal dockyards and arsenals and also the bulk of the native soldiers were drawn during later years, and many high officials, Judges, Auditors and others, as well as many priests and ecclesiastical dignitaries were of pure Pampanga blood.

The interior of the larger islands, then as now, was peopled by black tribes of a low stage of development who were regarded by the Malays as the original inhabitants and who were usually at war with them. There were also mixed races, such as the Igorrotes and Aetas, whose condition was like that of our own Sioux fifty years ago. It was only afterwards that the Spaniards, whether

soldiers or missionaries, had intercourse with the latter and if the larger part of them remained in their barbarism there was no attempt made to exterminate or enslave them, during the three centuries of Spanish dominion.

The Malay race, to which Tagals, Visayas and Pampangas belong, is spread through most of the Australasian islands as well as the peninsula of Malacca. It is a well marked division of the human race and quite distinct from the Chinese, Indians or other Asiatics. Mahometanism had extended among the Southern Malays when first they came into contact with Europeans, and various strong despotic governments had been formed among them, but the Mahometan propaganda had hardly touched the Philippines. There were powerful Malay Sultans in Borneo, Sumatra and Java, and the Mahometan subjects of these princes, like the Turks in Europe, were acquainted with firearms and warlike organization. Their vessels were larger than the canoes of the Philippines, and when Legaspi settled in Manila, corsairs from Borneo were already making raids into the islands of the Visayas. The Sultans of Sulu, a group of small islands between Borneo and Mindanao, were the chief enemies the Spaniards had to contend with during the whole history of the Philippines. It shows how small the military strength of the colony was that it should never have effectually subjugated this piratical state till the present century.

Aggressiveness on neighbors was certainly not a fault which could be laid to the Spanish Government in the Philippines. The establishment of posts in Ternate was the only attempt made to extend its dominion in the Eastern seas. The wars waged from Manila were almost wholly defensive. A Chinese pirate, Li Ma Hong, attacked that city in 1574 shortly after the death of the first Governor, and was driven off after a long siege, but the Spaniards made no attempt at retaliation on China. Dutch corsairs afterwards tried to establish themselves in the islands and repeatedly burned and plundered the smaller settlements, but they were driven off finally. Manila grew rapidly, owing to the trade with China and Mexico. The Chinese traders settled there and married native women in large numbers so that in the course of three centuries they have become a large element of the population. The capture of Manila by the English during the last century was the only occasion on which it was attacked by a foreign invader since the time of Li Ma Hung. Three centuries of peace is more than falls to the lot of most lands but practically it has to the Philippines. There is little reason then to look for the existence of a military spirit among the people of the archipelago in consequence, be that an evil or a good.

It has been said that a people is happy that has no history. Politically the Philippines have had almost none. The colony of Legaspi was organized on the model of the American viceroalties of Spain. The Governor-General represented the executive power with little limit on its exercise. The law was that of Spain's colonies made with more or less wisdom by the Home Government and administered by a judiciary independent of the Governor. There was never any large immigration of Europeans. Such Spaniards as came to the islands were either merchants or officials or soldiers in limited numbers. The public works in Manila and other points, such as fortifications, dockyards, arsenals, and cannon foundries, were on a fairly extensive scale, but they were mainly carried out by natives. The whites never formed a fiftieth of the population. It is in the growth of a fairly civilized and Christian population out of a few tribes of savages that the chief interest of the story of the Philippines lies.

The work of converting strange races has generally fallen to the religious orders rather than to the regular parochial clergy of the Catholic Church. It was especially so in the Spanish colonies and more than any in the Philippines. The smallness of the European population made the work of the Church, there, mainly missionary, and as such, from the beginning it was entrusted to a religious order by the special desire of Philip II. When Manila had grown to some importance, a bishopric was established there in 1585 with the ordinary ecclesiastical powers, but the members of the Orders continued to furnish the bulk of the clergy. The zeal of the Spaniards for conversion was remarkable during the Sixteenth Century and long afterwards, and it found an outlet in the number of missionaries furnished by the religious orders. Franciscans, Jesuits, Dominicans, and Recollects came in succession to share in the work commenced by the Augustinians. By a special decree of the Sovereign Pontiff, it was provided that the friars, as the members of these orders are commonly called in Spain, should furnish the parochial clergy to the natives under the jurisdiction of the Bishops. The ordinary parochial clergy served the Europeans and a few of the more settled districts, but the work of converting and civilizing was to continue in the hands of the friars.

The circumstances under which the first Franciscan missionaries came to the islands is a remarkable illustration of the spirit then prevalent. A lay brother, Fray Antonio, in a Franciscan convent in Peru, felt himself called to the conversion of the savages of the islands of the Pacific lately discovered by the Admiral Mendana. Before entering the Order he had been a soldier and a merchant, but had little schooling, and so his duties were ordinary

servants' work in the kitchen and garden of the convent. Still he proposed the project of a mission to those islands to the Guardian of his convent, and asked permission to go to Spain and recruit priests for it there. His application was for some time laughed at, but after three repetitions, the Guardian became impressed and Fray Antonio received the required permission. As the Franciscans lived on alms the expenses of the voyage were literally nothing. He travelled on foot to Panama and got passage to Spain. The vessel was captured by a privateer manned by French Huguenots, who were bitterly hostile to the friars. Fray Antonio was beaten and thrown overboard but he kept afloat for a couple of hours and the sailors relented, and took him aboard at last. It was only, however, to land him half-naked on a remote part of the Spanish coast without any means of identifying himself. The starving exile made his way to a Franciscan convent and with much difficulty got received there as a brother. Some of his fellow passengers finally got to Spain, and relieved him from the suspicion of imposture. He laid his plans before the Franciscan Commissary for the American Missions but was regarded as half crazy. The Commissary sent him to a convent near Madrid where a sister of the Superior of the Franciscans in Spain got interested in his plans. He finally got a favorable hearing from the latter, who gave him permission to go to Rome and lay his project before the General of the Order and the Sovereign Pontiff. Both were struck with the eloquence and mishaps of Fray Antonio, and not only did they approve of the projected mission, but commissioned the lay brother to visit the Spanish convents and obtain as many volunteers for it as possible. He secured seventeen Franciscan priests and brothers for the mission of the South seas but while waiting for a passage to America their destination was changed for the newly settled Manila. The company sailed for Mexico in 1576. Four died on the voyage and another at Vera Cruz. The survivors travelled on foot from Vera Cruz to Mexico, where five other priests joined them. They again walked through the mountains to Acapulco and finally reached Manila in 1577. Fray Antonio was sent back to Europe to collect more missionaries and made the same journey again, reaching Manila for the second time in 1581. Though but an unlettered lay brother Fray Antonio is held by the Franciscan chronicler to be the founder of their Mission in the Philippines. There is no aristocracy among the children of Francis of Assissi except that of self-sacrifice.

The Franciscans were received by their Augustinian predecessors with hospitality and lodged in their convent until one was built for their own abode. The building of the latter was no long task.

It was only a large thatched cabin and the church was little more, but the friars at once set to work. The first care was to prepare a grammar and dictionary of the Tagal language and a catechism of the Christian doctrine in the same. The latter was published in 1581 by Father Juan de Plascencia, and for over a hundred years it continued to serve as the ordinary text-book of instruction. It was then revised to suit the changes in the language itself which were noted carefully by the old missionaries. Father Pedro de Alfaro, the head of the Franciscans, afterwards went to China to examine the chances for further missions. He was some time in Macao, and thence had to sail to Goa to allay the suspicions of the Portuguese authorities who disliked the presence of Spaniards in their settlements. He perished at sea on his return to Manila. Another of the heads of the first Franciscan colony, Father Pedro Bautista, subsequently went to Japan, where he at first was well received but afterwards was executed by order of the Emperor Taicosama in 1598, with twenty-five other missionaries, Franciscans and Jesuits. They are the Japanese martyrs canonized in our own days by the late Pius IX.

The Jesuits had already been established in Japan some years when Manila was founded, but their arrival in the Philippines was in 1581, subsequent to the Augustinians and Franciscans. The Dominicans came six years later and the Recollects in 1606. While the Governors of Manila were building up their city, negotiating with Chinese Viceroy and the Japanese Emperor, and warring with the Sulu pirates, the work of converting the Tagals and Visayas went quietly on among the friars. The task they had undertaken was on the lines already laid down by Las Casas. It included both the conversion and the civilization of the natives. The old Spanish missionaries made no vague professions when they set about the task of bringing men from savage to civilized life. A civilized community, in their eyes, as told by the contemporary records and letters, meant one ruled by law and living according to the rules of Christian morals and faith. It should be free, it should be settled, and it should be instructed in religion and the common ways of civilized life as known in Europe. Schools for the children, and a knowledge of reading and writing for the new Christians, were recognized as matters of the first importance by all the Friars in the Philippines from the first settlement. The right of the natives to their own lands, property and personal freedom, was a cardinal principle with all the religious orders. That the Indians might be admitted to Holy Orders, was one of the points laid down emphatically in the first synod of the Philippines. To facilitate their admission, a University was founded by the third

Archbishop of Manila to which Europeans and natives were equally admitted. The University of San Tomas was on the general plan of similar institutions in Europe. The classical languages and literature, mathematics, history, law, medicine and theology were included in its course and numerous colleges were founded by the Jesuits and Dominicans to prepare the natives for entrance to its classes.

The material civilization of the Indians was not the leading object that led men like Father Urdaneta and Brother Antonio to give up wealth and high command and travel over land and sea. Their conversion, that is to say, to bring them to a knowledge of the true law of human life and the means of securing eternal happiness beyond the grave was the great motive. Civilization, with the Catholic missionaries, was only a means to make a Christian life easier of carrying out. Among civilized men, even, the motives which lead to the Catholic faith are most diversified. Among savages, generally speaking, as with children, a certain amount of mental training is necessary for any real belief. To this work the friars set themselves in the Philippines on definite lines. The native tribes recognized the supremacy of the Spaniards much as the Indians of the plains did that of the United States without much difficulty. The missionaries settled among them, preached to the grown up men and women, and gathered the children into schools. The chiefs continued to direct the public life, but in each settlement a church and school formed a center round which the huts of the natives were got together. Some of the wilder tribes of the interior declined to receive the priests, but they were not molested on that account. In fact the force of a couple of thousand men at the disposal of the Governors was inadequate to such a policy even had it been desired. The Christian settlements were formed without bloodshed and grew by the improved conditions of their inhabitants. The interference of the Spanish officials was very small. A tribute of ten reals for every Indian couple was the chief tax and it was generally paid in rice, cotton or other products at a fixed rate. The police administration was left with the native chiefs, subject, in capital cases, to the laws administered by the Spanish Judges of provinces. The chiefs gathered a force if needed to repel incursions of robbers or the savage tribes, and it was only in case of foreign invasions that the Spanish troops were called on. The Christian population grew in numbers. In the chronicle of the Augustinian Father Medina the number of Christian natives was given at somewhat over two hundred thousand at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century. Father Delgado's history, published in 1750, gave the number then at con-

siderably over a million. The official returns of 1896 report a population of six millions eight hundred thousand exclusive of the savage tribes of Luzon or the Mahometans of Mindanao.

The system adopted by the different Orders, Augustinians, Dominicans, and Franciscans, for the administration of the converted Philippine natives deserves special mention. The islands were formed into a diocese in 1581, a Dominican, Salazar, being the first Bishop. Manila was made an Archbishopric in 1594 with three suffragan sees, one in Cebu for the Visaya Islands, and two in Luzon. Each diocese had the chapter and usual organization of the Church in Spain, but in the greater part of the islands the right of naming priests for the parishes was vested in the Superiors of the different Orders. The Superior of the Augustinians or Dominicans presented to the Bishop a list of three priests in case of vacancy in a parish and the Bishop selected one and gave him the usual faculties for parochial administration. About three-quarters of the parishes were thus served by members of the Orders, the other quarter being supplied by the ordinary secular clergy. The missionaries have always been drawn from Europe and on their arrival in the Philippines receive a special course of one or two years in the native languages. They are then sent as assistants, for a limited time, to older pastors, and afterwards, in the majority of cases, their life is one of solitude in native parishes. The number of priests compared to the Catholic population in the Philippines is less than in almost any Catholic country and most parishes have only one priest. In 1896 there were about thirteen hundred priests of all the Orders, Augustinians, Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits, and besides their colleges and seminaries these furnished parish priests for about five and a half millions of Catholics. The secular clergy numbered about eight hundred and had charge of a million and a quarter of souls.

The missionary work of the Orders settled in the Philippines has not been limited to those islands. From Manila the Franciscans and Dominicans sent out missionaries all through the last three centuries to the countries of Eastern Asia. Annam, Siam, Cambodia, China and Japan have received missionaries from the Philippines. There has been no lack of martyrs in those lands. Within the last sixty years at least three Dominican Bishops have given their lives for the Faith in Tonquin as Fisher and More gave theirs in the days of the English Henry. The Franciscans who furnished Japan with its first martyrs are the beginning of a glorious list of brave believers who sealed their faith with their blood among the Friars of the Philippines.

The spirit which actuates Catholics to give their lives for the

conversion of souls is almost incomprehensible to the non-Catholic mind to-day. Las Casas, in an argument for the rights of the Indians before the Spanish Court, in the middle of the Sixteenth Century, expressed it in terms which may well abash the social reformers of our time. A dear friend and colleague of his own, in former years, had been slain by the Florida Indians while on a mission of charity to them and an eminent Doctor, Sepulveda, used the fact as a justification for war on them and subsequent slavery. "It is a divine and most right law," said the old Bishop, "that some of the servants of the Gospel should die for the Gospel, since by their precious deaths they may help more in conversion than they could by toil here on earth. And so we trust in God that Fray Luis Cancer does help in the conversion of those who slew him. For as they do not know what they do, and as they think are slaying enemies not true servants of God, so God will look on them with eyes of pity for the merits of that most blessed Fray Luis. And this is the true divine way of preaching the Gospel and converting souls."

It was this spirit which inspired the first friars to devote themselves to the conversion of the Philippines.

It may be asked what tangible result has been attained by three centuries of their work, and the answer is the formation of a Christian people from a race of savages. It is a task which has been often spoken of but nowhere else accomplished on such a scale. The passage of a people from barbarian to civilized life is a very slow process in the usual course of history. The Germans of the days of Augustus Caesar, in their present land, if we may trust the accounts of Tacitus, scarcely differed from the original Indians of our own New York. From Hermann to Charlemagne was a long eight centuries of development; from Charlemagne to Barbarossa, five more, yet how much of what many would call the essentials of civilization were lacking to the Germans of the Holy Roman Empire in the Thirteenth Century. National literature was scarcely known. Representative government was in its infancy, the majority of the population never moved from the bounds of its separate provinces, and knew almost nothing of the world beyond. Railroads, the press, foreign products and most of what are now thought the necessities of life were unknown and yet no reasonable man will deny the Germans of the Middle Ages the title of a civilized people. No American would assert that the men of the Revolution were not a civilized people though they knew not railroads or telephones, though modern physical science was unknown to their colleges and English literature practically a blank as far as American writers were concerned. The ideals of civilization for the Spanish missionary priests in the Philippines

were substantially the same as those of Bacon and Raleigh, of the founders of New England and the founders of New York. In the mind of all, a civilized people was one which lived under settled laws by steady labor, which was more or less acquainted with the material progress made amongst the races of Europe, and, as all would say, which was Christian. The Spanish friars undertook the task of giving such a civilization to the Malays of the Philippines and no other body of men of any race or any faith have accomplished what they have done.

A task of somewhat similar kind has been attempted by others in our own day in the name of Christian civilization but not the Catholic Church. Hawaii has been under control of missionaries from New England for seventy-five years more completely than the Philippines were ever under that of the Spanish friars. The native kings adopted the new creed and enforced its adoption on their subjects by vigorous corporal punishments. The missionaries were abundantly supplied with such resources of civilization as money could buy and they have grown wealthy on their mission, but what has been the fate of the natives? They have dwindled in numbers to a fourth of what they were when Messrs. Bingham and Thurston entered their islands, their lands have been taken by strangers, their government overthrown by brute force, and the scanty remnant has dropped the religion imposed on them. In the Philippines in a hundred and forty years a million of Catholic natives has grown seven fold. In Hawaii under missioners of the world's manufacture a hundred and forty thousand of the same race has shrunk to thirty-eight thousand. Have the promises of the Spanish friars or those of the American ministers been the most truthfully kept?

The actual condition of the Catholic population formed by the work of the religious orders should not be judged by the excesses which have marked the present revolution. Many old Christian nations have gone through similar experiences. It would be as unreasonable to judge the Christianity of France by the Reign of Terror as to condemn the Filipino population for the atrocities sanctioned by Aguinaldo. The mass of the country population has taken no part in these deeds of blood which are the work of a small number of political adventurers and aspirants for office by any means. Until lately revolutionary disturbance was unknown in the Philippines. During three centuries there was only one serious Indian rebellion, that of Silan, in the province of Illocos, at the time of the English invasion. The Spanish military force was always too small to hold the islands had there been any real disaffection to the Government. The whole force at Manila in the present war, as given by General Otis, was only fifty-six hun-

dred and about as many more represented the entire Spanish force among a population of seven millions. The disposition of the Catholic Filipinos is essentially law abiding. One of the friars lately driven from the islands by the revolution assured the writer that in Panay, an island with a population of half a million, a murder did not occur more often than once or twice in a year. In our own country last year the proportion was more than fifty times as great. There is no forced labor as in the Dutch Indian colonies to compel the native Philippines to work yet they support themselves in content without any of the famines so common in India under the boasted rule of civilized England. A sure evidence of material prosperity is the growth of the population, and of its religion a fair test is the proportion of Catholic marriages, baptisms and religious interments to the whole number. The proportion of marriages in 1896 to the population among the natives administered by the friars was one to every hundred and twenty, which is higher than England, Germany or any European country. The number of baptisms exceeded the deaths by more than two and a half per cent, a greater proportion than in our own land. Compare this with Hawaii and one feels what a farce is the promise of increased prosperity held out by the American Press as the result of the expulsion of the Spanish friars.

It is not easy to compare accurately the intellectual development of the Catholic Filipinos with American or European standards. The ideals of civilization of the Catholic missionaries were different from those popular with English statesmen and their American admirers. The friars did not believe that the accumulation of wealth was the end of civilization, but the support of a large population in fair comfort. There are no trusts and few millionaires in the islands but their population is six times greater than that of California after fifty years of American Government. The test so often applied of reading and writing among the population finds the Filipinos fairly up to the standard of Europe at least. Of highly educated men the proportion is not so large as in Europe, but it is not inconsiderable, and neither in science nor in literature are the descendants of the Malay pirates unrepresented in their remote islands. The native languages have developed no important literature of their own but they have a fair supply of translations from Spanish works in history, poetry and philosophy. In that they are superior to the Hindoo of British India though spoken by nearly a hundred millions. These are facts that throw a strange light on the real meaning of civilization as planted by the Spanish friars among a barbarian race. Compare them with the fate of the Indian races on our own territory and say what benefit the Filipinos may expect from the advent of "Anglo-Saxon" civilization.

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PEDAGOGICS: THE ETHICAL MOVEMENT IN EDUCATION.

THE central law of nature is the law of equilibrium. It is the law of rest, not only, but of motion, and of repose in motion; it is the indispensable law of progress. It is not merely co-extensive with the law of gravity in the balancing of atoms and in the cycles of the stars. It is as inexorable in the spiritual and moral orders, in the affairs of the human mind and will, in the preservation and advancement of social and civil life. Its violation, if persevered in, always means catastrophe. In human things, where man has the physical power to disregard it, it has always been its own avenger whenever it has been antagonized or set aside or supplanted by arbitrary human provisions. It is not destroyed by being ignored, but with gathered momentum eventually crushes its way through human interference; and then puts equipoise into the ruins, for men to begin again, if they will, as followers and not as founders of nature's laws.

Erroneous theories in philosophical systems and in plans of society and in economics and education, however plausible they may appear as outlines on paper and fortified by the prophecies of enthusiasts and backed by the hopes and support of the anxious and unthinking multitude, when put upon practical trial, must prove themselves unadapted to the end, in the inevitable retribution which follows rash experiment. Great, practical questions which have come up in the histories of peoples have never received a satisfactory solution where they have not been approached in a spirit of submission to nature's central law. Unfortunately, grave, practical questions are not always thus approached, to be determined by the standard of unassailable principle, certified fact and the logical consequences. To-day, the shifting restlessness of opinions that rules in social matters seems to bid defiance to the law. In matters of supreme social import we are constantly meeting with some new error rushing in upon a hundred others half applied; and the catastrophe is delayed. Men pass away and their schemes lose the impetus that is born of personal interest; successors are rarely heirs to great enterprise in carrying out the theories of the deposed or the departed. Yet, a certain following often remains; and so it is that now we have a hundred errors jousting for possession of the field. Superadded to disorder we have internal conflict which gives prom-

ise that the central law is preparing to manifest itself in a destruction which has not had a parallel in the history of civilizations.

But, why do we stand philosophizing thus bodingly before venturing to put our foot upon the threshold? Because we are about to enter, though it be only in thought, the sanctified precincts of a temple, the microcosm, the noblest structure reared by the Creator in this his visible creation, the temple of man, sanctified in his origin, sanctified in his destiny, sanctified in Christ by the elevation of human nature to individual, substantial union with the divine in the personality of the incarnate God.

There are few subjects, outside of those which are handed over to blustering politics and partizan journalism, upon which more is written amongst us to-day than is written upon the subject of education. Where once he had teachers, now we have teachers of teachers. The shelves of the libraries are laden with books, pamphlets, magazines, journals, reviews,—all occupied with the great subject of education. We hear, endlessly, of conferences and conventions and institutes and congresses, called to discuss the ever present question of universal interest, "Views" upon education are always in demand. When "views" upon any subject are in demand, we all know that there are a hundred million orators waiting for their turn to thrill the audience. But when it comes to a matter such as this, to the discussion of methods of teaching and of subjects to be taught, as everybody has either had an education which he considers best or worst according, perhaps, to the standard of the dollars now in his pocket, or else has not had much of an education and so patronizes or despises education according to the measure of mercantile success or failure which has attended him without it, and as, moreover, there are millions who are passing through that narrow acquaintance which comes from a year or two of authority in the school-room, and who are, therefore, "enabled to speak from experience,"—it is natural for us to suppose that those who, in the throng, are most competent to speak will find it hard to get even the recognition which is necessary to a hearing. In upheavals such as that by which we are confronted we usually find some word that seems to reduce and crystallize the matter for discussion. But it is, too often, a crystal with a different face for every looker-on. Here, the word is "pedagogics." Just whisper "pedagogics," and you will evoke the wisdom of the millions, not to listen but to talk.

The name, "pedagogics," is intended to express what we mean by the science—and the art—of education. Originally, the *pedagogue* (*παθγωγός*) was the slave who led the boy to school and home again. By degrees the name was applied to the teacher, in-

structor, trainer of every kind, and so the "leading" acquired a broader meaning. So, pedagogy (*παιδαγωγία*) came gradually to signify the entire system pursued in a boy's education. The name pedagogue with other school-terms was adopted into the Latin—for the Romans went to school to Athens. We find them making a distinction between "*paedagogus*" and their quasi-translation of it, "*educator*." Varro says, "*Educat nutrix, instituit paedagogus*," "the nurse educates, the pedagogue establishes, forms, finishes off." (ap. Non. 5.105.) Seneca tells us: "*Differunt autem paedagogus et praeceptor: nam hujus munus est puerum liberalibus instituere disciplinis; ille proprie custos est vitae et morum*." "Pedagogue and preceptor differ: the office of the latter is to form (institute) the boy in liberal studies; the former is, properly speaking, the guardian of his life and conduct." (2 Ira, 22.) Flavius Vopiscus states that the two offices were sometimes combined: "*Aliquando tamen paedagogus idem est ac praeceptor qui nempe pueros litteras docet*." "Sometimes, however, the office of pedagogue is exercised by the preceptor, that is, by the one who teaches the boy literature." (Vopisc. Bonos. 14.) Although, as we have seen, Varro said, "the nurse educates," we find Quintilian beginning, "If some one were entrusted to me to be educated as an orator," "*Si mihi educandus tradatur orator*." (1 proem.)

So much for the original meaning of words, from which it is clear that "pedagogy, pedagogics" are very well chosen to indicate what ought to belong to both the earlier and to the academic training in general; and can stand with full propriety for what we may mean by the science and the art of education. Unfortunately, the difficulty begins when we go on to consider what is meant by education. For, the word, education, is very widely taken to mean only a part of what it really means. The laws of conduct, the rules for the building and establishment of character are often assigned a minor place, or are treated as a negligible quantity, in the science of pedagogics as it is understood and taught and applied amongst us to-day.

When you speak of rearing, of founding, of establishing, let us say, a temple, you mean that you intend to build a structure that will be harmonious in the strength and proportions of walls and foundations and roof. Our pedagogics, if applied to architecture, would mean all walls, without foundation or roof. It would resemble a science that was occupied with walls and windows and mullions and buttresses, with rich columns and carved capitals and bold frescoes and tessellated floors. It would be a science that provided no foundation to rest the structure on, beyond the sands of a shifting

philosophy of uncertainty where nothing is fixed; and which spread above but a roof of paper that could yield no protection and had no binding force upon the walls. Without the strong foundation, all the walls and buttresses and columns, even were they to stand for a while, could not support the roof that would be needed to give the edifice stability, the roof of character and morality which must be the shield of safety to the human temple divine when the storms of adversity come to try it, when the flood-gates of passion are opened upon it. Even under the withering sun of daily life its scant covering will be seared and warped and seamed, until it is blown away by the lightest breeze or washes away under the softest rain to disfigure that very glory beneath which has been reared upon the quicksand.

What, then, is the matter with our pedagogics, with our systems of teaching? And what should our pedagogics and our teaching be? What do we aim at? Education. The education of what? The education of the man, of the human being. And what is man, the human being? An angel? No. Then, just only an animal? No. *Paulo minus ab angelis*, a little less than the angels. Here let us call attention to a fact that pervades the universe; and which, being thus universal, can be announced as a physical principle or law. We may formulate it in this manner: Whenever there is a substantial union of natures of different orders, such a union, namely, that there results but one individual, separate, complete, and the subject of every affirmation regarding any and all functions of the natures so united, it is universally true that the separate, distinct individuality is supplied by and denominated from that one of the united natures which is of the highest order. The highest nature always dominates and supplies in its higher efficiency for that subsistent individuality which is always found as belonging to the lower nature when it exists apart and independent, but which is lost to the nature of lower order when this is united with a nature of higher order to the formation of an individual which is to be in its totality the subject of all affirmation and denial. In man, we find the animal nature and the free, intelligent, spiritual nature. In man, therefore, the subsistence, the independent individuality is supplied for the unit of being by the free, intelligent soul. In man, we dignify this separate, independent, individual subsistence by the special name of personality. Man is a person. This prerogative of the highest nature in a substantial union we find all along the scale of being. Take the animal, that is, a being in which the highest nature is of the purely animal order. The animal, besides its special life of sensation, of sense-perception and locomotion, by which it is char-

acterized, does, nevertheless, exercise as its own certain activities which, if found apart, would belong to a being of a lower order. It exercises the functions or activities of assimilation, nutrition, growth, reproduction; and these, apart and not belonging to a being capable of sense activity are distinctive of plant life and indicate the individual, independent vegetative being. Yet, in the substantial union, this independence disappears, and the plant activity is predicated of the unit which is an animal. And so, again, does the plant take up and control to its own purposes and as a part of its own individuality, the inorganic elements; and it does this in such a way as to set at naught all laboratory chemistry of these elements as they are found in their independent individuality outside of the living organism. And so all these natures of lower order, animal, plant, mineral, as found in man, lose their independent individuality which is supplied for by the autonomous personality which belongs distinctively to a higher nature in man, namely, the spiritual, free, intelligent nature, the spiritual soul.

Now, what do we want to do? We want to educate the man. How is this to be done? Shall we turn our attention solely to the animal nature, to what is called physical development? Shall our chief aim be to make the man as strong as an ox? Shall we devote our best efforts to the training up of a race of lifters and runners and punchers? The man is a unit; and in his unity he is subject to the law of equilibrium. The rule, therefore, should be, so much bodily strength as is requisite to the best development in other lines as demanded by the harmonious development of the whole. To be brief upon this point we may lay down the recognized truth, that there is a due physical development which we can have without devoting our lives to mere physical culture, a development which with moral and mental culture really fits the body to resist disease better than it can be so fitted by turning it into knots of muscle. What is, however, being done to-day in this regard, is well expressed by a writer in *The Tablet* (Baltimore, Jan., 1894). Amongst other things the writer says: "A dozen years ago a valedictorian could not walk across the campus of any one of the larger colleges without attracting attention. . . . In those days, too, before the deification of muscle, references to 'honor' men were received with applause at college gatherings, and the elevation, boy fashion, of the first scholar of the class was enthusiastically demanded. All this has largely passed away. Graduate gatherings almost exclusively discuss the last foot-ball match or the coming boat race. It is the Hercules on whom attention is riveted. His movements and opinions are followed with eagerness. He is cheered and admired

wherever he goes. Where he flourishes new 'students' hasten to enroll themselves. Brain has yielded to brawn.

"This dethroning of the old ideals is unfortunate and serious. . . . The most significant and the saddest feature of the modern athletic craze is the inspiration given boys and young men to look upon the physical giant as representative of the best manhood, irrespective of mental quality; and an unconscious disregard in youth of those of their fellows whose trained minds and force of character are most in demand in the world outside."

I do not believe that, previous to the month of March, 1897, we shall find it stated in the history of education that the banner of a great university was considered by the students a fit thing to plant beside the arena of a pugilistic prize-fight. And the late fact is all the more intensely suggestive in that the banner was sent three thousand miles across a continent, from a locality which we are so often warned to speak of as the home of enlightened culture and the new haven of classic lore, to the far-off "west," and even to those confines where that "west" is believed by the scholars of the Orient to be "wildest" and most "woolly." Full certain it was to all, from the beginning, that the letter of good wishes and the university standard—as the gage of patriotic partizanship for the Californian against the ambitious Australian, who won, nevertheless, without the inspiration of an academic flag—were not ordered to be sent by the Board of Regents. And, in fact, a few days after the transmission of the ribbons and the billet-doux had been published, so great was the storm of criticism from the daily press, that the students were called upon by the Regents to exonerate the administration from any responsibility in the disgraceful affair; and, forthwith, in the students' Journal there appeared a card to the effect that the students, some students, were sole authors and abettors in the enterprise. But, lo! the year was not passed away, when the world was startled and dismayed by the recital of an orgie which has not, to my knowledge, been paralleled in the history of any university, and which took place through the night following the victory of the "foot-ball team" accredited to the same now twice centenarian institute of learning. The affair is recent and well known; and is too painful to be dwelt upon. But I can imagine the spirits of the ten clergymen, the original trustees, who gave their own libraries to the founding of the school, I can see them hovering through that night over that theatre of debauchery, shedding the tears of the righteous, and whispering to one another that it might have been better for them to have burned their books and to have left their children and their grandchildren's grandchildren to read but Bibles

at the rustic fireside, rather than that, even at the end of two centuries, the name of their infant school should be used as the pretext for the desecration of the humanity which they had proposed to elevate.

Men whose lives are given seriously and intelligently to the work of education, and who apply themselves conscientiously to study the influences which have wrought upon it in time, and the consequent results, very naturally take an interest, a sad interest, upon beholding the marks of decay upon any time-honored institute of learning. I do not speak of material decay, of crumbling walls and dismantled spires, of moss upon once worn walks and of spiders tapestrying deserted corridors. The view of all this might still, indeed, be linked with none but hallowed memories of a career that was noble to the end. But I mean the decay that may be going on at the heart and centre of a university's life, though well kept groves and shaven lawns and polished windows and marble halls may bribe the eye by visions of splendor to distract the judgment from passing sentence on the things that are not made with the trowel, the chisel and the saw.

But let us pass on to higher things. Man is not all body. He is especially soul, spiritual soul. And this soul is endowed with intelligence and memory. Man has the power of both receiving and retaining truth: he can acquire knowledge. But what should he learn and how should he learn and how much should he learn? These are the questions which tax the ingenuity of those amongst us who profess to be given to pedagogy or the science of education. One may labor so hard at learning, at the effort to know and to store the memory with knowledge, as to go against the ancient precept of the *mens sana in corpore sano*, that is, of keeping a sound body as the habitat for a sound mind. As it would appear, however, our education is not exposing the body directly to many disadvantageous risks. But again, this process of mere receptivity and retention may be pushed so far, and so much stress may be laid upon it at a certain stage in the human training where another phase of culture is imperatively demanded for the formation of the true man, that the result may be very much of a monstrosity when compared with the harmonious standard of the human ideal. We may spend our lives learning even more and more, learning lists of kings and dates and battles, lists of birds and reptiles and animals and fishes, lists of rocks and strata and minerals and plants, lists of stars and rivers and mountains, lists of algebraical formulae and of philosophical theories, lists of writers, especially of novelists, and lists of their books and of their fictitious characters. We may make of ourselves living dictionaries and encyclopedias. You might do the

same with the phonograph, which would, indeed, be more exact in reproducing what it had received. But with all this, the development may not be a harmonious development of the whole man. The chief part, the entire moral side of human nature may be overlooked. The truly essential office in education, the office of instruction and of drilling in the moral virtues may be neglected or even ignored.

There are two kinds of virtues; that is, we can distinguish two classes of virtues according to the manner in which one may become possessed of the virtue. When we say that a person possesses a given virtue, we do not mean that he has performed an act of that virtue, but that he possesses the power of *readily* performing the act. An individual act is not the virtue. Ten thousand acts are not the virtue, though they may indicate the presence of that ease and readiness which constitute the virtue. The virtue is not merely the radical power by which one is physically capable of performing the act. If the virtue were the mere physical, untrained power, then, because we all are physically capable of performing an act of patience we should all be said to possess the virtue of patience; or, to take the case of vice, because we are all physically able to steal we should consequently be born a race of thieves. A virtue is neither the act, nor the mere physical power to do the act. The virtue is, to use the strict terminology, the *expedited* power. It is the *habit* of the act, possessed to the degree that, when the occasion calls for an act of the virtue in question, such act can be readily and easily elicited. A virtue, then, is simply the habit. There are two ways in which one may become possessed of the habit. The habit may be infused or it may be acquired, and we have, accordingly, two classes, the infused and the acquired virtues. There are some virtues that cannot be acquired, that have to be infused. These are the supernatural virtues, the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. We do not possess the radical power to elicit one act of these virtues. But for all the other virtues—styled moral virtues—we do possess the radical power, and this, too, speaking in the purely natural sense. We do not, indeed possess the readiness and ease, the *expedited* power, the habit, the virtue: this has to be acquired. I do not say that the Founder of human nature cannot, if He so pleases, bestow the ready habit of a moral virtue, or that He does not here and there bestow it for his own special designs. But all this is outside of our question, and it is something which we are not authorized to reckon upon for ourselves or for anyone else. The regular, natural order, as we know it, for these natural virtues is, that the radical power can be brought by training, only, to the condition of readiness and responsive alacrity which constitutes the habit. The virtue, the ease and readiness of habit, must be the

result of exercise. A virtue being a habit, is to be acquired in the way in which other habits are acquired, namely, by a repetition of acts. It is by repetition of acts that we acquire ease and readiness in memorizing, in speaking a new language, in adding numbers, in swimming, in skating, in catching a ball, in singing, in writing with a pen, etc. And so effective is the repetition of act in the formation of habit, that we can form even a strong inclination to something to which we may have felt a great repugnance, thus establishing what we call a "second nature" which prompts us to do unconsciously that which cost us quite a struggle when we first attempted it. Now, the difference between a virtue and a vice is this: a virtue is the habit of some good, whilst a vice is the habit of some evil. These virtues are called moral virtues because they regard the morality (*mores*) which man is bound to aim at for the perfecting of his being.

It is by the exercise of the habits of the moral virtues that man's great work in life is to be done. And it is a far harder task to form a single moral virtue than to become a philosopher, a puncher or a mathematical phenomenon. There is no natural way of acquiring the virtue but by instruction, study, discipline and exercise. One may learn practically the rules for government in the syntax of a foreign language in less time than it will take him to become proficient in the government of his temper. Strangely enough, we find many a student applying himself a thousand times more assiduously to the mastery of the unruly syntax than to the mastery of his unruly temper. Yet the control of his temper is vastly more important to him than the habit of the foreign syntax, not only in his separate individual existence, but in his domestic life, in his social life, in his commercial and professional pursuits, and in his civil life. It is, indeed, the control and judicious exercise of the emotions, it is the possession and practice of the moral virtues, that prove the man to be a man, first in his unseen life and then in his dealings with his family, with his friends, with the commonwealth. The exercise of the hidden virtues, of the domestic and social virtues, is a thing that enters into the daily life of every man. The astronomy and chemistry and algebra and smattering of languages, that absorb the time and energies of the period of formation, are things that enter into the after-life of very few. We say a man is a *man*, when we see him exercising an act of forgiveness, of alms-giving, of sympathy, of humility, of justice, of self-sacrifice, and so on. But we never say a man is a *man*, for the reason that he has spent so many years at school and college, stuffing his head with physiology and botany and French and mineralogy and with all the ologies on the list. Hence, the better education is, necessarily, the one that forms to the civil, social and domestic virtues which make the *man*,—the man that is

needed in the family, in society, in the state, in every civic role, whether as a public servant holding the trust of the people or as an unnoticed individual lending the unit of his righteousness to the momentum which must carry forward as a mass the aggregate of the civilized community. It is these virtues, and these alone, that can harmonize the inequalities between the powerful and the weak, between the rich and the poor, between the lettered and the unlettered, between the employer and the employed. It is these virtues, and these alone, that can bring out and emphasize the dignity of humanity on all sides, and obviate that calamity which observant students tell us is impending over the world, namely, the formation of two classes with opposing motive forces: tyrants on the one hand and serfs on the other; drivers on the one hand and beasts of burden on the other; the proud, the haughty, the selfish, the scornful on the one hand,—the irritated, the revengeful, the desperate on the other; two aggregates with opposing momenta that will not be equilibrated until they collide and reduce one another to powder.

Now, it has so happened, that very widely, for a time, amongst us, this higher, this highest education, this moral education, this training in the moral virtues has been swept away from the curriculum: so that the knowledge of it has not entered, at all, into the programme which the teacher must follow in order to qualify, or into the discipline and examinations which the student must go through in order to graduate. The consequence is that, education having run its course for a generation or two with the most important factor, the indispensable factor, excluded from the formula for the problem of human life, wise men are at length awakening, startled by the awful logic of results. And so it is that we have, now, what I have chosen to call "the ethical movement in education."

Now, first of all, we know that it is easy to see a mote that is in our neighbor's eye, and to be at the same time utterly unconscious of the beam that is in our own. As citizens of the Republic of the United States of America, this wonderful foundation of Providence in the new world, we very naturally take an exceptional interest in those who have been our imitators in the old world. We take a special interest in the fortunes of the Republic of France. Over there, between 1876 and 1880, there was inaugurated a great crusade to establish schools without the only effective basis for practical morality. Being a people naturally endowed with the gift of recognizing the short way to conclusions, our imitators have, as a matter of course, outstripped us in the race to results. Fifteen years after the beginning of their experiment, they compiled their statistics. The Paris correspondent of the *Germania*, writing in August, 1891, says of these schools that "their corruption has to be acknowledged

even by infidels and is irrefragably proved by the official returns of the French tribunals and the proceedings of the Chambers. Of course, in France, as in other countries, there are always crimes and suicides. But during the last few years these have increased to a terrible extent among the young people." He cites the report of the Administration of Criminal Justice to show that the number of children and minors proceeded against increased by five thousand in a single year (23,000 in 1886 and 28,000 in 1887). Comparing the suicides of minors in 1875-76-77 with those of 1885-86-87, he says: "Whilst the general total of suicides in France increased between the two periods by 41.24 per centum, that of suicides under the age of twenty-one increased by 72.27 per centum." To give the exact figures, the suicides of minors were in the three years 1875-76-77, 142, 196, 227. In the years 1885-86-87 they were 319, 324, 375. The amount of money already spent in establishing these schools of the new morality is, we are told, 689,496,000 francs.

The people, over there, are growing frightened. The schools that have held to the old morality had in 1876, 440,000 children. At the time of which we are speaking, 1891, they had 800,000. And you must remember that there has been no increase in the population of France. As for the relative cost of the two educations, take, for instance, the large city of Lyons, where the children were divided about equally between the two kinds of schools: the schools of the new morality cost, in 1890, 2,401,032 francs, whilst the schools of the old morality cost 150,000 francs, or less than one-sixteenth. And this, moreover, whilst in the schools of the old morality the education was just as good as the other and, indeed, far better, because it was given by teachers who made a profession of teaching, who had been teaching for years, and who had been trained for the purpose.

The Methodist *Christian Advocate*, commenting on these facts, in February, 1891, under the heading "A suggestive fact from France," says: "Fifteen years ago, youthful criminals who could read were sixty-eight per cent: at present the percentage has arisen to seventy-eight per cent." The *Advocate* continues: "Our Protestant authority for this says that 'the evident failure in a moral point of view, of education without religion is throwing weight into the Roman Catholic scale. Children are crowding their private schools. Schools without religion in a country where homes are without God can but raise up a godless generation.'"

Professor Fouillère, writing in the *Revue des deux Mondes* (May, 1897), about the actual condition of things, gives some facts and makes some reflections which ought to provoke us to very serious thought. He says: "In France, the increase of criminal cases over

1881 has been 30,000, though there has been practically no increase in the population. There has been especially an increase in the number of homicides and murders. . . . The saddest feature about this increase is that it has been proportionately greatest among the youth of the country. The actual fact is that the number of criminals who are yet children or youths is twice as large as the number of adult criminals; although France has only about seven million children and youths against twenty million adults. . . . On all sides the warmest friends of education in France are entirely discouraged. . . . Our present system of education dissipates instead of concentrating. . . It does not supply the children with the principles that strengthen them against temptation. . . . ”

Professor Harry Thurston Peck, editor of *The Bookman* and Professor of the Latin language in Columbia College, New York, speaking of France, says: “Its (the Church’s) conservative influence has been estranged, and its teachings, which are those that make for national security, have been blotted out of the education of modern France. The result is seen each year with more and more distinctness, and is a shocking example of what a purely secular training for the young can lead to.” (*Bookman*, Dec., 1897.)

Facing this testimony concerning the results of our own experiment as it has been applied abroad we are forced to ask,—how do we fare, ourselves? For an answer, take your daily papers of one year: add on your own observation of what did not get into the papers; add on what you may fairly conjecture has been the observation of a great population from sea to sea; sum up, for an illustration, the public crime, the hidden crime and the tolerated iniquity of a large city in the course of a year; consider the standard of honor avowed in the means adopted to secure the votes of the sovereign people; consider the value in dollars which it is calculated a sovereign people may be expected to put upon its voice in deciding the destiny of the commonwealth; consider the price laid down for the passage of a law which should be passed or rejected in justice on its own merits. I have no intention of going into details or of piling up statistics. I leave the matter to your own individual judgment, to define what you know to be very widely the standard of virtue in private life, in domestic life, in public life. It is just precisely what you know that has, as I said a while ago, startled some wise men from the dream in which they were planning easily—as we do in a dream—planning our future ideal section of the human family, brought up solely on the physico-intellectual programme, from the scissors and dumb-bells of the kindergarten to the wild athletics and intangible philosophy of the university,—but planning, all the while, with a negative indifference to, when not with a posi-

tive elimination of that most essential moral element in education, without which we cannot get the man that is needed in society. They have been startled, I said, by the stern logic of results; and a movement is on foot for a general renovation. This awakening to a present need, this restless anxiety for the future, this new partial willingness to listen, the attempt that is actually being made to put some kind of a proposed remedy on trial, this is what I have called the Ethical Movement in Education. And here I may as well lay down, at once, my pedagogical thesis, which is that this ethical movement in education has been planned along paths by following which it is doomed inevitably to be a practical failure.

The line of argument by which this thesis is established is precisely analogous to that which we pursued when speaking of the general subject of pedagogics, and where we saw that physical and intellectual culture would not make the man, if the moral element was excluded. So, also, no ethical or moral culture will produce practical morality in life, the things we are looking for, if that ethical or moral culture excludes the one, sole, indispensable basis upon which the practical moral life can be built. And this one, sole, indispensable basis does not enter into the principles of the ethical movement.

In the July of 1897, the National Educational Association met in the city of Milwaukee. The call for the meeting resulted in one of the most largely attended educational conventions ever held in this country. It brought together an imposing array of delegates from the aristocracy of mind. The most forcible discussions of the Convention were those which elicited the recognition of a need for moral culture in education. In connection with the general assembly the National Herbart Society held its sessions, at which were read papers by distinguished educators of national fame. These papers were exclusively on the subject of moral training and ethics in education. What was particularly noticeable, however, in the scheme of papers to be presented and discussed was this, that the ultimate motive upon which alone practical morality can be effectively secured, was left out. This sole ultimate effective motive is religion, the recognition of a Supreme Lawgiver, whose will alone can give to every just law its binding force upon the hidden conscience. The one reason alleged for refusing to the one effective moral motive due acknowledgment of its value in a general scheme of education, including moral education, was clearly enunciated by a distinguished Member, in the progress of the warmest discussion that took place during the session of the Assembly. This is the sentence containing the alleged reason: "I believe with him (the last speaker), that morality can be taught without religion."

Here, then, we may be permitted to draw the line between certain points of agreement and the point of disagreement. Those who have considered the matter seriously upon its practical side, affirm generally as being beyond dispute:

1. That practical morality in the various phases of the citizen's life, looked at in the broad aggregate of a population of seventy-five millions, has suffered a decline;

2. That the influences at work are not sufficient to stop the decline and prevent it from going on to one or another of the crises or calamities which form the dismal landmarks on the field of human history;

3. That this decline can be stopped only by providing some safeguard for the young whilst character is in the process of formation;

4. That this safeguard can be provided only by inculcating upon the young those principles which ought to govern the conduct of man in all the phases of his life, private, domestic, social and civil;

5. That these principles are the principles of morality.

This is the agreement. The difference lies between an opinion, on the one hand, and on the other hand, a positive affirmation backed by facts and unanswerable argument. The opinion is, that morality can be taught without religion. The positive affirmation is, that morality, a practical morality which is to be anything more than an ineffective, mental fiction, cannot be taught without religion. The whole point at issue lies right here; and the question demands a settlement upon the basis of fact and argument, and not upon the shifting uncertainties of mere opinion. The theoretical fiction of a morality without religion is lacking in what is essential to any kind of theory, that is, the hope, at least, of the possibility of its application to the matter under consideration. Eliminate religion as a factor in morality, and, first of all, you cannot formulate a complete code of morality; and, secondly, the diminished code which you may be able to formulate will have no more of motive in it to make a man observe it, than the mere objective knowledge of geography can have to make him travel around the world. It will have even less. There may be something in the travel to entice him. He may travel because he likes it. But with the purely objective moral code, the probabilities and the facts are a thousand against one that, when the occasion calls for the application of the code to his practical life, he will not like it. However, the projectors of a morality without religion do not propose the fickleness of liking as their motive. The motive which they propose as enforcing morality without the factor of religion is the fitness or suitableness of the separate propositions of their moral scheme to the ideal humanity. Now, is there perceptible such fitness of the moral act

to the ideal humanity? Undoubtedly, there is. We ourselves lay the greatest stress upon that fitness, and we make the objective truth of that fitness *not the motive* but the *foundation for the real motive* which is to be found precisely and only in the religious element which the others have discarded as unnecessary. But the sole perception of the objective truth of the fitness of an individual moral proposition, as isolated from the religious motive for action, is in no wise of itself adapted to induce the concrete man to keep his life in order. Of course, if man were absolutely devoid of all passions and emotions, if he were rid of his body and free from every influence except the influence of the objective fitness perceived, if he were receptively nothing more than an intellectual mirror reflecting the objective truth, then we might perhaps begin to discuss the question. But that is not the kind of man we have under consideration; nor do we know of any one about us to whom the conditions would be applicable.

You can, it is true, *announce verbally* certain proximate moral truths without making *explicit* mention of religion. You can announce to the boys and girls that they ought to obey their parents and teachers, that they ought not to quarrel or lie or steal or murder, etc. But herein your "ought," if it be a real "ought," *implies* religion. However, you must make explicit mention of a motive. But if all mention of the one efficient motive is outlawed, what are you going to do? You may hold up to them the beauty of domestic peace and civil order. But the proposing of this objective beauty of the thing is not going to secure the result desired. If you leave out the prime motive you cannot secure motion. You may teach a boy book-keeping, and tell him how becoming it will be for him to keep his father's books. He may answer you that your fitness is very lovely in the abstract, but that he finds it less jarring upon the conditions of his concrete humanity to go to the races and to live on his father's income. You may teach the boy music, and put before him the beautiful picture of the young man who stays at home of nights and plays the piano for company. But if he tells you that he admires your ideal and envies you your imagination, but that he feels his complex personality actually better fitted to play cards and to drink at the club, what will you say? You cannot reply.

So the mere objective knowledge of the fitness of some formulae of morality will not induce a man to arrange his life accordingly. It is not enough for you to tell a man that this is becoming and that that is becoming. He needs to know that the application of the formula of ideal fitness to his concrete existence is a duty imposed by law upon his free will by an authority that has a right to bind his

free will, and that has also the power to vindicate that right. He needs to know that there is a binding force outside of and over and above the fitness. How many there are, especially in the beginning and without experience, who cannot reason philosophically to the importance of a moral deed, and yet who can sufficiently grasp that it is a duty imposed by a lawful authority. They accept the fitness as implied in the obligation. If we descend from the higher law to the civil law, we shall find that this is precisely the principle upon which the civil law proceeds, and that it could not proceed otherwise. For the securing of public order and security and the common advantages of society, the civil authority does not wait until each and every citizen has considered and understood the general fitness of certain propositions, their economic and social advantage, importance, necessity. It does not even offer propositions and then wait until they are recognized as fit, looking for men to carry them out from the mere abstract knowledge of their fitness. How many would understand the philosophical fitness? When would it ever be possible to carry out any general design for the welfare of the social body? And even if a man did come to understand that a certain proposition was in harmony with the abstract ideal of human society, he would still be in need of a motive to apply the proposition to his own personal conduct. Moreover, the same man's ideal society may be a very variable one. It can easily be one thing when his coffers are full; and another, when his purse is empty. Hence, the civil authority knowing that there is something which the citizen does understand, namely, the duty of obedience to a real authority which possesses the power of a sanction for the keeper and the violator of its commands,—the civil authority, knowing this, simply *enacts laws*. Now, to come back to the natural law, to the natural code of morality, you may pick out individual points and explain their beauty and fitness and order as much as you please, but in the manifestation of all this objective fitness and beauty, religion aside, you can never proclaim a law. The objective beauty of a deed as perceived does not constitute law to the will that is physically free to do the contrary. Law is the ordination of a superior. But the objective beauty and harmony of a deed are neither an ordination nor a superior. The mere objective deed as known has no authority over me, the physically free conscious ego. So that, if you wish to have a real motive for the observance of the moral order, you must have the seal of a superior, of the Supreme Law-giver, put upon that order. Until you have that seal of command put upon the objective morality, you cannot call this morality law: and where there is no law, there is no obligation. More than this. Unless you recognize in the authority that commands, the power of a just re-

tribution that will be visited upon the subject who presumes freely to violate the law, that law will not have its effective binding force. A man may check himself in one vice through the motive of another. He may even play two vices, one against the other. He may, for instance, refrain from stealing a dollar, to-day, through the motive of purely human shame, dread of the judgment of his friends. To-morrow he may be able to lay his hands upon a hundred thousand dollars. He sees that he can make a theft so smooth that he will be able to slide it through the technicalities of the courts and so escape the penitentiary. But, the shame! Well, this time, shame may be in the light pan of the balance.

Man, therefore, needs—society, as society, needs and must recognize—a comprehensive motive which can serve universally to all men for the complete code of morality. Leave out religion, and you cannot have that motive. Beauty, fitness, order cannot put on the character of law to be perceived by man as binding upon his will unless he recognizes his absolute dependence upon and his duty of reverence and obedience to a Supreme Lawgiver who wills the observance of the order that is due in the universe which He has created. And still further, if we wish to have an effective law, a law with a complete and sufficient sanction, we must recognize that our present conscious self is to live on hereafter and will be, even in its immortality, responsible to the Supreme Lawgiver for every broken law.

We are not contending, here, for a mere theory which we wish to have put on trial, to be accorded the privilege of an experiment as a change from some other theory which has proved itself unequal to the solution. We are contending for what we know to be the only basis for the practical moral life. We are contending for social order, for law with an incontrovertible and competent source, and with an effective sanction. We are contending for what we know to be the only means of securing order by the recognition of a truly binding force in law. And we know that if our position were calmly and seriously studied, there are millions, to-day most antagonistic to it, who would soon become its firmest adherents, and who would be anxious to enroll themselves amongst the most zealous and self-sacrificing workers in promoting the sole saving help that can tide us over a crisis that has already begun. It may be said that the people do not see the crisis. The people never see the crisis. But the handwriting is on the wall: and there are a hundred thousand Daniels who have come forward to translate it into identical words. People are eating and drinking and making merry. So it was when the waters came and covered the earth; so it was that very night when the Assyrian came down on Babylon; so it was when Goth

and Vandal swept over what was once the peaceful empire of Augustus; so it was when the guillotine sprang up like a mushroom in the night, right in the heart of the world's fashion and licence; so comes the earthquake, the cyclone, the flood; so comes every disaster that befalls men and families and states.

Professor E. R. Morrison of San Bernardino, California, writing in the *Educational Review* (November, 1897), said: "That some change in the educational system of the country is imperatively required seems to be generally admitted."

"It is no educational system which fails to educate."

"If our schools are doing their work efficiently, how comes it that our criminal statistics are the most terrible which the world has to show?"

At the National Prison Congress, opened on December 2d, 1897, at Austin, Texas, the President, General Roeliff Brinkerhoff, said in his address: "First and foremost what is essential is to revolutionize our educational system from top to bottom, so that good morals, good citizenship, and ability to earn an honest living shall be its primary purposes, instead of intellectual culture as heretofore."

President Eliot of Harvard, writes as follows in the *Outlook* (January, 1898): "No educational system can be successfully carried on without education in morals, and no education in morals is possible without a religious life."

Dr. Strong, Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, writing in the *North American Review* (September, 1897), on "The Problem of the Twentieth Century City," says: "The problem of the twentieth century city, therefore, demands for its solution a higher type of citizenship, for which we must look chiefly to those who direct the education of the young."

Mr. Amasa Thornton, commenting upon the article of Dr. Strong, in the issue of the same Review for January, 1898, speaks thus: "On every side is heard the statement that there must be a reorganization of society. Ten years ago the man who made that statement was considered an enemy to the public peace. To-day the statement is listened to by the people with respect, and accepted by many. . . .

"The questions we have to solve then are these: How can the present decline in religious teaching and influence be checked; and how can such teaching and influence be increased to such a point as will preserve the great cities of the next century from depravity, degradation, and destruction?

"If the adults of the present age are not as religious as the needs of the hour and of the future require, will the children receive the proper religious training if they receive none except in the home

circle? The average parent does not have the time, nor has he the inclination.

"The Catholic Church has insisted that it is its duty to educate the children of parents of the Catholic faith in such a way as to fix religious truths in the youthful mind and although a Protestant of the firmest kind, I believe the time has come to recognize this fact, and for us all to lay aside religious prejudices and patriotically meet this question."

The words of Mr. Frederick Harrison may not be out of place here. This is what he writes in the *Forum* of December, 1891: "If there be such things as morality and religion, and if anything can be said or done by way of inculcating them, or applying them to life, then education cannot be severed from morality and religion, and all education must be inspired by religion as well as morality.

. I do not understand what systematic morality can mean if it have no religious direction at all. . . Morality apart from religion is a rattling of dry bones."

In the Methodist *Christian Advocate* (Sep. 16, 1897), there was an article on our subject bearing special reference to a circular which a contributor to the journal had sent out to about four hundred persons, ministers, professors, lawyers, editors. The purpose of the circular was to obtain independent answers to a number of serious questions. The writer stated that, in most cases, he knew nothing of the religious preferences of those to whom he had sent the request. He received about two hundred and fifty replies. It will be of service to us here to read the first six questions and the answers which he appends as gathered from the replies.

1. Is religious instruction necessary to a properly developed character?

YES.

2. If so, are the American youth receiving such education?

NO.

3. Is the Church (including the Sunday-school) accomplishing it?

NO.

4. Is the home accomplishing it?

NO.

5. Or are these two agencies combined (or any other agency) accomplishing it?

NO.

6. Is religious education necessary to good citizenship?

YES.

In the *Educational Review* (Feb., 1898), Dr. Levi Seeley of the State Normal School, Trenton, N. J., writing upon "Religious Instruction in American Schools," states that he had sent out the

circular of which he wrote in the *Advocate*. In the *Educational Review* he gives a detailed account of the replies received, and makes his commentary. Dr. Seeley says: "The more educators come to recognize that there is a philosophy of education, the more profoundly convinced are they that there is something radically lacking in the American school system." He remarks that "Young people are deplorably irreverent and careless concerning the deeper things of life, to say nothing of the graver and more criminal tendencies. The dense ignorance of sacred history and the teachings of the Bible is simply appalling." In the course of his article Dr. Seeley makes a computation which he bases upon the Sunday-school reports and the educational reports for the year 1896. Summing up, he says: "We shall have then about 9,500,000 children from five to eighteen years of age in the Sunday-school, or a little less than fifty per cent. of all the children of our country. The meaning of these figures is simply overwhelming. More than one-half of the children of this land now receive practically no religious instruction. For but few parents who fail to send their children to Sunday-school are careful about the religious training in the home. Even this feature does not show all of the truth. It seems to admit that the fifty per cent. who attend Sunday-school are receiving proper religious instruction; but every one knows that this cannot be granted."

It is very necessary that we should beware, at the critical juncture which all acknowledge we have now reached, that the discussion do not take on the form of a dispute between men, that is to say, of war between living, individual emotions, passions and prejudices. Individuals aside, we have to do what I said, in the beginning, is absolutely necessary for the serious treatment of any question. We must deal with the question upon its merits, we must apply ourselves to study over again and to promote the free activity of those eternal principles which alone can re-establish and preserve the equilibrium of the individual life and of human society.

I know that there are estimable, thinking men who, from time to time, in their writings and their speech give utterance to principles which, if logically built upon in practical life, are subversive of all virtue and order. We find these men in their own practical lives to be much better than their principles. The principles are errors of speculation, whilst their lives are still guided under habit by a light that was kindled long ago in the very education they are speculatively contending against, an education which formed them to be the men they practically are because it laid so much stress upon the culture of the higher life. Still their own better lives do not hinder their speculative theories from being a menace and a danger, be-

cause these theories are taken up by personal admirers who do not think for themselves, and are used as general guides or maxims to mould the plastic mind of youth and to fix the character and conduct that are eventually reached by following the compass of the thought. And the consequence is, that erroneous speculative principles become to the community at large precisely that menace which the original propounders of the principles had it in their minds to avert.

Let us here instance the one sided application of a single principle which is so persistently announced, namely, that "ignorance is the mother of vice." As an abstract principle it is captivating, because it seems so brief, so clear, so comprehensive. It seems to crystallize into a single axiom the entire method of morality. Eliminate ignorance and you have the virtuous child. Eliminate still more, and you have the virtuous father and mother, the virtuous family. With only virtuous families you will have none other than virtuous communities and municipalities. With virtuous municipalities thus made up of virtuous individuals, you have a nation of people without a vice. So teach, teach, teach anything right and left, have a great supply of branches and books and teachers, and you put humanity on the high road to sanctity. Now, the fact is, that the principle, "ignorance is the mother of vice," without the proper modifications, distinctions and explanations, is false. As it has been very widely accepted, understood and applied, it is dangerous. In the fruit of its acceptance and application it is deplorable.

Without discrimination between knowledge and knowledge, between ignorance and ignorance, otherwise willing workers are accepting the principle as a contain-all. It is so comforting to have found an axiom that will rid one of the labor of thinking, and then to dispense algebra and poetry and color-boxes and object lessons on the passing clouds; and still more comforting to be able to congratulate oneself upon the way home with having fulfilled all the requirements of an apostle of morality and good citizenship. And do we not all know without a doubt that handwriting without the other thing in the heart is the accomplishment of the forger; and that arithmetic without the other thing in the heart is the reliance of the defaulter? And do we not know most unfortunately, that, under the plea of dispelling ignorance, there are being introduced into the curriculum for young children subjects which are not bringing about the physical well-being intended, whilst they are creating the moral disease which has gone before the downfall of every great civilization in the history of man? It is a very false principle to work upon, the principle that ignorance is the mother of vice. Go into

the homes of the poor, where father and mother and children are laboring for daily bread, where there is little arithmetic and less grammar, and no art or philosophy at all but the art of living according to the philosophy of conscience, and you will find illustrations of industry, sobriety, obedience to law, respect for parents, charity, tenderness, forgiveness, forbearance, kindness in judgment, modesty and unsullied purity, aureolas of virtue that are going to shame delegates from the four hundreds of four hundred Sodoms and Gomorrhas when Gabriel blows the horn. Will any one tell me that our ancestors, the barbarians, who broke up the license of the old Roman Empire were not on the whole better living men than those cultured imperialists of Italy and Greece and Africa and Asia Minor?—yea, even though they did not know how to make hexameter verses, though they had no rose water in the instruments of their toilets, and had not learned the hygienic value of a marble bath.

We have, therefore, made a strange experiment upon the individual human nature; and, through it, upon the domestic, social and civil life of a people. It is an experiment which was never tried before by any people, but which has always been declared a peril by the wisest men of all nations in all the ages past. We have naturally, been anxious about the outcome of our experiment as imitated in France, Italy, and some few other fields. We see that, abroad, the experiment has worked to results more rapidly than with us. In France the experiment had its root in irreligion with irreligion for its aim. Here, the root and origin has not been irreligion, but religious difference and religious indifference, and the aim has been to effect a compromise by ignoring and ostracising the whole subject of difference. The compromise is acknowledged to have been a very unsatisfactory one, dealing disadvantage all around, and no advantage.

Looking at the case, then, in the true light, it behooves us in a matter admittedly so grave, to judge with the same calm judgment which we are accustomed to apply to the minor, insignificant affairs of practical life. In the depths of our conscience we have to answer this question: Whether we can hope to send forth a moral, God-fearing people, a people fit to be entrusted with domestic management and the guardianship of the commonwealth, if they are trained up under the conviction that religion, the only basis of morality is a proscribed and outlawed thing during the best and brightest hours of the day through the tenderest and most impressionable years of life. Without the only effective basis of practical morality, how are we to expect to have any other practical morality than that which the *Western Christian Advocate* (M. E.), of Cincinnati, has been tell-

ing us about in the year of grace, 1898? If we all have such a struggle with ourselves, even under the most favorable circumstances of religious influence and religious opportunity, to keep ourselves, I will not say in the path of perfection, but to bring ourselves every morning to the resolve or the desire of walking therein, what must be the untold struggle of those whose years from the very outset have been cut off and estranged from this only motive that can spur a man on steadily to keep his life in order?

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MR. PARNELL AND HIS BIOGRAPHY.

BIOGRAPHICAL works differ from other forms of literature in the personal way they affect the reader. Whether we sympathize with or dislike the object of the pen-picture, we are constrained by the human element within us to follow the author carefully and to seek for confirmation or dissipation of whatever theories or prejudices we may have previously entertained regarding the subject of the memoir. It is difficult to over-estimate the worth of a good biography. Such a work is more helpful to us in the building up of a good historical knowledge than volumes of strictly historical reading.

The impression which a biography gives the reader concerning the aims and ambitions of the subject of the memoir, as an active determining force in any political, social or literary movement, is the measure of the ability with which the biographer has performed his task. Now, the effect which Mr. R. Barry O'Brien's *Life of Charles Stewart Parnell* has had upon Mr. Stead, editor of the *Review of Reviews* would lead us to believe that Mr. O'Brien had labored to a sinister end in compiling his book. Mr. O'Brien is a strong sympathizer with Irish National aspirations, and Mr. Stead bluntly says that his presentation of the late Mr. Parnell is likely to turn English sympathy against the Irish cause rather than in its favor. He presents the departed Irish leader, he says, in the rôle of the Avenger—the unappeasable exactor of retribution for the sufferings inflicted by England upon his country. Mr. Stead professes to deplore the appearance of the work for the unfortunate effect which he foresees as flowing from it on the cause of Home Rule. We are not confident that Mr. Stead

is a consistent upholder of that policy, or any other. If he were genuine in his deprecation of the appearance of this biography, we might very well confront him with his own article upon the Irish Rebellion of 1798, and ask him, if the case against England were not overstated in that article, could he blame any Irishman for entertaining the bitterest hatred that man can feel against the system of government, aye, the country too, which had perpetrated the revolting outrages upon his people which Mr. Stead has been at such pains to present in all their frightful truth. But Mr. Stead's judgment upon Mr. O'Brien's work is a strained and distorted one. The late Mr. Parnell hated the English rule, not with any hysterical hate or any Hannibal-sworn animosity, as a sacred heritage, but just as every other honest and patriotic Irishman hates it—because it is oppression and an incubus upon the genius, the development and the prosperity of the Irish people. He hated it because it is alien and a denial of the natural rights of man. And if Mr. Stead wants to know, he can very easily ascertain that among the survivors of Mr. Parnell in Parliament, on the Irish side, there are men who hate it in their passionate nature as thoroughly as Mr. Parnell did in his still and cool and immobile nature, and who would have not the slightest hesitation in proclaiming this fact to-morrow were they asked about it. They lose, in fact, no opportunity of demonstrating this sentiment by word and deed, in the House of Commons and elsewhere, and is Mr. Stead going to tell the world, after he himself has given the most cogent reasons for that hatred, that they are injuring the cause of Home Rule by persistence in such a state of mind? Mr. Stead is a phenomenon in literary industry, but that fact does not save him from being at times a trifle inconsequential.

The passage in the book upon which Mr. Stead has fastened, to sustain his threnody is an unfortunate one. It reads thus:

"Parnell hated England before he entered the House of Commons; and his hatred was intensified by his parliamentary experience. He thought the position of the Irish members painfully humiliating. They were waiters on English providence; beggars for English favours. English Ministers behaved as if *they* belonged to the injured nation; as, if, indeed, they showed excessive generosity in tolerating Irishmen in their midst at all. This arrogance, this assumption of superiority, galled Parnell. It was repugnant to his nature to approach anyone with bated breath and whispering humbleness; and he resolved to wring justice from England, and to humiliate her in the process. He wanted not only reparation, but vengeance as well."

We have no recollection of anything ever said or done by the late

Mr. Parnell to warrant the statement that he desired vengeance as well as reparation. To hate England meant that England's political system was gall to him as an Irishman; in many of his speeches he made it clear that he did full justice to the spirit of justice and conciliation which he found animating a large portion of the English people. In an address delivered in Liverpool before an assembly of Irish Home Rulers resident in England he made the distinction clear. He said among other things:

"You have also another duty to perform, which is to educate public opinion in England upon Irish questions, which I have looked upon as a difficult and almost impossible task—so difficult that I have often been tempted to think that it was no use trying to educate English public opinion. The English Press encourage prejudice against Ireland. Englishmen themselves are in many respects fair-minded and reasonable, but it is almost impossible to get at them—it requires intelligence almost superhuman to remove the clouds of prejudice under which they have lived during their lives. I know the difficulties of the position of the Irish people in England. It is not easy for people, living as they are in friendship with their English neighbors, to keep themselves separated from English political organisations, but they have never been afraid to lay aside private and local considerations in favour of supporting their fellow-countrymen at home."

Now, Mr. Stead is selected as an instance of the effect which this biography has produced among Englishmen, because he represents a very large body of opinion in England—the body which compassed Mr. Gladstone's repudiation of Mr. Parnell. There are many more moderate men amongst English political parties who will not be carried away by this view of Mr. Parnell's character. These will remember that in the days when the Irish party in Parliament worked in co-operation with the Liberals for the attainment of Home Rule, there was an entire abandonment of the attitude of hate on the part of the former and a cordial co-operation with the English people for the attainment of such measures as were deemed essential for the attainment of popular ends in England as clearing the way for the introduction of measures to pacify Ireland. Mr. Parnell was not the "Avenger" then, but the reliable, unwavering, cool-headed ally. Why does Mr. Stead ignore this important factor in the story? But who can answer for the inscrutable mind which was capable of evolving "Julia" and her correspondence from the world behind the curtain?

Mr. O'Brien was at several disadvantages in attempting such a work. In the first place, it is not an easy task to paint the picture of a man who may be said to have led a dual life, and who

made no confidant among his political connections. Very little is known of Mr. Parnell's interior life, and even of his political life and his everyday life, while he was more or less in the view of his colleagues, there is little to be gained save what appeared in the newspapers of the day. This habit of secretiveness must militate exceedingly against the most skilful attempt to portray the departed Irish leader. It tells heavily in Mr. O'Brien's book, which does not flow smoothly and lifelike, as a good biography should, but is largely made up of extracts from speeches and letters, "interviews," and other more or less formal and artificial vehicles of information. Then, again, Mr. O'Brien appears to have lived most of his time in London, and the background for his pictures is therefore wanting in that vividness and movement which made Irish life, during the days of Mr. Parnell's political power, so thrilling and absorbing a factor in the world's activities. It would be necessary for the reader to take up, along with this work, such a book as Mr. O'Connor's history of *The Parnell Movement*, or some of Duffy's later works, in order to gain an illuminative knowledge of the currents of political feeling in Ireland before and during Mr. Parnell's period, for the law of continuity in history is as fixed as it is in actual life, and the reader cannot settle down like a bee upon any particular flower of it, disregarding all the rest, with any great advantage to his stock of valuable knowledge. He must, in order to begin at a midway chapter of its romance, have at least a synopsis of those which have led up to the situation in which he finds himself plunged. Mr. O'Brien's introduction to his subject, it must be observed, is hasty and jejune. His literary style is plain and practical, and were it not that his work is enlivened by a good many personal anecdotes, the book might be pronounced lacking in literary attraction.

Again, it was Mr. Parnell's misfortune to close his career in the midst of a desperate and most unpatriotic attempt to sow eternal enmity between the priests and people of Ireland. The act of the pirate captain who fires his magazine rather than be taken alive is but a poor counterpart of Mr. Parnell's action when driven to bay and fighting for the retention of a leadership which he saw was hopelessly gone. There is no excuse for such an unscrupulous resort as this. It obliterated all obligations of past service, and revealed a selfish ambition in the man which nothing could palliate. Nor does Mr. O'Brien attempt to palliate it. He appears rather to think that enmity between the Irish people and the Irish priesthood was the natural and inevitable logic of the situation. He quotes the saying of a Fenian, while the deplorable election contest in Kilkenny was raging: "The only power in Ireland that

can stand up to Parnell is the Church, and the only power that can stand up to the Church is Fenianism." The man or men who, appreciating the religious, civil and social organization of the country, can contemplate the creation of a perpetual chasm between the ecclesiastical and lay orders in Ireland by means of a secret society is no friend to Ireland's freedom. And this was what Mr. Parnell, in his desperate extremity, sought to do, and the evil seed then sown in his Kilkenny speeches has borne poisonous fruit which has not even yet decayed. Never has there been a more striking illustration of the truth we find embodied in the dramatist's lines:

The evil that men do lives after them;
The good is oft interred with their bones.

The evil that Mr. Parnell deliberately wrought in the few months which witnessed his moral downfall and his fight for supremacy transcended all the good he had been the means of accomplishing in the creation of an independent Irish party and the concentration of the national forces for one great national object. We would fain believe that his action, in that hour of national frenzy, was prompted by a spirit of resentment, foreign to his better nature, but for the moment uncontrollable and overmastering—a temporary passion which in cooler moments might be repented of and atoned for. But his biographer unfortunately leaves us in no doubt as to the perfect deliberation and malice aforethought with which Mr. Parnell set about the task of rending his party in twain and ranging priests and people in unnatural antagonism against each other. Summing up the results of the negotiations between Mr. Parnell, Mr. Dillon, and Mr. W. O'Brien at Boulogne, the biographer says:

"The question has been raised whether Mr. Parnell meant business in these Boulogne conferences; whether he went into the negotiations with the intention of making peace, or only for strategic purposes in carrying on the war. I asked an Anti-Parnellite who was concerned in the negotiations to give me his opinion on the point. He said it was perhaps hard to tell; but on the whole he inclined to the view that there were moments when Parnell meant peace, and that again there were moments when he used the negotiations merely for strategic purposes. Other Anti-Parnellites were of opinion that the Chief was playing a strategic game all the time, and playing it with his accustomed skill.

"What was his strategy? To divide the Anti-Parnellite forces (1) by drawing Dillon and O'Brien away from Healy; (2) by drawing O'Brien away from Dillon; (3) by out-manceuvring the three in detail; (4) by involving the Liberals in fresh difficulties and

bringing them into collision with their Irish allies. In the first object he succeeded completely. Healy's voice was for war à *outrance*, and accordingly the Boulogne negotiations led to the opening of the breach between him and Dillon and O'Brien which has not been closed to this day. In the second object he failed, for O'Brien and Dillon stood together to the end. But he scored a success in another way. Very many people believed that O'Brien was really on the side of Parnell, and that the relations between himself and Dillon were strained if not sundered.

"When both went into gaol it generally thought that O'Brien was a Parnellite and Dillon an Anti-Parnellite. O'Brien's ultimate declaration against Parnell on leaving gaol caused a revulsion of popular feeling against him which he has not recovered yet. Some said: 'Why did he pose as the friend of Parnell and desert the Chief in the end?' Others said: 'Why did he waste time over these Boulogne negotiations? If he were not a fool he would have known that nothing could have come of them.' One set of people lost faith in his heart, another lost faith in his head. To this hour the Boulogne negotiations are a stick with which Mr. Healy never fails to flagellate Mr. Dillon and Mr. O'Brien. The 'fighting Catholic curates' were driven to Mr. Healy's side by what was called the Boulogne fiasco more than by anything else. 'Some of the seceders,' said Parnell with bitter scorn—'the majority of them—have changed only twice; Mr. Dillon and Mr. O'Brien have changed four times.'"

For a period almost as long as the Trojan war this piece of Machiavellianism has been working out its disastrous results in Ireland and verifying all too certainly the malign foresight of the man whom the biographer styles as, next to Mr. Gladstone, the greatest political strategist of his time. It must seem to the unbiased student that when political strategy comes in at the door patriotism and conscience fly out at the window. We would rather that Mr. Barry O'Brien fastened our attention upon Philip sober than upon Philip drunk.

A very important question had been raised by Mr. Parnell's action in those brief but stirring days before his death. He challenged what many men before him had challenged—the right of the Irish bishops and clergy to take action in affairs of national importance. But the other men who had disputed this claim were usually persons on the side opposed to Mr. Parnell in politics—persons, that is to say, in the pay and service of England. Mr. Justice Keogh had disputed it in terms of historic vilipend; ermined personages of lesser note have followed that illustrious example, when hearing election appeals, from that time down to our own

day. The late Bishop of Meath was mulcted heavily for pointing out to his flock the dangers of following the advice of the supporters of Mr. Parnell. We cannot undertake the task of defining what is right and proper in all such cases, so far as choice of language is concerned. But there is not the slightest doubt of the position which hierarchy and clergy are bound to take up when questions of the moral law become entangled with the political problems of the hour. The Church must uphold the moral law, no matter whom its procedure may offend. When it ceases to do that it abnegates its proper functions and renounces its divine commission. Mr. Parnell might feel himself justified in refusing to yield to the demand of the English Nonconformists, through Mr. Gladstone, that he retire from the Irish leadership, for these irresponsible persons spoke with no authority behind them but their spokesman's *ipse dixit*; but the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes and his conventicle and the Irish bishops and clergy were very different mandatories. Mr. Parnell had always recognized the authority of the latter, in the summoning of conventions and in public affairs generally; how he could dream of carrying on a campaign for personal supremacy in the teeth of their solemn repudiation appears, now that one looks back at the whole episode, an extraordinary case of self-delusion. The only explanation that can be accepted is that he had temporarily lost, through passion and disappointment, that foresight and clearness of political vision which had enabled him to attain the position he so long held and to measure swords successfully with the greatest English statesmen of his day.

On a notable occasion, when Mr. Trevelyan, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, made a vicious attack upon Mr. Parnell and his party because of the recrudescence of agrarian outrage in Ireland, Mr. Parnell made a stinging retort holding the Chief Secretary and his officials responsible for the disorder because of their incompetence and ignorance of the principles of government. He commenced his defiant speech by the declaration that he cared only for the opinion of Ireland and was indifferent about what the House of Commons and the English people thought of him. Had he lived up to that declaration and bowed to the opinion of the majority in Ireland, when the storm-cloud of dishonor burst over his head, he might have been spared for a nobler fate, and he certainly would have spared the country a series of discreditable and disastrous wrangles that mightily tickled her foes while wasting the national strength. There was cunning in the contrivance of these disorders, says Mr. Parnell's biographer; there is cunning in madness. We prefer to regard Mr. Parnell's malign diplomacy in the closing days as the result of feverish excitement rather

than patriotic resistance to English dictation and the sagacity that had so often previously organized victories. Mr. Parnell's attitude toward the Church was dictated by policy rather than by private sentiment. On one occasion some delegates from England were protesting to him against the action of the Catholic clergy in England in opposing Home Rule and supporting the Tories because these favored their views on education. Mr. Parnell was asked should not these Catholic clergymen be fought. He shook his head and said with a smile that he would not think of fighting the Church. Mr. O'Brien would have us believe that in those early days he disliked the Church but dared not openly avow his feelings. He says:

"I asked an Irish member, who had been a Fenian, on one occasion, if Parnell had been forced to quarrel either with the Fenians or the Church, which it would be? He said: 'The Church, for Parnell liked the Fenians, but he did not like the Church. He knew, however, the power of the Church, and he wished unquestionably to have a great conserving force like it at his back. Parnell would never quarrel with the Church unless the Church forced the quarrel, there can be no doubt of that.'"

Mr. Parnell's astuteness was very strikingly displayed in his dealings with the Church and with the Fenian party. He paid equal deference to both, but would not suffer either to control his action once he had made up his mind on any certain line of procedure as necessary to the success of his ultimate aims. He avoided any open conflict with the Irish bishops and clergy, but he steadfastly stuck to his own programme even though they had pronounced against it. The first case in which we find him at variance with the ecclesiastical body was the Westport Land League meeting of 1879. He had been invited by the promoters of that meeting to attend, and he did not consent until he had weighed the pros and cons of the situation very carefully. The Land League had only then been started, and few could foresee what its fortunes were likely to be—save those who had been in direct contact with the agricultural population and knew their passionate attachment to the soil. In considering the subject he had consulted Charles Kickham, one of the Fenian leaders, who had for the greater part of his life been in sympathetic touch with the Irish peasantry. The answer and the action which followed it are so characteristic of the man and the times that they are worth reproducing from Mr. O'Brien's pages:

"'Do you think, Mr. Kickham,' he asked, 'that the people feel very keenly on the land question?' 'Feel keenly on the land question?' answered Kickham. 'I am only sorry to say that I think

they would go to hell for it.' Finally Parnell resolved to accept the invitation of the Westport men. The Archbishop of Tuam, who saw something besides land in the new movement, condemned the meeting, and indirectly warned Parnell not to come. But he came, and delivered a stirring speech, which was long remembered by friends and foes.

" 'A fair rent is a rent a tenant can reasonably pay according to the times; but in bad times the tenant cannot be expected to pay as much as he did in good times, three or four years ago. If such rents are insisted upon a repetition of the scenes of 1847 and 1848 will be witnessed. Now, what must we do in order to induce the landlords to see the position? You must show the landlords that you intend to hold a firm grip on your homesteads and lands. You must not allow yourselves to be dispossessed as you were dispossessed in 1847. You must not allow your small holdings to be turned into large ones. I am not supposing that the landlords will remain deaf to the voice of reason, but I hope they may not, and that on those properties on which the rents are out of all proportion to the times that a reduction may be made, and that immediately. If not, you must help yourselves, and the public opinion of the world will stand by you and support you in your struggle to defend your homesteads. I should be deceiving you if I told you that there was any use in relying upon the exertions of the Irish members of Parliament on your behalf. I think that if your members were determined and resolute they could help you, but I am afraid they won't. I hope that I may be wrong, and that you may rely upon the constitutional action of your parliamentary representatives in this the sore time of your need and trial; but above all things remember that God helps him who helps himself, and that by showing such a public spirit as you have shown here to-day, by coming in your thousands in the face of every difficulty, you will do more to show the landlords the necessity of dealing justly with you than if you had 150 Irish members in the House of Commons.' "

Soon another incident arose which brought him again into indirect collision with the Church in Ireland, and which again displayed his skill in avoiding actual conflict. In the same year a vacancy occurred in the representation of Ennis, and Mr. Parnell put forward Mr. Lysaght Finnigan. His opponent was Mr. William O'Brien, a Catholic barrister and Crown prosecutor (now a member of the Irish judicial bench and a bitter anti-Nationalist). He had the support of the bishop and many of the priests, but Finnigan rallied all the men of advanced politics to his side, and Mr. Parnell went down personally to take part in his canvass. Finni-

gan won the fight, which was a very bitter one while it lasted. It was the first test of Mr. Parnell's strength in the country, and how much depended on the result was made manifest by his own admission to one of his party. "If Ennis had been lost," he said, "I would have retired from public life, for it would have satisfied me that the priests were supreme in Irish politics." So says Mr. O'Brien's biographer, though he gives no data for the remark, nor the name of the person to whom it is alleged it was made. It ought, therefore, to be taken with some reserve, for Mr. Parnell knew how to conciliate as well as how to repel. This fact was strongly demonstrated very shortly after the Ennis episode by the events which followed the introduction of the Irish University Bill by the Government. This was the measure which established a Royal University in Ireland, in place of the one which the Catholics demanded. The Royal University is modelled on the plan of the London University—being nothing more, in fact, than an examining board with power to confer degrees on those who succeed in passing the examiners. Mr. Parnell was strongly in favor of the more equitable demand of the Catholics for a real university; and time has proved the clearness of his judgment in this respect, inasmuch as, although the Royal University has been twenty years in existence, the demand for a Catholic University is louder, more importunate, and more irresistible than ever. In this he showed how deeply he valued the support of the ecclesiastical body in Ireland, and an incident which sprang out of his action in the House of Commons gave a further remarkable illustration of his sagacity and skill in finesse. The incident is thus related by Mr. Barry O'Brien:

"Mr. Gray, the proprietor of the 'Freeman's Journal,' and other moderate Catholic members were in favour of a compromise such as the Government proposed. There was a meeting of the Irish members to consider the subject. Some hot words passed between the extreme and the moderate men, and Parnell was reported to have referred contemptuously to the moderates as 'Papist rats.' Currency was given to this report in the 'Freeman's Journal.' Parnell said the statement was 'absolutely false,' and several of the extreme Catholics corroborated his assertion. Still, there was a good deal of unpleasantness over the matter, and many people believed that Parnell used the words. As a matter of fact he did not use them. They were used by an extreme Catholic just as the meeting had broken up and when there was a good deal of confusion in the room. 'The first time I ever had a talk with Parnell about politics,' Mr. Corbett, the present member for Wicklow, said to me, 'was about the "Papist rats" incident. Gray and

Parnell had differed on the education question. Gray was in favour of a compromise; Parnell wanted the extreme Catholic demand. Gray succeeded in carrying the party with him, and Parnell was reported to have said, on leaving the room, "These Papist rats." I asked Parnell if he had used the words. He said: "No. The words were used, but not by me. Why Corbett, should I offend the Catholics of Ireland by speaking insultingly of them? Certainly it would be very foolish, to put the matter on no other ground. An Irish Protestant politician can least of all afford to offend the Catholic priests or laity. No; I would not insult the priests.'"

Now the present writer had the most positive assurance from Mr. Gray that Mr. Parnell did use the insulting expression, for he had been close to him when he was passing through the door. Mr. Gray, furthermore, repeated the charge very specifically in the columns of the *Freeman's Journal*, but the country at large was more inclined to believe Mr. Parnell's version than Mr. Gray's. Seeing that the weight of sympathy, if not of judgment, was against him, Mr. Gray very wisely allowed the controversy to drop, after an emphatic disclaimer from Mr. Parnell. Subsequent events showed that the latter was not a rigid stickler for exact truth when a denial became necessary for his purposes. His assurances to some of his colleagues on the subject of the divorce proceedings induced them to rely implicitly on his power to clear himself of the odious charge brought against him. But those who knew him best knew only too well that the charge was unfortunately but too well-founded.

The situation as between Mr. Parnell, the Church, and the people at the period of the general election of 1880 revealed the fact that while Mr. Parnell had won over the majority of the people and of the Fenian party to his side, he had also secured a considerable support among the clergy, but that the bishops distrusted him. At this election Mr. Parnell was returned for three different constituencies. Of this episode and the new situation which it indicated the biographer says:

asked, What was the attitude of the Catholic Church towards him

"Parnell was returned for all three constituencies—Meath, Mayo, and Cork City. He elected ultimately to sit for Cork. It may be at this crisis? The majority of the priests were certainly for him, the majority of the bishops were against him. Cardinal McCabe, the late Archbishop of Dublin, was indeed a vehement opponent both of Parnell and of the League.

" 'The schemes of amelioration proposed by the League,' his Eminence said, 'are of such an order that no Government laying

claim to statesmanship can for a moment entertain them.' The Archbishop of Tuam was in sympathy with the Archbishop of Dublin. We have seen how the Bishops of Cork, Cloyne, Ross, and Kerry opposed him at the Cork election. Dr. Croke, the Archbishop of Cashel, was, however, then as later, in favour of a forward policy, and not hostile to the man who was the embodiment of that policy. Of the National Press, the 'Nation' supported Parnell, the 'Freeman's Journal' opposed him. He himself made light of his opponents, feeling that the masses of the people were at his back, and that the dissensionists would soon fall into line."

Many delicate situations arose during the course of Mr. Parnell's leadership, which, had the Irish bishops been less tactful men than they showed themselves to be, might have borne evil fruit for the Church in Ireland. There was, in the first place, the issuance of the "No rent manifesto." Mr. Parnell, it is stated in the biography, was opposed, or at least lukewarm with regard to the policy of this measure, which was also antagonized by Mr. John Dillon, who at once perceived that it must alienate the bishops and clergy. They did immediately oppose it, and their opposition was successful, for the advice given in the manifesto as a rule fell flat. It is but just to Mr. Parnell and the cooler heads among the Land Leaguers to show that they were outvoted on this affair, that the hotter heads apologized for it by pleading that it was only adopted as a retaliatory measure for the imprisonment of so many men under the Coercion Act, and that as soon as the "Kilmainham Treaty" was arranged the manifesto was publicly withdrawn. Parnell, while in jail, used to joke in his own quiet way when asked about the effect of the manifesto, and say, with a smile, that his own tenants were carrying it out to the letter. Then there was the Papal rescript about the Parnell tribute, which many regarded as an unfortunate and ill-judged piece of interference, whose effect was to make the national compliment to Mr. Parnell more generous and more prompt than it seemed at one time likely to be. This tribute was started as an answer to a particularly vicious attack by Mr. Forster, then Chief Secretary for Ireland, on the Irish leader and his chief colleagues as being the instigators of agrarian crime in Ireland. Mr. Parnell's reply, full of cutting scorn and defiance, hurling back the charge on Forster and the Ministry as the really responsible parties, roused the whole country to a pitch of enthusiasm rarely beheld; and when the people saw the Vatican apparently ranged on the side of their enemies, the situation became extremely dangerous. Were it not for the prudence of the bishops at this juncture, much harm might have accrued to the Church. The discretion which is vested in them

with regard to the publication of such documents was wisely exercised. The writer saw a vast meeting held in the Phoenix Park, outside Dublin, to denounce the issuance of this Rescript, and never beheld a more excited crowd. But to their credit be it said, both the Land League leaders and the people blamed nobody at the Vatican for the Rescript; all the blame was for the English Ministry who had been mean enough to use their influence at Rome to have the document issued.

A still more exasperating cause of friction between the Vatican and the Irish people was the employment of Mr. George Errington by the English Government as a sort of back-stairs go-between at a court where there was no regular ambassador. There was, unhappily, no doubt, that this personage spent his time intriguing to get the vacant archiepiscopal see of Dublin filled by a prelate as antagonistic as the late Cardinal McCabe and his predecessor, Cardinal Cullen, to the national aspirations of Ireland—in fact this sinister purpose was quite frankly avowed in a letter of Errington's to Lord Granville which was purloined from the post office and given for publication to *United Ireland*, the Nationalist organ. Mr. Gladstone afterwards expressed regret that he had been induced to countenance the employment of Mr. Errington in this business. It would be difficult to find any motive more likely to arouse resentment in Ireland, and disaffection toward the Church, than the interference of English emissaries in the appointment of Irish bishops with a view to the exercise of spiritual influence on Irish politics. The faith of the people could be put to no stronger test than the knowledge that such was actually being done; and here again the admirable tact of the Irish hierarchy came in to prevent evil consequences. The announcement that all Mr. Errington's manoeuvring was labor thrown away, and that the see of Dublin was to be filled by an ecclesiastic so decidedly Nationalistic as Dr. Walsh, of Maynooth, acted as a powerful sedative and smoothed away all rancor.

Still there were rocks ahead, not so much for Mr. Parnell as for the Church, and a glance back at the years of trouble makes one marvel that they were encountered and caused no disastrous shipwreck. There was, in the first place, the shocking tragedy of the Phoenix Park, wherein the cause of Home Rule was stricken down for the time by the knives that sent Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. Thomas Burke to their graves. This outrage so deeply affected Mr. Parnell that he at once wrote to Mr. Gladstone offering to retire from public life, if such a step would make easier the task of the Ministry in its new mission of conciliating rather than harassing Ireland. But Mr. Gladstone feared that such a step

would not help, but rather retard the Government, and he accordingly gave no sanction to the proposal. The Irish bishops and clergy had no friction with Mr. Parnell or any other public man over this dark and sanguinary transaction. It created a feeling of genuine horror so instantaneous and universal throughout the country, that but little was needed from the spiritual guides of the people to make the latter wash their hands of it and execrate the assassins who had brought so deep a stain on the fair name of the country. Later on there came the trouble about the "Plan of Campaign." This was the name applied to the outline of a new agrarian movement for the purpose of coercing landlords to grant reductions of rent, but the title of the scheme was immediately but erroneously applied to the working of the scheme itself. Here, again, the Vatican felt constrained to intervene in Irish politics. It sent over Mgr. Persico to examine into and report on the state of Ireland, and Mgr. Persico made the mistake of taking his information chiefly from the landlord class, who felt most keenly the operation of the plan and who were correspondingly bitter against the authors of it. He was for a considerable time the guest of Lord Emly, then a Unionist politician, though now a Home Rule advocate, and some Unionist people of lesser note were his hosts when he went further south. When he returned to Rome his report was found to be damaging to the popular cause, and then followed a Papal condemnation of the "Plan." The bishops were once more placed in a dilemma, for they knew only too well how deep was the provocation afforded by the landlords and the Salisbury Government, and how cruel the position of the Irish tenants. Mr. Gladstone had publicly denounced the Ministry as the real authors of the movement, because while they admitted the inability of the people to pay the rack-rents they refused to bring in any measure of relief, yet were guilty of the extraordinary inconsistency of making a personal appeal to the landlords to refrain from their legal right of eviction, and even went so far as to despatch Sir Redvers Buller, a special military commissioner, to the South to get these cruel landlords to stay their hand. The rejection of Mr. Parnell's Land Bill that year had fired them with greed and vengeance.

But no difficulty arose as between the bishops and Mr. Parnell on this occasion, for he took care to repudiate all responsibility for the launching of the scheme. He was perfectly right in this evasion; but as a matter of fact it was he who was indirectly the cause of the experiment. He had been invisible for months previously; the tenant-farmers were being cruelly harried by the triumphant landlords, who were mercilessly utilizing the Coercion Act to crush out all resistance, moral or physical. It was felt by the more energetic

of Mr. Parnell's adherents that a crisis had arisen in the combined Nationalist and agrarian movement, for coercion seemed to have cowed the people. Something striking had to be done, independently of Mr. Parnell, and the "Plan of Campaign" was the practical result of this keen political necessity. The salient features of this device were an offer by the tenant to the landlord of what the former considered a fair rent, in view of the general fall in agricultural prices; the placing of the money in the hands of a managing committee, in case of the landlord's refusal, and the keeping it there until he came to terms. In case the landlord took legal proceedings, the money was to be utilized in defence of the tenant. These were the rough lines upon which the scheme was drawn, and many farmers eagerly availed themselves of the advice tendered them by the authors of it. It simply made the tenant the authority by whom a fair rent was fixed, instead of the landlord or a court of law; and since Parliament had closed the law courts against him by the rejection of Mr. Parnell's bill, some excuse might be found for the man who offered to pay what he could instead of what he had agreed, under compulsion perhaps, to pay. The Irish hierarchy were too keenly alive to the desperate nature of the case to take any very active steps regarding the Papal condemnation which followed Mgr. Persico's report. They caused the letter to be read, as duty demanded, and there the matter ended. In the subsequent peace which was established between the Liberals and the Irish party, on the offer of the Home Rule Bill, the "Plan of Campaign" was allowed to fall into desuetude.

On the whole the situation as between Mr. Parnell and the spiritual guides of the Irish people, down to the fatal turning-point in his career, were as smooth as could be expected under the circumstances. Most of the Irish bishops and a large majority of the priests are highly patriotic—that is, using the word in its commonly-accepted sense. They may be conservative in their views regarding ways and means, but they favor the principle of a separate Legislature for Ireland and the control of Irish resources for Irish purposes. Of course there may be some dissenters, but judging from the public utterances of many members of that distinguished body, they are thus far in accord with National sentiment. Mr. Parnell, although a Protestant, had been eminently successful as a leader. He kept his party together as much by the power of repulsion as by attraction. So long as he behaved with judgment and dignity he could rely on the bishops not running counter to the sympathy of the country—a sympathy which Mr. Parnell enjoyed to an extent never experienced by any public man since O'Connell's time. It is not relevant to the issue to consider the apparent anom-

ally of this fact. That he possessed so few of the characteristic notes of the Celtic character, and was, in fact, the antithesis of the Celt in his taciturnity and imperturbability, his want of humor and geniality, and yet attracted popular admiration to an almost unprecedented degree, is a consideration for the psychologist. What chiefly demands our notice is the fact that a leader who recognised his enormous political power did not at the crucial moment also recognise his moral responsibility. Here we have the inexplicable feature in a career that was at one time so full of brilliant promise both for the man and the nation. If he failed to recognise his responsibility because of the duller moral sense of the Protestant mind, then we are not certain that those of his party who were nearest to him, and who were morally certain of his equivocal position before the divorce proceedings were begun, were altogether blameless in failing to warn him of the danger of defying the moral sense of a Catholic country by a continuance of his clandestine relations in another man's household. We have it on record that these relations were suspected by the injured husband a good many years before the scandal ripened, and we know that at the period of the Galway election there was open talk of such a *liaison* among the refractory members of Mr. Parnell's party. This was the time to have spoken plainly to "the chief," and not in "Committee Room 15," after the harm had been done and the cause of Ireland betrayed.

We find nothing in Mr. O'Brien's book to show that either Mr. Parnell or those who took up his name as a party designation after his death felt that there was anything to apologize for in this closing chapter of his public life. On the contrary, he is always presented as the injured hero—the man to whom the country owed everything and repaid the debt with the blackest ingratitude. It is insisted on that Mr. Gladstone's letter, after the verdict in the divorce suit, made it impossible for him to resign, even temporarily, his position as leader. But nothing is made out of the condemnation of the Irish bishops. Mr. Parnell had always been ostentatious about his respect for Irish opinion and his contempt for the opinion of Englishmen. Here was the test of his sincerity. He was deposed by the moral sentiment of Ireland, and yet he would maintain his position in despite of that opinion—asseverating that he would never yield to English dictation. So, too, when he was driven to bay, the mask of iciness was laid aside; he made himself hail fellow well met with the rough element and headed a mob to capture the office of the organ of his own movement. He forgot his usual dignity of speech and bandied epithets with such of his opponents as had their natural aptitude for billingsgate sharpened by a legal training and the opportunity which the law of cross-

examination affords for the pleasant pastime of excoriating those who are placed at a disadvantage by the rules of legal procedure. The fact that a number of such legal practitioners were engaged on opposite sides during the struggle that ensued, after the failure of the Boulogne negotiations, was a superaddition to the misfortunes of a deplorable situation. Their eagerness for the miserable fray, their comparative youthfulness, and the desire to avail of the opportunity afforded them of acquiring distinction, no matter how questionable its character, were unfortunate elements in a most untoward conjuncture. They were for the most part patriotic young men, in their own way, but they were "dangerous pilots in adversity." This was a portion of the stage setting which does not play its proper part in Mr. Barry O'Brien's narrative—possibly because he had been living at a distance from the scene of strife, and could only catch a faint echo of it in the London newspapers.

Mr. Parnell's life was an example and a warning, but his biographer appears to have failed to grasp its meaning. Davis had a truer idea of the requirements for an Irish leader when he wrote the lines,

"And righteous men shall make our land
A nation once again."

A nation that has clung to religion and morality under all forms of persecution is jealous of her escutcheon. We cannot put up men to contend for justice and morality who do not themselves show an example in their interpretation of the responsibilities of life.

But we must not let the memory of this great Irishman's fall obliterate our sense of the priceless services which he, in his better years, rendered his country. He produced order out of political chaos, enabled Ireland to stand erect time and again before her hereditary foe, beat down the mailed hand of coercion, and flung the business of the oldest Legislature in the world into direst confusion because it trampled on the just demands of Ireland. For these unique achievements Ireland idolized him. His own was the hand which flung the jewel of her homage away. It is not just to his memory to put him before the world in the character of the Avenger. In his better days his aim was altogether too exalted for that rôle. He made no such impression on Mr. Gladstone, as we find from the report of an interview which the author had with the great English statesman shortly after the Irish leader's death. He (Mr. O'Brien) asked him had he found Mr. Parnell a satisfactory person to do business with. To this Mr. Gladstone replied:

"Most pleasant, most satisfactory. On the surface it was impossible to transact business with a more satisfactory man. He took

such a thorough grasp of the subject in hand, was so quick, and treated the matter with so much clearness and brevity. It's a curious thing that the two most laconic men I ever met were Irishmen, Parnell and Archdeacon Stopford. When the Irish Church Bill was under consideration, Archdeacon Stopford wrote to me saying that he objected strongly to the Bill, but that he saw it was bound to pass, and that he thought the best thing for him to do was to communicate with me, and see if he could get favourable amendments introduced. He came to see me, and we went through the Bill together. Well, he was just like Parnell—took everything in at a glance, made up his mind quickly, and stated his own views with the greatest simplicity and clearness. It was an intellectual treat to do business with Parnell. * * * As a rule, he was frank in his declarations and could be relied upon. I will give you an instance of what I mean. I was very anxious about the Royal Allowances Bill. I was not only anxious that the grant should be made, but that it should be unanimously and even generously made. The Irish members could not defeat the grant, but they could have obstructed and made difficulties, and deprived the measure of the grace which I wished it to have. I met Parnell in one of the division lobbies, and said to him: 'The Prince of Wales is no enemy of Ireland; he is no enemy to any Irish policy which has the sanction of the masses of the Irish people.' Parnell answered as usual in a few words. He said: 'I am glad to hear it. I do not think you need fear anything from us.' Well, I got Parnell and Sexton put on a committee which was appointed to consider the subject. Nothing could be better than Parnell's conduct on that occasion. He showed the greatest skill, tact, and ability, and gave me the most efficient help at every turn. I always felt that I could rely on his word."

Such was the judgment of the greatest of Mr. Parnell's adversaries, and those who look for the settlement of international controversies by the arbitrament of cool reason and the weapons of the mind will prefer that he should be remembered not as the Avenger but the Vindicator—the character which, Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Stead to the contrary notwithstanding, more faithfully conformed to all his speech and action on the great stage whereon he nobly played his part for years.

JOHN J. O'SHEA.

THE PRE-REFORMATION CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

PART II.

THE student of Scottish history, who sets himself to analyse the Reformation movement, will discover in the forces arrayed against the Church in order to compass her ruin, three component parts. A body of the more powerful nobles of the land form the first; sheltering themselves under the protection of the former are the few weak and insignificant leaders among the Puritan preachers: these form the second element; while hiding himself behind all, as far as his unwieldy bulk will permit, is the third and most powerful factor—Henry VIII, the Arch-reformer, the destroyer of Catholicity in England, and its vindictive opponent in Scotland.

Of themselves, the nobles were by no means enemies to be despised. In Scotland the ancient feudal power had never been broken as it had been in England, where the Tudors put the finishing stroke to the aggrandisement of the monarchy at the expense of their subjects. In the northern kingdom it was the constant effort of the kings of the 15th and 16th centuries to crush the power of the nobles, and generally speaking, their endeavours met with but scanty success. For, strong as the Scottish nobles ordinarily were, they grew continually more powerful on account of the successive minorities of youthful monarchs, which form so striking a feature in the history of the country during the last two centuries of the Church's sway there. James I, detained a prisoner in England for a period of 20 years, was during that time but a shadow of royalty; under the regency of his uncle, the Duke of Albany, the audacity of the nobles exceeded all bounds, and when James returned to his realm, it was his chief policy to restrain these overweening pretensions. This wise and powerful king did much to restore the prestige of the crown, but he paid the penalty of his endeavor in an early death by the assassin's hand. Through this tragic event the crown passed to his son, James II, a child of but 6 years old, whose actual reign was but short, for he died at the age of 30, leaving the throne to another infant King, James III, a boy of 8. This monarch also came to an untimely end in his 35th year, in a rebellion of crafty nobles. James IV, his son and successor—at that time, a youth of 16—reigned 26 years, and fell on the field of Flodden, leaving the crown to an infant prince, 18 months old. This child, proclaimed

as James V, in his turn died an early death, and was succeeded by a baby daughter, born only a few days before her father died—the ill-fated Mary Stuart, whose reign saw the overthrow of the Catholic religion.

The history of all these reigns shows a constant struggle between the crown and the nobility. Two of the monarchs met with a violent death at the hands of their subjects, the others were perpetually striving to repress undue ambition on the part of the nobles. During every minority it was the effort of some particular faction to gain possession of the young sovereign as an earnest of superior strength. This is especially noticeable in the instances of James V and Mary. Thus in 1526, when Sir Walter Scott of Buccleugh had almost persuaded the youthful James to entrust himself to his care, the rival faction of the Douglasses exclaimed: "Rather as the enemies take you from us, we must keep one-half of your body with us."¹ In like manner Arran, in 1543, tried to get possession of the infant Mary "in hopes that he should not only have upon his side the shadow of her name, but also might dispose of her by marriage as he thought good, and either feed the English King with promises, or draw him to his partie."²

It was especially after the death of James IV, when his queen, Margaret, sister of Henry VIII, espoused in almost indecent haste the Earl of Angus, head of the powerful house of Douglas, that the factions among the nobles reached their height. Their feuds kept the realm in a perpetual ferment; armed bands traversed the country, waging private war upon one another and each striving for supremacy. The mistrust with which the majority of the nation regarded the predominance of English influence in the Councils of the nation split up the wrangling nobles into two groups—the French and English parties. The former desired the Duke of Albany, the heir presumptive, to be appointed Regent. The cousin of the late king, born of a French mother, married to a French wife, and brought up for the most part in France, the Duke's sympathies were all in favor of that country and his principles thoroughly Catholic. Angus, on the other hand, through his alliance, by marriage with the English King, represented the English faction which was in subservience to the crafty Henry, and used every means to further that monarch's influence in Scotland. It was the policy of that wily intriguer, Henry, to get possession of the person of James V, educate him in England and thus gain over Scotland the power he coveted. These schemes, however, were frustrated by the zeal and watchfulness of the French party. Nevertheless, after the Duke of Albany had assumed the reigns of government, and the

¹ Forbes Leith, *Narratives of Scott. Catholics*, p. 4 (note).

² *Ibid.*

power of the English faction was weakened, the repeated intrigues of the nobles caused the regent to twice resign his office and eventually retire permanently to France.

The climax of the insubordination of the Scottish nobility to their sovereign was reached under James V, when that monarch had assumed the reins of government, and for some 14 years had endeavoured to preserve peace between his unruly subjects. Henry VIII. had been ravaging the border country with his troops, and harassing lands and burning villages, and yet the Scottish nobles absolutely refused to carry out their sovereign's will and gain an easy victory over the retreating foe by following them over the border. This disaffection had its issue in the disastrous defeat a little later on Solway Moss, when 300 English put to flight 10,000 Scots, carrying off many nobles and barons as prisoners to England, and James V, overcome by the disgrace, died of a broken heart.

Such were the men who, when Protestant principles began to show themselves in Scotland, took their stand as the enemies of the Catholic religion. But it must not be supposed that their real motive was that burning desire for pure Gospel truth which some of their biographers would have us imagine. "Many of them," says one historian, "favoured the doctrines of the Reformation, some from a conscientious conviction of their truth, others from an envious eye to those possessions of the Church which, under the dissolution of the English religious houses, they had seen become the prey of their brethren in England."³ Another writer is still more uncompromising in analysing their motives. "The lay gentry of Scotland," says Burton, "had their eyes pretty steadily fixed on the estates of the Church and clergy. When a set of teachers arose whose doctrine pointed to the conclusion that these clergy were false prophets who had no title to their position, and consequently no just right to the wealth it brought them, there was a disposition to listen."⁴

The real fact was that the bad example of Henry VIII, had suggested to some of these unscrupulous nobles a means of enriching themselves with very little trouble. It has been calculated that the annual ecclesiastical revenues of the Church of Scotland previous to the Reformation, taking all sources into consideration, amounted to something like 1,635,000 dollars of present money value. It had been accumulating for more than 1300 years from the generous gifts which kings and nobles had freely offered to God and His poor. The general practice of the distribution of the revenues of the

³ Fraser Tytler, *Hist. of Scot.*, Vol. II., p. 373.

⁴ Burton, *Hist. of Scot.*, Vol. IV., p. 25.

Church at that period was to divide them into three equal portions, one of which was retained for the support of the clergy, another for buildings and repairs, and the third for the benefit of the poor. According to the statistics given above, the share of the clergy would amount to some 545,000 dollars. Allowing to each of the more dignified ecclesiastics, Archbishops, bishops and abbots—about 1000 in number—an annual income of 300 dollars, there would remain 245,000 dollars for division between the 2000 priests, vicars, monks and nuns, who represented the other dependants upon Church bounty. So that the wealth of the Church, vast as it may appear at first sight, brought no exorbitant income to individuals; 300 dollars per annum would scarcely satisfy a Protestant prelate of these days! But if the reforming nobles, who numbered about a hundred, might seize upon the whole 1,635,000 dollars, each would possess a share amounting to 16,350 dollars, and in addition there were the vast and well cultivated church lands to be divided amongst themselves and their followers.⁵ It was a tempting bait, and one calculated to induce them to favour a change of religion.

That the possessions of the Church and not a desire for new doctrines was the real motive which animated the nobles in their support of the principles of the Reformation, is seen by the events which followed the suppression of the Catholic religion. There was at once what may be called a general scramble for the spoils. The result proves the truth of the assertion just made as regards the nobles. Not only Abbeys and priories, but collegiate churches, hospitals and almshouses became in most instances the property of some one of their number. Thus, for example, the vast possessions of the royal abbey of Dunfermline passed in 1605 to Alexander Seton with the title of Earl of Dunfermline; the dependent priory of Urquhart was also conferred on the same individual with the secondary title of Lord Urquhart. The last Commendator of Arbroath, Lord John Hamilton, foreseeing the impending disaster, made over the possessions of that abbey in 1553 to his brother, Lord Claude Hamilton; that nobleman also became endowed with the revenues of Paisley, of which he was Commendator and received the title of Lord Paisley. Kelso passed to Sir Robert Kerr of Creswell, with the title of Earl of Kelso; Lindores, with the title of Lord Lindores, to Patrick Lesley, son of the Earl of Rothes; Balmerino, to Sir James Elphinstone, who became Lord Balmerino. The Austin Canons' abbey of Jedburgh and the title of Lord Jedburgh were bestowed upon Andrew Kerr of Fernhurst; Blantyre, another house of the same religious, became the property of Walter Steward, son

⁵ These statistics are taken from Walsh's *History of the Cath. Church in Scot.*, p. 329-333.

of the Earl of Minto, and he received at the same time the title of Lord Blantyre. The Duke of Hamilton appropriated the revenues of the Collegiate Churches of Bothwell and Hamilton; the Earl of Cassillis those of Maybole. These are only a few instances out of many, but they will serve to show that the nobility of Scotland were not altogether disinterested spectators of the downfall of the National Church.

The reformers, of themselves, were utterly without influence on the nation at large; had they lacked the support of the nobles they would have given little anxiety to the ecclesiastical authorities. The first who dared openly to preach Protestant doctrine, which had only recently been promulgated by Luther in Germany, was Patrick Hamilton, Commendator of Ferne Abbey. It is doubtful whether he was ever a priest; he went abroad for his education, and having imbibed Lutheran teaching, strove to spread the new heresy on his return to Scotland. All classes rose against him, and in 1528 he paid for his rashness with his life; for according to the spirit of the age heresy was regarded as the murder of souls, and was visited by capital punishment at the hands of the secular authorities. Hamilton's fate made a great impression upon the people, for he was related both to the royal family and the powerful house of Arran. A few other insignificant teachers of the new doctrines sprang up here and there, and were promptly suppressed, during the ten years that followed Hamilton's execution. The first who was at all formidable was a schoolmaster of Montrose named George Wishart. He had been suspected of heretical leanings, and had fled to Bristol, where he publicly recanted. He is found in Scotland again in 1543. This man and John Knox, one of his disciples, were the foremost figures among the Scottish reformers, and it is significant that both of them sheltered themselves under the protection of the powerful nobles of the English faction. Something more will have to be said concerning these two worthies later on.

The third factor in the combination now claims attention. When James IV met an untimely death on Flodden Field, the country, as we have seen, was left with an infant King. A regency was appointed consisting of the Queen Mother, the Earls of Angus and Huntly, and the Archbishop of Glasgow, James Beaton. The desire of the nation, as we have seen, looked to the Duke of Albany as regent. It seemed only too probable that Henry VIII would be able to gain an ascendancy over his widowed sister which would not be beneficial to the nation. When the nobles split up into French and English factions, Henry seized his opportunity to ingratiate himself still more with the latter by a system of widespread bribery. The State Papers of the period show that he had a com-

plete service of spies in his pay, each one, as circumstances might permit, keeping the English monarch informed of every move in the political game. More than a hundred of the leading nobles and gentry of Scotland were implicated in this disgraceful treachery in the early part of the 16th century.

Foiled in his earlier attempts to get possession of the young King, James V, Henry lost no time, when his nephew assumed the reins of government, in seeking to induce him to side with the Protestant Reformation. Dr. Barlow, Henry's chaplain, and Lord William Howard were sent in 1535 to propose a marriage between James and Henry's daughter Mary, with the prospect of the Scottish king succeeding to the rule of both kingdoms. At the same time, James was invited to meet Henry at York, and discuss religious matters. James would have nothing to do with Protestantism, and refused to accept the treatise offered by Barlow on *The Doctrines of a Christian man*; while Barlow, much to his indignation, found all the pulpits of the country closed against him. He accordingly stigmatised the Scottish clergy as "the Pope's pestilent creatures, and very limbs of the devil." The conference at York was prevented by the intervention of the Pope, and thus Henry's plots were again foiled. The marriage of James with Magdalen of France, and his second union with Mary of Guise, after the early death of the former queen, strengthened still more the bond between Scotland and France, and proportionately irritated the English monarch; the more so that he had earnestly desired to win the latter princess for himself. He urged James again and again to cast off "the usurped authority of the Pope," but the Scottish king refused to listen to such a proposal.⁶

The title of "Defender of the Faith," bestowed upon James V. by Pope Paul III.—a title which had been given to Henry by that pope's predecessor, Leo X.—was the last drop in the cup of the English monarch, and he indignantly prepared for open warfare. It is significant that he actually had the audacity to assign as the motive for war the exploded claim of the English kings to the sovereignty of Scotland. A letter from the Privy Council to the Archbishop of York, dated 1542, runs thus: "Mynding to have the Kyng's Majesties title to the realme of Scotland more fully playnly and clerely set forth to all the worlde, that the justnes of our quarell and demande may apere we pray you to cawse all your old registers and auncient places to be sought, where you think eny thing may be founde for the more clerer declaration to the world of His Majesties title to that realme." etc., etc.⁷

⁶ *Vide* State Papers, Henry VIII., Vol. V., p. 81-89.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 212.

Upon the death of James V., Henry's fresh scheme was to unite the realms by the marriage of the infant Mary Stuart with Edward VI. The loyal Scottish party opposed Henry's plan for the education of the princess in England, and the design was frustrated. The English intriguer, however, was not easily baffled, and he determined to overthrow the opposing party. The Lords of the Douglas faction had been compelled to withdraw from Scotland fifteen years before, when James V. took the government into his own hands, and they had taken refuge with their patron Henry VIII., whose stipendiaries they had long been. To these nobles, with Angus at their head, and to the numerous lords and barons who had been captured at the battle of Solway Moss, Henry submitted certain conditions, on fulfilment of which the prisoners would be restored to liberty, and the rebel lords, who were now free to return to Scotland on account of the death of James, would entitle themselves to fixed pensions from the English king. The conditions proposed were the following: The nobles in question were to bind themselves by a solemn obligation—

1. To acknowledge Henry's claim to Scotland as Superior Lord.
2. To use all possible exertions to obtain for him the government of Scotland, and to put all fortresses into his hands.
3. To endeavour to deliver the infant queen into his keeping.
4. To seize and hand over to Henry his most powerful opponent in Scotland, Cardinal Beaton.
5. In case the Scottish Parliament should refuse the demands of England, to use their whole feudal strength to co-operate with the English army for the conquest of Scotland.

Among the traitors who bound themselves to fulfil these disgraceful conditions were the Earl of Glencairn, the Earl of Cassilis, the Earl of Angus, the Earl of Marshall, Lord Maxwell, Lord Somerville, Lord Oliphant, Sir George Douglas, the Master of Maxwell, and other barons who favored the Protestant party. The precise pensions paid to some of these are mentioned in a letter from the Duke of Suffolk preserved in the Hamilton papers,⁸ and the real nature of their engagement is clearly expressed by Henry himself in a letter to the same Duke. "They have not stiked," he says, "to take upon them *to set the crown of Scotland upon our head.*"⁹

Enough evidence has been produced to show that Henry VIII. was the most vigorous promoter of the Reformation in Scotland that history can furnish; the reformers apart from the seditious nobles were mere nonentities, and the nobles were instigated and paid by the English king to further his designs. It may be objected

⁸ Vide Tytler, *History*, Vol. III., p. 375.

⁹ Ibid.

by some that here is no record of the reforming of religion, but of political scheming merely. The remark is a just one, and serves to bring out clearly the true nature of the Scottish Reformation. Religion had little to do with it; from first to last it was a political movement, the chief elements of which were personal aggrandisement, temporal success and worldly ambition. It is certain that the overthrow of the Catholic Church was the aim of Henry VIII., for the Church and churchmen were the only vigorous opponents of his policy. That he was regarded as a dangerous enemy to religion in Scotland is clear from contemporary evidence. Cardinal Beaton in a letter to Pope Paul III., in the beginning of the war of 1542, pointed out to that pontiff, that the sole cause of the rupture between the two monarchs of England and Scotland was the loyal refusal of James V. to break with the Holy See and with France.¹⁰ The Pope fully recognized this, for in January, 1543, before the news of the king's death, had reached Rome, he granted a large subsidy from the ecclesiastical revenues of Scotland for the prosecution of the war with Henry, whom he styles "that son of perdition who is labouring for no other end than to make himself master of Scotland, and destroy the Catholic faith there as he has already done in England."¹¹ Enough for the present of Henry VIII. and his intrigues; it will be necessary to return to the subject in a future page.

It will naturally be asked: how could such schemes meet with ultimate success in the overthrow of the Church, if religion had so small a part in them? The question opens out a portion of the subject by no means pleasant to contemplate.

An impregnable fortress, well manned, sufficiently victualled for a long siege, may resist successfully the violent attacks of hostile arms for almost any length of time; strong defences, plentiful supplies, and brave and capable warriors render its capture a matter of practical impossibility. But one insignificant being only, is able to put an end to this security; let one of the inmates, whether by accident or design, give entrance to the foe, and ultimate defence is no longer possible; the garrison overcome, the citadel must fall. The metaphor may be applied to the Scottish Church. The fortress from its nature was impregnable; had the garrison remained staunch the victory must have been ultimately with the Church; the enemies

¹⁰ "Tanti autem belli causa non alia sane extitit, nisi quod Serenissimus Dominus meus a Sancta ista Sede Apostolica deflere, illiusque insaniam sequi noluerit, Christianissimique Gallorum Regis, soceri sui, partes deserere, suasque contra illum sequi recusarit." Theiner, *Monumenta*, p. 613.

¹¹ "Nihil aliud molitur, nisi ut regnum Scotiae occupet, et Catholicam et orthodoxam fidem in eo, sicut in Anglia fecit, destruat." Bellesheim, *Geschichte der Katholischen Kirche in Schottland*, Vol. I., p. 341 (note).

ranged against her were powerless of themselves to overthrow her. "Les sophistes ont ebranlé l'autel, mais ce sont les prêtres qui l'ont avilé," said a French writer; the accusation is not without reason when levelled at the Scottish clergy. It is impossible to deny that those were most responsible for the downfall of the Church whose duty it was to man her bulwarks.

Protestant historians are never weary of pouring out torrents of abusive rhetoric upon the Scottish Church as it existed at the time of the Reformation. Some of them would have us believe that the clergy were nearly all worthless, the bishops false hirelings, the whole ecclesiastical system "rotten to the core." Such statements are gross exaggerations. In all that tended to set forth the glory of the Scottish Church, the quotations in these pages have been designedly taken from writers of avowed Protestant principles. It is, therefore, only fair that whatever of blame may attach to the prelates and clergy should be stated in the words of faithful sons of the Catholic Church.

But first it may not be unprofitable to give a glance at some of the charges made by contemporaries of a less friendly disposition. Sir David Lindsay, of the Mount, the popular satirist of the time, is far too sympathetic with the reforming party to be taken as a reliable witness, even if he were not a professional humorist; still no satire is acceptable unless it contain a grain or two of truth, and it will be worth while to give some quotations from this witty though often scurrilous writer, as an index to the popular sentiment at the time. In his "Satyre on the Thrie Estaitis," he thus sums up the office of a Pastor:

"Ane bishop's office is for to be ane prechour
And of the law of God ane public techour."¹²

In the same play he puts into the mouth of a bishop the following naive confession:

"I red never the New Testament nor auld
Nor ever thinks to do, Sir, be the Rude;
I heir Freiris say, that reiding does na gude."¹³

The accusation of neglect of study and preaching on the part of ecclesiastics runs all through his satires. He was no lover of the clergy and lost no occasion of holding them up to ridicule. His special antipathy was against the Friars, probably on account of their indefatigable zeal for religion. It is said that he once found an opportunity of reprehending the mode of ecclesiastical patronage then in vogue, by applying to James V. for the appointment of himself as Master-tailor to the King. James was amazed. "Sir,"

¹² Laing, *Works of Sir D. Lindsay*, Vol. II., p. 146.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 147.

said Lindsay, "you have given bishoprics and benefices to mony standing here about you, and yet they can nouthier teach nor preach: and why may not I as weil be your taylor, thocht I can nouthier shape nor sew?"¹⁴

All this cannot of course be accepted as genuine evidence, for in such satires exaggeration belongs to their very nature; yet witnesses of a more sober sort bear testimony to the same deficiency on the part of many of the pastors of the Scottish Church. The estimable John Lesley, Bishop of Ross, the faithful companion in exile of the persecuted Mary Stuart, and the author of a history of his times, in treating upon the Reformation, asks how the overthrow of religion could have been accomplished in so short a time. "It was not," he answers, "that the rulers of the Church had betrayed their trust; but that they did not promptly extinguish the sparks of heresy by instruction, explanation and reproof as they ought to have done." He goes on to say, "The source and origin of the evil was that the people, neglected by the clergy and uninstructed in the catechism in their tender years, had no sure and certain belief."¹⁵

The evidence of Bishop Lesley is borne out by the repeated enactments of ecclesiastical councils and synods in the 16th century. Thus the Provincial National Council, which assembled under the presidency of Archbishop Hamilton in the Blackfriars' Church, Edinburgh, in August, 1549, decreed that every Ordinary should preach publicly at least four times a year; and *if unaccustomed to this duty*, they were to fit themselves for it by study, and by receiving into their houses men skilled in sacred learning. Rectors of parishes, *who in the judgment of the Ordinary were competent for the office*, were in like manner bound to preach at least four times a year. Those *unable to preach* were to fit themselves for the duty by studying in some public seminary, providing approved substitutes for their respective parishes in the meantime. A theologian and canonist were to be attached to each cathedral; the former to lecture on Sacred Scripture at least once a week, and to preach in the cathedral and other churches; the latter to lecture in Canon Law to the clergy. The passages which are here put in italics bear witness to the necessity of the legislation, just as the enactments themselves—a fact often overlooked by unsympathetic writers—testify to the anxiety of the majority, at least, of the prelates for the reformation of abuses. For in this council sixty ecclesiastics took part, among them being seven out of the thirteen bishops, and the representatives of two vacant sees.

Another council, held in 1552, emphasises these decrees relating

¹⁴ Lesley, *Do Rebus Gestis Scotorum*, lib. X.

¹⁵ Irving, *Lives of Scottish Poets*.

to the instruction of the people by a still more stringent enactment, in itself illustrative of the crying need for reform. Lamenting the fact that neither the prelates nor the inferior clergy were as a rule sufficiently learned to be able to instruct the people in the faith, or to convert those who had been led into error by the false teachers then rife, the council decreed that a catechism should be compiled containing a brief, clear and Catholic explanation of the doctrines of the Church, and that the clergy should read from it for the space of half an hour every Sunday and holy day to their respective flocks, except on such occasion as there should be a public sermon delivered by a religious or by some other preacher.

This catechism, known by the name of "Archbishop Hamilton's," was accordingly compiled and put into use in the same year. Even writers of pronounced Protestant tendencies are forced to witness to its value. "No divine at this day," said one, writing nearly two centuries after, "need be ashamed of such a work. Its composition," he says, "shows that all the clergy in those days have not been such dunces as some people would make us apprehend."¹⁰

The last Council of this kind ever held in Scotland assembled in 1559, and again insisted on the instruction of the people; binding the bishops to preach not merely four times a year, but more frequently, as the Council of Trent had enjoined. It also insisted on catechetical instructions or sermons being provided by all parochial clergy for their respective flocks on every Sunday and holy day, and indicated the special articles of faith upon which stress was to be laid. But enough has been said on this subject to show that there was need of legislation in the matter, and that the prelates attempted to supply it. The pity was that the remedy came too late.

generated by hostile writers. Lindsay's pages teem with scurrilous of truth, but there is no question but they have been grossly exaggerated by hostile writers. Lindsay's pages teem with scurrillous imputations which are unfit for quotation. Other authors, too, would have us believe that the lives of all the clergy were grossly immoral. In this matter the same may be asserted as with regard to the ignorance and indifference of prelates and others in connection with the instruction of the people; there was need of reform, but it is certain that all were not corrupt. Bishop Lesley, among the reasons he gives for the success of the Protestant movement touches on this subject also. "The lives of many ecclesiastical persons," he says, "were apparently stained by avarice and voluptuousness, and this gave to the sectarian ministers matter enough to cry down the Church with the common people, maintaining that the

¹⁰ Keith, *Affairs of Church and State*, p. 63, note (d).

light of the Gospel could not dwell in the darkness of vice.”¹⁷ Another Catholic witness is found in Father de Gouda, of the Society of Jesus, an emissary from Pope Pius IV. to Queen Mary, in 1562. “The lives of priests and clerics,” he says, “are not unfrequently such as to cause grave scandal; an evil increased by the supine indifference and negligence of the bishops themselves.”¹⁸

Here again it is to be noted that neither writer affirms the general depravity of the clergy. “The lives of many,” says Bishop Lesley; “not unfrequently,” is the expression of Fr. de Gouda. The legislation of ecclesiastical councils in this matter also testifies to the existence of the evil, but at the same time to the anxiety of the majority to remedy it. We have indeed shining examples of uprightness of life as well as zeal for learning in many of the prelates of the time.

Robert Reid, Bishop of Orkney, was not only a man of irreproachable life, but a distinguished patron of letters. When Commendator of Kinloss, and afterwards of Beaulieu, he brought from Italy the learned Ferrerius to become the instructor of the Monks of those houses in classical knowledge. He was also, as we have already seen, the practical founder of Edinburgh University. A Protestant writer, McCosmo Innes, pays an eloquent tribute to the virtues, learning and piety of this estimable bishop. “Than such a prelate, religious, learned, and fostering learning, loving the arts, and encouraging them, religion has no shape more dignified and amiable.”¹⁹ The same writer pays an eloquent tribute to “the blessed influence such a bishop exercised” over his diocese. Archbishop Foreman, who died in 1521, is another brilliant example of a worthy pastor of souls; Archbishop Hamilton’s zeal has already been noticed; James Beaton, Archbishop of Glasgow (1552-60), who suffered exile for his faith and died full of days in Paris in 1603, was another worthy prelate; of Bishop Elphinstone much has been said already: these are a few noble names out of many.

Among the regular prelates too, are not a few who are worthy of mention: Abbot Chrystall of Kinloss, a great patron of letters; Abbot Myln of Cambuskenneth, who sent his subjects to study in Paris; Ninian Winzet, a priest, master of Linlithgow Grammar School, banished for his faith and afterwards Abbot of Ratisbon; Quentin Kennedy, the valiant Abbot of Crossraguel, a truly loyal son of the Catholic Church, who ceased not by every means in his power to confute heresy and further the truth; Gilbert Brown, Abbot of Sweetheart, one of the most vigorous opponents of the new doctrine, who was banished for his persistence in saying Mass:

¹⁷ Lesley, *De Rebus Gest. Scot.*, lib. X.¹⁸ Forbes Leith, *Narratives of Scott. Catholics*, p. 76.

¹⁹ *Quarterly Review*, Vol. LXXII., p. 394.

these are names to be held in remembrance out of a crowd of others of like renown.

And now it will be well to glance at the causes which led to the evident neglect of duty and laxity of morals which characterized some of the prelates and clergy. Fr. de Gouda, who has been already quoted, gives the opinion of sensible Catholics in Scotland at the time as to the origin of the misfortunes of the country. "They consider them," he says, "as owing to the suspension of the ordinary mode of election to abbacies and other high dignities. The preferments are conferred upon children or other incapable persons, without any care for God's honor and the service of the Church, and very often one such person holds several offices in the same church."²⁰ A Protestant writer of note, Mr. Gairdner, says of the Scottish sees: "Numerous instances of bishops of one family succeeding each other in the same sees show the extraordinary prevalence of nepotism. . . . In one see there had been a succession of Stewarts, in another of Gordons, in another of Hepburns; and the Church, which in all other countries had broken the neck of feudalism . . . fell, like everything else in Scotland, completely under the sway of the king and nobles."²¹ Previous to the Reformation, too many of the bishops were mere feudal lords—sometimes courtiers, sometimes warriors, sometimes statesmen—too seldom real pastors of souls. Easy, worldly lives in the prelates were not calculated to further the ecclesiastical virtues in the inferior clergy, and thus arose the lamentable neglect of duty which later ages tried in vain to remedy. And the origin of it all may be traced to the state of things referred to by the writers above quoted.

The system of presentation instead of canonical election to sees and abbacies was the root of the evil. It began in the right assumed by the crown early in the 15th century, of appointing some favorite to the vacant see or benefice, and became in course of time a recognised mode of procedure. Owing to this pernicious system the most unworthy persons were often promoted to high office and it began to be practically a settled thing for the natural children of the sovereign and the greater nobles to be thus provided for. Especially was this the case with the religious houses. The custom of appointing a superior *in commendam*, that is, to take charge of the benefice during a vacancy, grew into the practice of handing over the revenues to such superior—generally a noble, seldom even a cleric—for the term of his natural life.

The result of this disgraceful state of things was that a natural son of James IV., when only 16 years of age, was raised to the primacy

²⁰ Forbes Leith, *Narratives*, p. 76.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 8 (note).

in 1509. How little of the typical churchman there was in his character is seen by the fact that he died in the battle of Flodden fighting at his father's side. Besides the archbishopric of St. Andrews, he held the Abbacy of Dunfermline and the Priory of Coldingham. James V. is a still more notorious example. Five, if not six of his illegitimate sons were promoted to benefices. James Stewart, afterwards Earl of Moray, was made perpetual Commendator of the Priory of St. Andrews, and later, of Pittenweem also; another James held the Abbeys of Kelso and Melrose; John Stewart was Prior of Coldingham and drew a yearly pension from the revenues of the see of Orkney; Robert Stewart, afterwards Earl of Orkney, was perpetual Commendator of Holyrood; Adam was made Prior of the Charter-house in Perth.

It is easy to see that with such a disposal of the benefices of the Church, neither worthy bishops nor zealous religious superiors could well be expected to flourish in the country. The marvel is—not that the clergy were in some cases unworthy of their high calling, but that they were not all, as some would have us believe, utterly depraved. The mercy of God preserved throughout those evil times a faithful remnant, as history clearly shows. The monks of Dunfermline and Paisley, Kelso and Crossraguel, still clung to their ruined homes, when all the glory had departed, and many of them ended their days in those ruins. James V. warmly commended the Franciscans of his Kingdom to the favour of Pope Clement VII., in 1531; speaking of them as religious of good observance and of the greatest purity of life.²² Many of the secular clergy, too, were good and holy priests. In 1569, four of those attached to Dunblane Cathedral were tied to the market cross at Stirling wearing their sacred vestments and holding chalices, while the mob “cast eggs and other villany at their faces for over an hour, and thereafter their vestments and chalices were burnt to ashes” by the common hangman. Their crime was that of saying Mass.

Amid all the dangers which threatened the Church from foes without and apathetic defenders within, there was one man alone fitted by his high position, energetic character, and ability as a statesman to stand forward in defence of religion and country. This was David Beaton, Cardinal Archbishop of St. Andrews.

He was the third son of John Beaton of Balfour, in Fifeshire, and was born in 1494. Of his early life little is known; he matriculated at the University of St. Andrews, and in his 16th year passed to the University of Glasgow, where his uncle, James Beaton, was then Archbishop. Afterwards he spent some years in the study of Canon

²² Theiner, *Monumenta*, p. 597.

and Civil Law at Paris—a university at that time renowned for those branches of knowledge. He had returned to Scotland before 1519; for, having come under the notice of the regent Albany, he was sent in that year to act as Scottish resident at the Court of Francis I; his French education and legal studies rendering him eminently fitted for the post. He was then in his 25th year and made full use of his opportunities to become proficient in the art of diplomacy. He was presented by his uncle, the Archbishop of Glasgow, to the benefices of Campsie and Cambusland in that diocese; and in 1523, when that prelate was translated to the primatial see, received in addition the abbacy of Abroath, which the Archbishop resigned in favor of his nephew.

In 1525 David Beaton took his seat in the Scottish parliament as titular Abbot of the above monastery, and from that time advanced rapidly to the highest offices of state. He became, in 1528, Lord Privy Seal and constantly grew in favour with James V. He successfully negotiated both marriages of that monarch, and it was in connection with the visit to France to arrange the match with Mary of Guise that Francis I conferred upon him the Bishopric of Mirepoix, a suffragan see of Toulouse, which brought him an annual income of 10,000 livres. This gift was confirmed by the Pope December 5, 1537. Soon after the French King petitioned Paul III. to raise the newly made prelate to the cardinalate, and this dignity was eagerly sought for him by James V. also, and was conferred in 1538. In that year Beaton had already been appointed coadjutor to his uncle with the right of succession, and early in 1539, at the death of Archbishop James Beaton, he became primate.

The jealousy of Henry VIII. had been long roused against the strong-minded ecclesiastic who stood so high in the counsels of the Scottish King, and he made many a secret attempt to stir up animosity between James and his minister, but without effect. At the untimely death of the former all Henry's powers of intrigue were exerted to ruin the influence of the Cardinal in Scotland; for in him the English King recognized the only formidable opponent to his ambitious designs. From that time forward until the death of both of them the history of the Scottish Reformation is practically a record of the plots of the one and the masterly opposition of the other.

After the death of James V. a regency was proclaimed at Edinburgh Cross, under the dying instructions of that monarch, consisting of Cardinal Beaton, with the Earls of Huntly, Argyle and Moray. The Earl of Arran, heir presumptive to the throne, though unfitted for the office by his weakness of character, combined with the majority of the nobles in order to get himself appointed Regent in place of

the Cardinal and the other earls. Under pretence that the Cardinal had been making overtures to the Duke of Guise to assume the government on behalf of the infant queen, Arran seized him and imprisoned him in Blackness Castle, acting, as it is thought, on the instigation of Henry VIII. and the English faction, at the head of which was Angus, lately returned from England. The governor then openly espoused the cause of the Puritan party and promised to bring about the reform of the Scottish Church after the model of the English. On the imprisonment of the Cardinal, the greater part of the kingdom was placed under an interdict. Mass was suspended; no Sacraments were administered, and feeling ran so high among the people that it was deemed prudent to set him at liberty. He immediately gathered round him the nobles of the Scottish party, together with the whole of the clergy, and deliberated on the means to further the national cause. The persons of the infant queen and her mother were placed in safety, and many of the nobles, through the Cardinal's influence, were induced to break faith with Henry VIII. Among these was the governor Arran, who had been won by the promise of the hand of the Princess Elizabeth and the prospect of the throne of Scotland. He abjured his Protestant opinions in the Franciscan Church at Stirling, and from that time was staunch in his adherence to the policy of the Cardinal.

Henry VIII., seeing no prospect of carrying out his designs during Cardinal Beaton's life, had no hesitation in conniving at a plot for his assassination. This is clear from letters found among the State Papers of the time. Indeed, there is good reason to suppose that the English King took a more active part in the affair than appears on the surface; for not all the letters have been preserved. Among the secret correspondence of the period is a letter dated 30 May, 1545, referring to an offer made by the Earl of Cassillis to kill the Cardinal, "if his majesty wold have it done, and wold promise, when it were done, a reward." The letter goes on to inform the agent in the affair, the Earl of Hertford, that "his highness, reputing the fact not mete to be set forward expressly by his majesty, will not seem to have to do in it; and yet, not misliking the offer, thinketh good that Mr. Saddleyr, to whom that letter was addressed, should write to th' Erle he shall say, that if he were in th' Erle of Cassillis' place, and were as able to do his majesty good service there as he knoweth him to be, . . . he would surely do what he could for th' execution of it, believing verily to do thereby not only an acceptable service to the King's Majesty, but also a special benefit to the realme of Scotland, and would trust verily the King's Majesty would consider his service in the same."²³

²³ *State Papers*, Henry VIII., Vol. V., p. 449.

In 1544 Henry had already begun to make war on Scotland, and in terms of the greatest cruelty had ordered Hertford to direct his attention especially to "the Fife land not forgetting, amongst all the rest, so to spoil and turn upside down the Cardinal's town of St. Andrews, as the upper stone may be the nether, and not one stick stand by another, sparing no creature alive within the same, specially such as either in friendship or blood be allied to the Cardinal."²⁴ The result was the wholesale destruction of the great border monasteries, Melrose, Jedburgh, Kelso and Dryburgh, with many smaller houses and churches.

To add to the trouble of the government, the reforming party under the protection of the nobles began to agitate amongst the people in the large towns. Wishart, who had lately returned to Scotland, preached in Dundee, Perth, Ayr and Montrose, declaiming against Popery in a way that stirred up the populace to fanaticism. The result was the destruction by the mob of the convents of the Dominicans and Franciscans at Dundee, the sack of the Abbey of Lindores, and an attempt to overthrow the Blackfriars' Convent at Edinburgh. When the citizens rose to protect the latter, Wishart threatened them with Heaven's vengeance for daring to oppose.²⁵ The reformer was accordingly arrested and put upon his trial, and finally executed as an obdurate heretic at St. Andrews, March 28, 1546. By many writers he is considered to have played a foremost part in the plot against the Cardinal's life. It is clear from the State Papers that "one Wishart" was the bearer of communications on the subject from Crichton, Laird of Brunston, to Henry VIII.,²⁶ and Wishart, "the Martyr," was at that time under the protection of Brunston, and was in the company of that gentleman when arrested.²⁷

The execution of Wishart hurried on the plot against the Cardinal. Brunston and others had long been in correspondence with Henry on the subject. In May, 1546, it was determined to strike the blow. John Lesley, brother of the Earl of Rothes, says Knox, "in all companies spared not to say that that same dagger, showing forth his dagger, and that same hand should be put in the Cardinal's breast; or, as Spottiswood puts it: "that his hand and dagger should be the Cardinal's priests." On Saturday, May 29th, at an

²⁴ Tytler, *History*, Vol. VIII., p. 365.

²⁵ It is not universally accepted that Wishart's preaching was responsible for these results. Tytler, however (Vol. III., p. 41), attributes the outbreak to the influence of the reformer, and Mr. Andrew Lang (*Blackwood's Mag.*, March, 1898,) is still more positive about it.

²⁶ *State Papers*, Henry VIII., Vol. V., 377-8.

²⁷ *Vide* Lang, *The Truth about the Cardinal's Murder*, *Blackwood's Magazine*, March, 1898.

early hour in the morning, Norman Lesley, Master of Rothes, one of those who had consented to be the Cardinal's murderers, in the proposal sent to Henry VIII. by Wishart, his uncle John Leslie, Andrew Melville, and other conspirators, forced their way into the castle of St. Andrews, and, probably by the corruption of the servants, penetrated to the Cardinal's chamber. "Threatening to burn down the door, it was at once opened. The Cardinal, sitting on a chair cried to the men who thronged his chamber: "I am a priest! I am a priest! Ye will not slay me!" Andrew Melville, described by Knox as "a man most gentle and most modest," called upon the Cardinal to repent of his former wicked life, and especially of shedding Wishart's blood, then immediately ran his sword through and through his body, avowing himself the messenger of God in despatching the enemy of Christ and his Holy Gospel. The prelate's mangled body was treated with every indignity and suspended by a sheet from the castle window by Norman Lesley, who cried to the people: "There is your God; and now that ye are satisfied, get you home to your houses." "These things we write merrily," says Knox in his account of the murder.

The complicity of Henry VIII. is attested by the pensions with which he rewarded the murderers. Sadler reported that the deed was done "to please God" and "for Christian zeal," but mentions also for the further reason of "a small sum of money."²⁸ From the Privy Council Records it appears that Norman Lesley received £250, and others of less prominence smaller sums. Tytler, speaking of the correspondence of the conspirators, which was overlooked by historians till a comparatively recent date, makes the following important statement: "By its disclosure we have been enabled to trace the secret history of these iniquitous times, and it may now be pronounced without fear of contradiction, that the assassination of Beaton was no sudden event, arising simply out of indignation for the fate of Wishart, but an act of long projected murder, encouraged, if not originated by the English monarch."²⁹

After the perpetration of the cruel deed, the conspirators, together with a number of other adherents, fortified themselves in the castle of St. Andrews, which, by the help of supplies furnished by Henry VIII., they managed to hold for fourteen months, in spite of the efforts of the Regent to retake it. In their company was John Knox, one of their "chaplains," who, together with the other rebels, was sent to the French galleys when the auxiliaries from France effected the downfall of their stronghold. The constant association of this man with the conspirators, and his close attachment to

²⁸ *State Papers, Henry VIII.*, Vol. V., p. 470.

²⁹ Tytler, *Hist. of Scot.*, Vol. III., p. 48.

Wishart, have thrown upon him also the strong suspicion of being implicated in the murder.³⁰

The character of Cardinal Beaton "has been," says a Protestant clergyman, "as much mangled by Knox, Buchanan and Sir David Lindsay, as his body was by his assassins."³¹ Among other crimes he has been charged with poisoning James V. and forging that monarch's will. The first accusation is too absurd to need refutation. It was clearly against the Cardinal's interest, and the welfare of both Church and State, to desire the king's death at so critical a moment. The charge of forgery is dismissed by Buckle, a writer of strong Anti-Catholic leanings, as having not the slightest evidence to prove it. "Some writers," he says with telling irony, "being themselves Protestants, seem to suppose that the fact of a man being a cardinal qualifies him for every crime."³² Mr. Lang, in a recent article, defends the great statesman with much enthusiasm; "A more shadowy charge," he says, "was never framed." He discusses the question minutely, and affirms stoutly the absence of proof.³³ Mr. Hay Fleming, who avows that he has no admiration for the Cardinal, attacks Mr. Lang in another article;³⁴ but although he criticises severely the method and reasoning of the latter, he does not succeed in establishing the truth of the charge in question.

The grossest statements have been made concerning the private life of the Cardinal. It must, however, be borne in mind that they have emanated from his sworn enemies, and are strenuously denied by his admirers—Lesley, Winzet and Barne—who are fully as worthy of credit.³⁵ Many of these charges rest on the sole testimony of Knox. He, beside being a priest who disregarded his obligations and was twice married, the second time to a girl of 16 when he was himself 60 years of age, is spoken of by contemporaries, Nichol Burne, James Laing, and Archibald Hamilton, as guilty of notorious vices of immorality at various times in his life;³⁶ he is therefore not an acceptable witness for the purity requisite in the priesthood.

That Cardinal Beaton was the only formidable opponent of the Reformation all writers allow. "Undoubtedly, if he had lived," says a Protestant writer, "the Reformers would have had a still harder fight for the victory."³⁷ "So short was the time between it (the murder) and the destruction of the ancient national faith," says

³⁰ Vide, Lang, *Blackwood's Mag.* ³¹ Lyon, *History of S. Andrews*, Vol. I., p. 304.

³² Buckle, *Hist. of Civilisation*, Vol. III., p. 70.

³³ Lang, *op. cit.*

³⁴ *Contemporary Review*, Sept., 1898.

³⁵ Lyon, *Hist. of S. Andrews*, Vol. I., p. 305.

³⁶ Vide Wilmot, *Hist. of Scott. Reformation*, pp. 55 seq. Stevenson, *Scotland and Rome*,

another, "that Beaton must be held to have been the last support of the Catholic Church."³⁸

To a Catholic it is gratifying to hear writers of another faith eulogise a prominent prelate of the Church, as "perhaps the most consummate statesman whom Scotland ever produced,"³⁹ whose character "shines against the blackness of his assassins;" or, as "almost the last politician to keep Scotland within the circle of European interests,"⁴⁰ but it would seem more to the purpose to inquire whether he was merely a politician who wished to save his country, or whether he fought, as a good Catholic should, for the Church and the Faith.

We have already seen his letter to Pope Paul III. that he looked upon the war with England as a result of James V.'s unswerving loyalty to the Holy See. In another letter to Rome, the Cardinal speaks of his overwhelming labors, but protests that he shrinks from no labor, cost or danger to bring back peace and concord, and destroy schism and heresy.⁴¹ The assertion is borne out by his zeal in striving to stop heretical teaching. His proceedings against Wishart, repugnant though they may be to modern notions, were recognized as just and lawful in that age, and they undoubtedly were the immediate cause of the loss of his life. We take leave of the great Cardinal in the enthusiastic words of Mr. Lang: "Beside his opponents, Beaton shows like a gentleman. 'I shun no danger,' he wrote to the Pope, 'if I may ward off danger from others.' God rest the soul of David Beaton! he fought for Scotland."⁴²

With the pillar of the Church's strength cast down, the work of destruction was swift. By the help of their French allies the Scottish arms were victorious over the English in several engagements, and peace was concluded between the two countries in 1550. In spite of the strenuous efforts of the ecclesiastical authorities which followed upon the peace, Protestantism continued to gain ground, receiving fresh support from the proscribed preachers who fled from England at Mary's accession. In 1555 Knox, who had taken refuge for a time in Geneva, returned to Scotland, and began to preach his doctrines in private houses, and afterwards more openly. In 1556, alarmed at the threatening attitude of the authorities, he fled again to Geneva.

Meanwhile the Protestant lords grew more bold, the Regent, Mary of Guise, was unable to cope with them, and sought to pacify them by promising them freedom from molestation. On December 3, 1557, the "Solemn League and Covenant," by which the re-

³⁸ Herkless, *Cardinal Beaton*, p. 6. ³⁹ Lang, *Blackwood's Mag.* ⁴⁰ Herkless, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴¹ Theiner, *Monumenta*, p. 615.

⁴² *Blackwood's Mag.*

forming party cut themselves off from the Catholic Church was subscribed by the leaders.

After Elizabeth's accession Knox summoned up courage to return to Scotland, knowing that the English government would ever be ready, as in the past, to encourage treason and heresy in the northern kingdom. The "Lords of the Congregation," emboldened by his presence, resolved to force their opinions upon the nation. Knox furiously denounced the Catholic religion in an inflammatory sermon in St. John's Church, Perth, and in response to his appeal to his audience to destroy all the monuments of idolatry, the mob attacked the sacred images, altars and adornments of that splendid Church, leaving little but the bare walls standing. The work of destruction lasted two days and spread to all the churches and religious houses in the city, and on to St. Andrews, Stirling and Edinburgh the "rascal multitude" pressed, bent on their ungodly work—desolated sanctuaries and blackened ruins marking the way they had trodden.

It was but the beginning of the end; the proscription of the Catholic religion and the substitution of Calvinism in its place was the inevitable sequence. After fire and bloodshed and the desecration of all that was holy, the climax came on August 24, 1560, when Parliament declared it a crime to profess the Catholic Faith in Scotland, abolished "for ever" the jurisdiction of the Pope, and forbade the celebration of Mass under the penalty of death for the third offence.

Yet the people clung still to the ancient faith. Round the ruined monasteries groups of Catholics lingered. Paisley, a century after, was described as "a very nest of Papists." Among the mountains of the north and in the lonely islands of the west it never died out, and to this day the faithful Catholics of those favoured regions proudly boast of an unstrained religious record during the centuries that have passed.

The Church in the Reformation period, in the words of Fr. Stevenson, the eminent Catholic historian, "underwent a great trial, and bent beneath it—for a time, not permanently, for her days are eternal." The re-action has already set in, and Scotland can boast of an established hierarchy ruling some three hundred and eighty thousand souls. Religious orders have come back to the land, Churches and monasteries are rising, and the signs of renewed life are seen everywhere.

May the continual prayers for unity to which the Vicar of Christ so lovingly exhorts his children hasten the day when the Church, Catholic and Apostolic, the sole teacher of truth to Scotland in past ages, may once more rule that realm with undisputed sway.

DOM MICHAEL BARRETT, O. S. B.

TERTULLIAN'S "IMPOSSIBLE."

Verba non sono solo sapiunt, sed et sensu: nec auribus tantummodo audienda sunt, sed et mentibus.—*Adv. Gnos. Scorpiace*, Cap. 7.

“THE real value of a word lies not in its sound, but in its meaning,” pleads Tertullian. A word is, in truth, but the sign of an idea; and if the sign be misinterpreted, the idea shall not fare better. The great African Father can scarce accuse his interpreters of any wilful or wanton disregard of such a canon of exegesis. Their herculean task, as well as their patient and heroic attempts to accomplish it, may be seen of all men in any edition of his complete works. To the manuscript-difficulties they replied by innumerable suggested readings and literal variants. To the “barbarous and African Latinity,” as Chateaubriand styles it, which is so prominent a characteristic of his phraseology, they replied by unwearied attempts to construct more than one acutely critical *Index Latinitatis*. To his “iron style”—with which metal, as Balzac declares, it must be allowed that he has forged excellent weapons—they replied by interpretative annotations and warning *prolegomena*. The whole ground has thus been often and very thoroughly gone over, although, it must be confessed, it has not been so very thoroughly cleared. Whatever difficulty still remains may well be considered *quasi-essential*.

The reader's attention has been called here to this summarized labor of the critics, in order to set over against that labor the curious fact that one little sentence of Tertullian, which must have seemed clear enough to all of them (for not one of them, as far as we know, has in any way annotated it), is the only one that has crept into general literature. It has been most widely quoted, misquoted, misunderstood. In a mangled, incorrect, but very prettily condensed form, it has been ascribed to St. Augustine. It constitutes for many their only familiarity with either St. Augustine or Tertullian. Even for those who should know better, it has formed the basis of invective against “the African Bossuet,” as a man whose fanatical spirit proclaimed in a frenzied way its abhorrence of ordinary reason and common-sense. Brilliant, compact, clear, it is a crystallized expression of the whole of Tertullian's great soul. “*Credo quia impossibile*”—there is Tertullian in a nutshell!

I. "CREDO."

A literary history of the dictum should certainly prove as entertaining as it would be instructive. But it would also prove a large task—and we shall not attempt it. Some features of that history may, however, be illustrated here.

First of all, we may glance at the question of its ascription to St. Augustine. How many *bon-mots* have found a convenient parentage by adoption! There is nothing new under the sun—and even the professed wit must borrow at times from the genius of some less prominent farceur. But, on the other hand, what innumerable *obiter dicta* have found a parentage, unconscious to itself, by ascription! Refer a "bull" to Sir Boyle Roche, a witticism to O'Connell, an aphorism to Aristotle—and you will be very safe. You will probably feel as safe in referring any brilliant bit of eloquent Patristic argument or splendid rhetoric to St. Augustine. Who will confute you by a negative argument? That must take the form of a complete edition of his works—a patient measuring out, drop by drop, of the *mare magnum* of his voluminous writings. Accordingly, for many years the world has quoted, with enthusiastic approbation, the golden utterance: "In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas," and has ascribed it—(and to whom with more felicity?)—to the great Bishop of Hippo. It is a genuinely Catholic sentiment, although it has not been found in any pre-Reformation writer, and *may* have been originated by one of the "reformers." But who really said it? The negative argument has not found it in the *mare magnum*. In the same way the *Credo quia impossibile* (slightly altered into *Credo quia absurdum*) has been ascribed to the same Saint, and the claim has been rejected in the same way—by an investigation of the *mare*. The fact that Tertullian said "Certum est quia impossibile" is not a sufficient reason for denying that St. Augustine said "Credo quia absurdum." It is not a sufficient reason, but it is, in view of the history of quotations, a very good reason. For of all our faculties, the least modest, the least willing to confess haziness or imperfection—except on the witness-stand in court—is the Memory. And if it does not recall either the author it quotes from, or even the exact words of the author, it will hang the quotation, revised, on the most convenient peg. As has been said, this is a generally safe thing to do; but in the case of St. Augustine, an exception must be made. Your ascription to him may be challenged. It is said that a certain orator in the French Assembly once quoted the dictum *Credo quia absurdum*, and ascribed it to St. Augustine; whereupon Bishop Dupanloup "indignantly denied that St. Augustine ever said anything of the kind." The

onus probandi thereupon fell, properly, on the quoter. We may well fancy that he was quite unprepared for either the challenge or an answer to it.

The mutilations undergone by the dictum of Tertullian—from *Certum est* to *Credo*, and from *impossibile* to *absurdum*—should cause little wonder when we recall how some of the most-quoted phrases of Shakespeare have been mutilated by curtailments until they have quite lost their original meaning. For instance, "Now is the winter of our discontent"—the opening line of *King Richard the Third*—has no meaning by itself, is but a logical subject and copula calling for the predicate in the next line, "Made glorious summer by this sun of York." The opening line is nevertheless often quoted singly; so that the sentence, thus curtailed, destroys *is* as copula and turns it into a complete verb—*exists*, as though the sense were: "Now is discontent come upon us like winter." Again, the incomplete sentiment and sense of "One touch of Nature makes the whole world kin," is often used to extol the human impulse of fellow-feeling which requires but a touch, as it were, of our common nature to make the whole world a band of brothers. When Ulysses (*Tro. and Cres.*, act III. sc. 3) was rating the sulky Achilles, he used it in quite a different meaning:

One touch of nature makes the whole world kin,—
That all, with one consent, praise new-born gawds,
Though they are made and moulded of things past;
And give to dust, that is a little gilt,
More laud than gilt o'er-dusted.

A finer kind of mutilation is employed when a complete dictum is stolen from its cradle; loses, therefore, some of the parental care that should jealously guide its wanderings; and finally appears in all the strutting manhood of a *sui juris* sentence. A mutilation of this kind has been inflicted on the strong rhetoric of Tertullian. He did not write "*Credo quia impossibile*;" neither—to speak with logical, if not grammatical, strictness—did he say: "*Certum est quia impossibile*." The *Certum est*, as he wrote it, is not a general proposition, applying to all things impossible, but a particular proposition, applying to but one thing, as the context shows; "*et sepultus, resurrexit* (sc. *Christ*); *certum est quia impossibile*." How far the completed context may cause a revision of the meaning commonly associated with the mutilated sentence of Tertullian we shall consider further on. For the present it is sufficient to note that already the dictum has shrunk somewhat as a brilliant generalization.

That a divorce between text and context may prove a very valid

misrepresentation of an author's real meaning is one of the most familiar facts in the literature of controversy. A generally unsuspected illustration of this fact is furnished by the jocular turn given to the words of Shakspeare: "Stand not upon the order of your going, but go at once." This remark is often addressed to a single person; as though the "order of going" referred to a *command*, or to one's *manner* of departure, rather than to the question of *relative precedence*. We have almost forgotten its original significance—the terrible agitation of Lady Macbeth as she implores the lords in the banquet-hall to forget their order of precedence in leaving the scene of her husband's horrible frenzy.

Taken thus from its context, and rendered more incisive by the change of *Certum est* into *Credo*, the dictum has been a theme of abuse based on a greater or lesser degree of misconception—not of its meaning, but—of its reputed author's meaning. We can get a pretty good peep into the scientific laboratory of some great men through this loop-hole of quotation. Hear Huxley: "When one thinks that such delicate questions as those involved fell into the hands of men like Papias (who believed in the famous millenarium grape story); of Irenaeus with his 'reasons' for the existence of only four gospels; and of such calm and dispassionate judges as Tertullian, with his *Credo quia impossibile*, the marvel is that the selection which constitutes our New Testament is as free as it is from obviously objectional matter."¹ The retort courteous furnished by these very words of Huxley to "men like Papias," Irenaeus, Tertullian, is surely the irony of logic. *Mutato nomine de te fabula narratur!* Let us change the name and quote the great scientist against himself: "When one thinks that such delicate questions as those involved fell into the hands of men like" Huxley (who charges Tertullian with what he never said; who pretends to estimate that marvellous man, as though familiar with his writings, and describes him as a "calm and dispassionate judge!"²—a description of that gladiatorial figure as unique as are the impetuous argumentative onslaughts of the gladiator himself)—"the marvel is that the selection which constitutes the New Testament" of Science "is as free as it is from obviously objectional matter." Apropos of Huxley's "calm and dispassionate," we may make room for another estimate quoted by Prof. A. Harnack (in his article on Tertullian in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*), who says that "His writings in tone and character are always alike 'rich in thought and destitute of form,

¹ Quoted in *A Literary Manual of Foreign Quotations*, p. 26.

² Tertullian (*De Patientia* cap. 1.) confesses to an irritable disposition: "Ita miserimus ego, semper aeger caloribus impatientiae."

passionate and hair-splitting. . . . His eloquence . . . wins hearers and readers by the strength of its passion. . . . Though he is wanting in moderation . . ." etc. The moral pointed by our illustration of Huxley's argumentative style is the unabashed ease with which scientific opponents of Christianity esteem as grist all that can be gleaned from the fruitful fields of literature.

To these two variants, namely, *Credo quia impossibile* and *Credo quia absurdum*, it is necessary to add still another. Proteus faces us now in a new disguise: "*Credo quia ineptum*!" Matthew Arnold, in his *Literature and Dogma*,³ curiously holds as "the real objection both to the Catholic and to the Protestant doctrine as a basis for conduct;—not that it is a degrading superstition, but that it is *not sure*; that it assumes what cannot be *verified*." He then proceeds to attack specifically the Ritualists as beings on whom this objection "has and can as yet have, so far as one can see, no effect at all. Who that watches the energumens during the celebration of the Communion in some Ritualistic church, their gestures and behaviour, the floor of the church strewn with what seem to be the dying and the dead, progress to the altar almost barred by forms suddenly dropping as if they were shot in battle,—who that observes this delighted adoption of vehement rites, till yesterday unknown, adopted and practised now with all that absence of tact, measure, and correct perception in things of form and manner, all that slowness to see when they are making themselves ridiculous, which belongs to the people of our English race,—who, I say, that marks this can doubt, that for a not small portion of the religious community, a difficulty to the intelligence will for a long time yet be no difficulty at all? With their mental condition and habits, given a story to which their religious emotions can attach themselves, and the famous *Credo quia ineptum* will hold good with them still." I have quoted Arnold here rather extensively, in order to illustrate what is the meaning he attaches to the phrase. To render *ineptum* here by *ludicrous* would probably be not far from his understanding of "the famous *Credo quia ineptum*," although the trend of his "objection," more closely argued out, should require *ineptum* to be rendered *absurd*, or *foolish*, or *unreasonable*. Needless to say, we do not quote him for his logic or his reverence. The cogency of his illustration ("energumens!") is much less patent than its easy ridicule of emotions he does not share and cannot understand.

Let us pass on to another expression of our famous dictum—an expression which, in view of the wonderful unanimity of all the others thus far cited in respect of their opening word *Credo*, might

³ *Passages from the Prose Writings of Matthew Arnold*, p. 212.

well seem at first sight to be the most corrupted of all. It runs: *Certum est quia impossibile est*, and is thus found in Sir Thomas Browne's *Religio Medici* (Cap. IX): "Methinks there be not impossibilities enough in religion for an active faith: the deepest mysteries ours contains have not only been illustrated, but maintained, by syllogism and the rule of reason. I love to lose myself in a mystery; to pursue my reason to an *O altitudo!* 'Tis my solitary recreation to pose my apprehension with those involved enigmas and riddles of the Trinity—incarnation and resurrection. I can answer all the objections of Satan and my rebellious reason with that odd resolution I learned of Tertullian, *Certum est quia impossibile est.*"

Here we have the four of them—three agreeing in a *Credo* and disagreeing in all else:

1. *Credo quia impossibile.*
2. *Credo quia absurdum.*
3. *Credo quia ineptum.*
4. *Certum est quia impossibile est.*

Poor Tertullian! One feels that a Carlylesque apostrophe would not be out of order at this stage of our investigation: "O thou impossible Man! Shall not thy poor dust, scattered through the yet dustier pages of thy legion of professed commentators, have no rest in the gorgeous tomb or sculptured urn of a world-covenanted and unique expression of thy *haec dixit* instead of each man's own privy *ipse dixit* (twisted around to make the *ipse* refer not to himself, but to Thee and Thyself—whereas not *Thou* saidst, but *He* said it)? What? Thou hast not uttered these poor *Credos*? And has then the whole literary, and scientific, and philosophical, and part of the religious world, too, despite the swarms of bee-critics (and some would-be critics) who have sipped lifelong honey from thy flowers only to feed the Drones with a few drops of thy inept *Credos*—has this world of ours shrieked out 'Tertullian said,' the while Thou didst not say? Impossible!" What retort courteous might the great African Father make to such an apostrophe? What other, indeed, than his own *Certum est quia impossibile*?

And in that answer we should perceive variant No. 5.

What did Tertullian really say? To speak with logical exactitude, he said none of these things, but instead wrote the splendidly rhetorical sentence which has been the favorite quarry for the blasting out of these too serviceable marbles. He addresses Marcion, and not the Nineteenth Century literary man, or scientist, or philosopher: *Natus est Dei Filius; non pudet, quia pudendum est: et mortuus est Dei Filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est: et sepultus, resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile.*

Various as have been the *Credos* attributed to Tertullian, there has been withal a strikingly consentient interpretation of them. Their rhetoric has been construed very literally; and Tertullian stands in general literature as a type of those hysterical believers whose fanatical spirit best expresses itself in an abhorrence of ordinary reason and common-sense. Thus he appears to Huxley, "with his *Credo quia impossibile*;" who accordingly marvels at the freedom of the New Testament selection from "obviously objectional matter." Thus, also, to Matthew Arnold, with his "famous *Credo quia ineptum*," as a man on whom reasonable "objection" can have no effect at all. Thus, too, to Sir Thomas Browne, as the author of "that odd resolution. . . *Certum est quia impossibile est*," which answers all the objections of Satan and rebellious reason. Thus, too, he is to some a prototype of Pascal—that hardly less-edited marvel—who appears "as an almost ferocious ascetic and paradoxer affecting the *credo quia impossibile* in intellectual matters and *odi quia amabile* in matters moral and sensuous."⁴

It might be asked: Do these crystallized dicta accurately represent the spirit of Tertullian? Or does the interpretation generally affixed to them fairly translate his meaning? Neander spent, from the standpoint of a Protestant, much effort in interpreting the general spirit of Tertullian. The *Antignostikos; Geist des Tertullianus*, etc., published in 1826, and re-published in an enlarged and emended form in 1849, should, one might think, have laid the ghost of the *Credos* attributed to Tertullian; and, by a partial quotation there introduced of the Latin original, have made a misquotation, at least, if not misinterpretation, practically impossible. Such, perhaps, was his thought when he penned these words in the *Preface* to the *Second Edition*:⁵ "There was a time of darkness, self-called enlightenment, which, in the contraction and obscurity of unconscious mental poverty, looked down with an air of pity on the greatness of earlier ages; it could not understand so striking a phenomenon as that of the new world of Christianity revealing itself to this man of rugged, wayward spirit, and fancied that by taking some paradoxical expressions of this eminent father on philosophy and reason, *torn from their connexion*, it could form an estimate of his whole character, thus judging of the fruit by the hard shell that protects it. But *this time has passed away*." We have italicized the cause of Neander's complaint, as well as his assurance that there is no further basis for it. The fact is, nevertheless, that the reason for the com-

⁴ One of the estimates of Pascal referred to by Saintsbury.

⁵ Ryland, publ. in Bohn's Stand. Lib., Vol. II., of *The Hist. of the Planting and Training*, etc., p. 195.

plaint has marvellously broadened since the day when Neander congratulated the present era on its improvement *in re* Tertullian. The Credos carelessly attributed to that "rugged, wayward spirit" have been multiplied and misinterpreted more than ever in our day. But let us hear the German historian further on the specific topic of our discussion. In his analysis of *De Carne Christi* he speaks of Tertullian's argumentative style, and incidentally refers to the words which have been the prolific parent of the Credos: "And here it may be proper to notice those words for which Tertullian has often been reproached, but which sound worse than they mean if taken in their connexion: '*Credibile est, quia ineptum est; certum est, quia impossibile.*' It may be easily perceived that the faith, the certainty of Tertullian, has a quite different ground from the *ineptum* and *impossibile*, and he was perfectly conscious of this ground. In order to form a right judgment of so original a writer, we must compare with such expressions (on which his ardent mind seized as a bold antithesis in maintaining a really profound truth) those other expressions in which he so emphatically urges the importance of the *rationale*."⁶

Despite Neander's confident approbation of the improved scholarship of his time, the illustrations brought together in our present discussion make it very clear that the world of literary and scientific men will continue to attach a meaning to the Credos quite alien to the mind and intent of Tertullian. What shall the apologist do with these little toys strewn so carelessly on every floor of the *House of Fame*? He can not gather them into one heap and burn them—for then the *House of Fame* might itself be placed in jeopardy! But may he not hope that, by insistent and provident warnings, the unsuspecting guest may learn to avoid stumbling over them in such a fashion as to risk breaking his head in the encounter? *Credo quia impossibile* has unquestionably—although, at the same time, strangely—proved already much of a stumbling-block. In this connection it will doubtless prove interesting to consider the suggestion offered by Mr. Joseph Wharton, the prominent Philadelphian,⁷ in his pamphlet printed last November for private distribution. The pamphlet (12 pp.) is entitled: "*Credo quia impossibile est.*" After noting that its title represents the common and wrong form of Tertullian's words, and after quoting the exact words of the original, Mr. Wharton urges his plea for a new connotation of the word 'quia.' So clearly and attractively is the argument made, that we

⁶ *Antignostikos* (Ryland, p. 474).

⁷ Founder of "The Wharton School of Finance and Economy" in the University of Pennsylvania, and a member of the Society of Friends.

should like to give space here to much of the author's own presentation of his theme; but our limits forbid. We avail ourselves of his courteous permission, however, to condense and to quote—which we shall do under the heading:

II. "QUIA."

Mr. Wharton admits that the language of Tertullian under review is paradoxical, and that it remains so even after a version into English that renders *quia* concessively and that freely expands, by appropriate interpolations, the compact original into flowing English. His aim is, therefore, "merely to mitigate the ferocity of that paradox as usually construed by suggesting such English rendition of the declarations of the Latin text as," he believes, "Tertullian would admit to be a correct expression of his views, and thus to make him comprehensible by English readers" (p. 6). He would render, therefore, the original text of Tertullian as follows:

Natus est Dei Filius; non pudet, quia pudendum est: et mortuus est Dei Filius; prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est: et sepultus, resurrexit; certum est, quia impossibile.

The Son of God was born: this is no cause for shame, though ordinary birth causes shame; and the Son of God died: this is perfectly credible, though it seems absurd; and having been buried, He rose again: this, though apparently impossible, is absolute fact.—(P. 4.)

In support of his suggested rendition of *quia* as *though* instead of *because*, he begs the reader to remember that Tertullian "was both subtle and uncompromising in controversy; that his mind appeared to leap at times to conclusions rather than take the pains to reach those conclusions by a series of logical steps; and that he seemed to delight in uttering paradoxes, perhaps to challenge attention to the points for which he was contending" (p. 1); and proceeds to argue as follows: "When Tertullian wrote there was no Latin-English lexicon; he wrote *quia* because that word, as he understood it, expressed what he wished to say, and it was no concern of his how some inhabitant of a distant country in a future age might construe the word. Our dictionary makers, in view of the numberless classical texts where *quia* obviously means 'because,' very properly set down that word as its synonym. Those who are mere dictionary users, although they may not in any instance lightly question this definition supported by such a wealth of examples, are at liberty to remember that Tertullian was a provincial—an African—writing at least two centuries after Cicero, and that distorted uses of words,

local perversions, variant meanings, and slang applications of words have always existed. A living language, as Latin emphatically was in Tertullian's time, is not absolutely rigid, but is plastic, as every philologist knows."⁸

He therefore asks: "May we assume that Tertullian aimed to accentuate his propositions by setting sharply against them opposites, which, while plausible, strengthen them by failing to overthrow them? May we therefore interpret *quia* as a disjunctive conjunction meaning 'although' or 'though?' May we, then, adding such words as seem fitting to expand the hard compactness of Latin into current English, interpret our text" as above?

Seeking an answer to these questions, Mr. Wharton submitted them first to a Catholic priest, who declared that Mr. Wharton's rendition of the text accurately represented the mind of Tertullian: then to "a learned professor in a great University who was pointed out" to him "as an eminent Latinist and a good authority concerning Tertullian," who disapproved the rendition: then to a second Catholic priest, who believed that *quia* should be rendered *because*; and, lastly, to a Protestant clergyman, "learned in Biblical and Oriental literature," who was inclined to accept *quia* in the sense of *because*. All of these advanced reasons for their respective views. The professor of Latin disallows the new connotation of *quia* as *though*, for the reason that the context does not imperatively demand it, and the usage of Tertullian militates against it. He notes that *quia* nowhere else in Latin has a concessive signification—an exact examination of the use of *quia* in post-classical Latin having already been made, with the result that a concessive *quia* is conspicuous by its absence; and that there is, therefore, an intrinsic improbability that it was used in this sense in one solitary passage of Tertullian. He objects to these interpolations in the English rendition: "*ordinary*;" "*seems absurd*;" "*apparently impossible*." The priest who had approved the rendition defends these interpolations on the score that Tertullian "jumped at conclusions, so rapid and impetuous was his thought, oftentimes leaving words to be filled in, just as writers and rapid talkers of our own day do." He contended that to fairly interpret a text, we should look at the context. Tertullian was engaged in refuting Marcion, and his refutation in capp. 4 and 5 was a running commentary on St. Paul, (I Cor. i. 27: "the foolish things of this world hath God chosen," etc.). When the text

⁸ "Brander Matthews, for instance, writing of 'New Words and Old' in *Harper's Magazine* for July, 1898, says, "'We have found out that nobody in Rome ever spoke Ciceronian Latin; Cicero did not speak it himself. . . . We have discovered that there was a wide gap between the elegance of the orator's polished periods and the uncouth bluntness of the vulgar tongue of the Roman people.'"

is separated from this context, a merely literal rendering fails to suggest the mind of Tertullian. Concessives, interpolations—*anything* that will save the reader of an isolated text from a complete misunderstanding of its author's real meaning should be permitted in the rendition of it into a foreign tongue. The priest who was unwilling to render *quia* concessively, contended that Tertullian was taking his argumentative cue from the words of Christ, "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible" (Matt. xix. 26), and had in mind not to make an *apology* (concessive) but an *apologia* (illative and vindicatory) which might be paraphrased thus: If some one should tell me that Almighty God has intervened in human affairs, and should allege as characteristics or phenomena of that intervention such characteristics as a finite creature might display, I should distrust the tale; but if, in support of the reported intervention, such characteristics should be alleged as only an *all-mighty* Being could display, I should infer and believe the rather that God had indeed intervened because (*quia*) things impossible (to human power) had been accomplished. For instance: Humans are the prey of the grave; God will therefore conquer the grave—an *impossibile quid* with men—*ergo*, a characteristic of God and his intervention. *Sepultus* (Dei Filius), *resurrexit: certum est quia impossibile*.

Practically identical with this comment is the estimate of the "Protestant clergyman, learned in Biblical and Oriental literature:" "I understand Tertullian to mean that in the realm of the supernatural he is not limited by the limits of the natural. He is familiar with the saying of Jesus, 'The things which are impossible with men are possible with God' (Luke xviii. 27). As the event of which he speaks is in the realm of the supernatural, it is to him all the more credible because in the realm of the natural it is impossible" (p. 9).

Of the last two critics quoted, Mr. Wharton writes:

"Their interesting remarks agree in the assumption, which may be conceded, that Tertullian aimed in this famous text to point out the possibility to God of that which is impossible to man, yet their argument does not justify his use of *quia* (if that word must be held to mean "because"), for *quamquam* would have served as well as—nay, much better than—*quia* to establish a line of demarcation between the two sorts of possibility, and to indicate his belief that certain occurrences were possible and actual on one side of that line, notwithstanding their impossibility on the other side. Besides, the first proposition of the text, namely, "*Natus est Dei Filius; non pudet quia pudendum est,*" where *quia* has exactly the same force as in the

two other branches of the text, is scarcely touched by that assumption, since that first branch involves not so much a question of divine possibility, as one of mere human sentiment or opinion.

"Obviously, Tertullian was thoroughly permeated by the feeling, experienced by so many in all ages, that the ways of God are not limited to the ways of man; that things impossible to man—nay, incomprehensible to man—are possible and open and feasible to God."

"In setting forth his argument, however, he largely failed to obtain acceptance, and indeed challenged the denial which it has so often encountered, when he chose to write "*certum est quia* (instead of *quamquam*) *impossibile*."

"It is easy to hold that such nice discussion of words is mere waste of time when time is already too short for the engrossing events that crowd our busy days. It is easy to say that the robust old theologian who never asked for aid or quarter would disdain such elucidation as is here offered, and still easier is it to pass him by with the light sneer that no one now cares what Tertullian said or what he meant to say.

"But it is not quite in vain to smooth the way, if possible, for careful students whose reason is sure to be shocked by the naked old stumbling block that is here considered."

Mr. Wharton concludes his paper by re-affirming his belief in the correctness of his rendition of the text, as a rendition that represents the *mind* of Tertullian.

III. "IMPOSSIBLE."

The plea for a new connotation of the word *quia* is ingenious, and the estimates formed of it by its four critics are interesting in that they display the various phases which a disputed text will present to different habits of mind. The present writer does not discover a very great difficulty in the interpretation of the original Latin text; and especially when it is considered—as it shall be further on in this paper—in connexion with its context. That it is paradoxical,⁹ and boldly so, is true. But paradoxes are rhetorical quantities, and are to be weighed in the scales, therefore, of rhetoric rather than of strict grammar or etymology. *Verba non sono solo sapiunt, sed et sensu; nec auribus tantummodo audienda sunt, sed et mentibus*. Our Lord spoke at times in paradoxes as well as in parables; for a stupendous truth can often be best understood—although not com-

⁹ It is needless to say that we use the word *paradox* in its second meaning—a truth under an appearance of untruth, reasonableness under that of unreasonableness, a *consequentia* under that of an *inconsequentia*. Perhaps *oxymoron* would more exactly describe the argumentation of Tertullian.

prehended—in the form of a stupendous paradox. Thomassinus, in his Tract on the Incarnation, almost unconsciously falls into the inevitable paradoxes that surround the mystery of the God-Man. The Incarnation, he says, "coacervatio quaedam est impossibilitium."¹⁰ Like Tertullian, he quotes "the foolish things" of St. Paul's paradox; but in an inverse order of reasoning. We do not so much wonder that the Omnipotence of God, he says, should conquer death and hell; but we begin the better to estimate His power if He does this by his *weakness*, girding Himself with infirmity. This depth of insight into His power is afforded by the Incarnation. Tertullian, on the other hand, argues from the same text of the Apostle to establish, by a kind of *a priori* logic, that a correct view of His Omnipotence should lead us to expect that vision of infirmity which was manifested by His Incarnation. Thomassinus argues from the accepted fact of the Incarnation to the proper concept of the Omnipotence. Tertullian argues from the accepted fact of the Omnipotence to the Incarnation. The paradoxes of the former are treated as facts; of the latter, as probabilities. So startling as almost to be *bizarre*, Tertullian's paradox nevertheless does not hide, but rather vividly insinuates, a stupendous truth: so that Hurter,¹¹ thoroughly read as he was in the Fathers, quotes with implied approbation the "Natus est Dei Filius," etc., merely remarking on the boldness characteristic of the style of Tertullian: "Quare more suo audacter scribit Tertullianus."¹²

Tertullian's *quia* is therefore a paradoxical statement of the argument of *congruity*. St. Anselm, in his *Cur Deus Homo*,¹³ states the congruity mildly in answer to the difficulties brought forward by Boso. Tertullian uses a stronger rhetoric flavored with a larger sprinkling of argumentativeness. Both appeal to reason. We fail to understand, therefore, a comment passed on the suggested rendering of Mr. Wharton by the "professor of Latin"—a comment which should be investigated in this connection, since it represents the popular estimate of Tertullian as merely an ecstatic, and somewhat bigoted, assertor of the truth of the Scriptures. "But is the '*credo quia absurdum*' of Tertullian really so absurd?" he asks; and answers his own question as follows: "*Non credo*. A careful perusal

¹⁰ And continues: Quid enim ex hominum non de trivio imperitorum, sed de lyceo, sed de academia philosophorum iudicio magis impossibile, quam Deum hominem fieri, aeternum nasci, immortalem mori, incommutabilem pati, mortuum reviviscere, virginem matremque eandem esse" (L. I. c. 1).

¹¹ Tract. VII. Thes. cxli.

¹² As an illustration of a rather lengthy paradox which, however, condenses into crystalline limits and brilliancy withal, the longer sermons that should else be required to describe the sufferings of the damned, we make room here for this sentence of St. Gregory the Great: "Fit ergo miseris mors sine morte, finis sine fine, defectus sine defectu: quia et mors vivit, et finis semper incipit et deficere defectus nescit" (Mor. IX. 66).

¹³ L. I. C. 8.

of the 'De carne Christi' and its companion essay 'De resurrectione' will convince you that the passage under notice is nothing more nor less than a defiant asseveration of the truth of the Scriptures implying the implicit acceptance, without question, doubt, or misgivings, of the New Testament narrative. I once heard Talmage say that if the Bible had said that Jonah swallowed the whale he would have believed it, simply because it was in the Bible. This is exactly the attitude of the fanatical, uncompromising propagandist, Tertullian."

We may first call attention to the fact that Tertullian did not say "*credo quia absurdum*," and that it was somewhat infelicitous thus to misquote him side by side with a recommendation to peruse carefully the two companion essays *De Carne Christi* and *De resurrectione*. We have here a little side-light thrown on the *genesis* and *exodus*—the origin and spread—of the *Credos* we have been considering.

Apropos of the professor's *Credo quia absurdum*, and as illustrating his sentiment with respect to the mind of Tertullian, that "fanatical, uncompromising propagandist," we make room here for another literary quotation. Dr. Paul Carus, in his *Primer of Philosophy* (Chicago, 1896: p. 28), is considering 'Experience,' and writes: "The second class of supernatural truths, i. e., mystical statements concerning extramundane affairs, are partly vague and partly absurd, so that they can neither be explained nor understood: they have simply to be believed. And this is the opinion of the supernaturalists themselves, stated in the sentence: *Credo quia absurdum*." Clearly, the 'supernaturalists' of Dr. Carus agree with the Tertullian of the Professor of Latin in "a defiant asseveration of the truth of the Scriptures implying the implicit acceptance, without question, doubt, or misgivings, of the New Testament narrative." We venture to think, nevertheless, that a careful perusal of the *De Carne Christi* will show the inaccuracy of this picture (of Tertullian, at least; for we are not concerned, just now, with the 'supernaturalists'). That Essay of the 'uncompromising propagandist' is certainly far from being a 'defiant asseveration,' etc. It is, in truth, very much of an *argumentum ad hominem*. At all events, it is not an *asseveration* but an *argument*.

A brief analysis of the first five chapters (the famous bone of contention is found in the *fifth* chapter) of the *De Carne Christi* will serve to disprove the estimate passed on Tertullian by the professor of Latin, and will furnish us with a reasonable basis for interpreting the mind of Tertullian. In the first chapter he states the purpose of his work, which is to refute those heretics (Marcion, Apelles,

Valentinus) who, rejecting the resurrection of our bodies, felt it necessary to deny to Christ a real flesh which suffered death on the Cross and rose again from the grave. To do this, the heretics refused to accept those portions of the Scriptures which militated against their position. With no other reason than the necessities of their position, they accepted what they pleased from the sacred text and rejected what they pleased. Was it absurd in Tertullian to point out to them that this was unreasonable? He asserts, therefore, his "prescription" against arguing scripturally with heretics—a principle having a special force in times that lay so very near to the original apostolic depositum and tradition. But even here he will not indulge in a mere violent asseveration of the truth of the Scriptures, but proceeds, in the most lawyer-like fashion, to choose for the arena of argument those portions of the scriptures which were admitted by Marcion in respect both of text and interpretation. What these portions exactly were we are largely forced to conjecture; but it is not unlikely that Tertullian was somewhat better informed on this subject than we can hope to be. He will first of all insist, however, on his own counsel or rule—one of his "prescriptions." He accordingly (*chapter the second*) rebukes Marcion for blotting out the records of Christ's nativity: "Ex qua, oro, auctoritate? Si propheta es, praenuntia aliquid; si apostolus, praedica publice; si apostolicus, cum apostolis senti; si tantum Christianus es, crede quod traditum est. . . ."

If Tertullian had pursued his attack on Marcion merely by quoting the Scriptures against him, he would have assumed as a principle what Marcion denied, and would have given the professor of Latin some very slight basis for the assertion that the *De carne Christi* is but a defiant asseveration of the truth of the Scriptures. But Tertullian does not do this. Having insisted, properly enough, on the value of the prescriptive principle, he proceeds to abandon it as follows (at the end of Chap. II): *Sed plenius ejusmodi praescriptionibus adversus omnes haereses, alibi jam usi sumus. Post quas ex abundanti retractamus desiderantes rationem, qua non putaveris natum esse Christum.*" Having elsewhere, he says, availed himself largely of "prescriptions" against all kinds of heresy, he considers a repetition of any one of them against Marcion as superfluous, and proceeds to investigate the particular reasons which may have led Marcion to deny the reality of the Flesh of Christ.

In *Chap. III.* he proves by an appeal to reason that Christ's nativity was something neither *impossible* nor *unbecoming* (hazardous) to God; and that an apparent Flesh is an hypothesis which Marcion's

own principles ought to regard as reflecting on the veracity of God. The discussion here is peculiarly philosophical, and not Scriptural. He argues that if neither the *impossibilitas* nor the *inconvenientia* may be alleged, perhaps Marcion's objection lay in the supposition of an *indignitas*? "Igitur si neque ut impossibilem neque ut periculosam Deo repudias corporationem, superest ut quasi indignam rejicias et accuses." (IV.) He still argues here philosophically, until the question becomes one merely of the different point of view, God's and man's. As Marcion was a great and singularly professed admirer of St. Paul, Tertullian quotes for him the words of St. Paul: "The foolish things of this world hath God chosen, that He might confound the wise." If the nativity of Christ were something foolish or unworthy of God, as looked at by earthly eyes and intellects, St. Paul warns us that this is no argument against the fact: "For the foolish things . . . hath God chosen." Now, asks Tertullian, what would the world esteem as "foolish" things? "The conversion of mankind to the worship of the true God? the rejection of error? the (new) training in justice, chastity, patience, mercy, innocence? But these are not foolish things!"—He bids Marcion look after the "foolish" things, and declares that Marcion shall not find a more foolish thing—and therefore more fully justifying the text of St. Paul—than the nativity of Christ. Whatever "foolishness" Marcion can allege, "non erit tam stultum quam credere in Deum natum, et quidem ex virgine, et quidem carneum, qui per illas naturae contumelias volutatus sit."

In *Chap. V.*, he admits that there are, certainly, other "foolishnesses," such as the sufferings and humiliations of Christ. Marcion had admitted the (apparent) crucifixion of Christ. Tertullian uses the admission thus: "Reject this (i. e., the scripture narrative of the crucifixion) also, O Marcion! you should do so with even greater reason. For which is the more unworthy of God—what could shame Him more—to be born or to die? to bear flesh, or the cross? to be circumcised, or crucified? to be raised or buried (*educari, an sepeliri*—apparently a playing on the "e" of *educare*, viz: "to be raised up, or to be laid down")? to be laid in a manger, or to be hidden in a tomb? It would be wiser in you to reject this (the crucifixion) than the nativity."

So far, Tertullian's line of argument is rather an appeal to reason than "a defiant asseveration of the truth of the Scriptures," as the professor of Latin (and "eminent authority on Tertullian") describes it. But just here he does make an appeal to Scripture; but it is to that Apostle whom Marcion revered and in whose epistles he took a special delight—St. Paul. If Marcion persisted in asserting

only an *apparent* crucifixion, then falsely did St. Paul judge himself to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified (I. Cor. ii. 2) and vain, therefore, is the faith of Christians (I. Cor. xv. 14). Tertullian's thought seems to be, that if the nativity involve "foolishness," more so does the resurrection; and yet our faith is built on this resurrection, which would not, however, be a real resurrection unless a real flesh had suffered death and burial. If all this great drama is but "foolishness" to the world, why, be it so! "Sed non eris sapiens nisi stultus saeculo fueris, Dei stulta credendo" ("You will not be wise unless you shall have become a fool to the world, by crediting the foolish things of God"). His argument is Pauline again.

And now we come to the famous text itself (*Chap. V.*) which has been the fruitful source of so much misinterpretation and misquotation; which has furnished from its richly stored armory so many hastily-snatched weapons both of those who seek to attack and of those who seek to defend truth. Huxley has brandished before our startled eyes *Credo quia impossibile*, and has demolished Tertullian with one sweep of the keen blade. With the lance of his *Credo quia ineptum* in rest, Matthew Arnold charges on Ritualists and Catholics alike. Furnished with the breast-plate of his *Certum est quia impossibile est*, Sir Thomas Browne could defy, while he invited, all the onslaughts of Satan and rebellious reason—nay, sighed only that there were no more worlds of doubt to conquer, declaring: "Methinks there be not impossibilities enough in religion for an active faith" that he might answer all of them with "that odd resolution I learned of Tertullian." With the pin-prick of his *Credo quia absurdum* Dr. Paul Carus, of *The Monist* and *The Open Court*, can deflate the big balloon of "the supernaturalists." On the other hand, the Traditionalists, panoplied in this armor, could assert the propriety of a belief in all rumored miracle and marvel. But let us hear Tertullian himself—*Audi alteram partem!*

He has quoted St. Paul—Marcion's favorite writer—in defence of the "foolishness of God." And asks:

Quid destruis necessarium dedecus fidei? Quodcumque Deo indignum est, mihi expedit. Salvus sum, si non confundar de Domino meo. "Qui mei," inquit, "confusus fuerit, confundar et ego ejus." Alias non invenio materias confusionis, quae me per contemptum ruboris pro-

Why do you destroy the necessary dishonor of our faith? Whatever is unworthy of God is my gain. I am safe, if I be not ashamed of my Lord. "Whoso," saith He, "shall be ashamed of Me, I also will be ashamed of him." Other reasons (*than these of His humiliations*) I find not

bent bene impudentem et felicitestultum. NATUSEST DEI FILIUS; NON PUDET, QUIA PUDENDUM EST: ET MORTUUS EST DEI FILIUS; PRORSUS CREDIBILE EST, QUIA INEPTUM EST: ET SEPULTUS, RESURREXIT; CERTUM EST, QUIA IMPOSSIBILE. Sed haec quomodo in illo vera erunt, si ipse non fuit verus, si non vere habuit in se quod figeretur, quod moreretur, quod sepeliretur et resuscitaretur, carnem scilicet sanguine suffusam.

for shame, which, by my contempt of shame, should prove me to be rightly shameless and happily foolish. THE SON OF GOD WAS BORN—I AM NOT ASHAMED, FOR THE VERY REASON THAT THIS IS SHAMEFUL: AND THE SON OF GOD DIED—IT IS WHOLLY CREDIBLE, FOR THE VERY REASON THAT IT IS ABSURD: AND, BURIED, ROSE AGAIN—IT IS CERTAIN, FOR THE VERY REASON THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE. But how shall all this be true of Him, unless He had in Himself that which should be crucified, should die, should be buried and should rise again, namely, flesh suffused with blood.

Clearly, this is not "a defiant asseveration of the truth of the Scriptures." It is simply a serviceable *argumentum ad hominem*. He says, in effect, to Marcion: Your reasons for rejecting the nativity of Christ must be some one of these, namely; that for God to assume real flesh is "impossible," or "hazardous," or "unworthy," or "foolish." But do you not see that the crucifixion of Christ, which you admit, presents a dilemma either horn of which is more repulsive to merely human reason? You are impaled on one horn of the dilemma if you contend for an *apparent* crucifixion; for this is to impeach the veracity of God, and to render nugatory that Magna Charta of our faith asserted by St. Paul, namely, that *if Christ be not risen again, our faith is vain*. But how could he rise again if that which was buried was not Christ, but only an *apparent* body? Turning from this horn of the dilemma, you are confronted with the other: for if you admit a *real* crucifixion, you admit something even more "impossible," "inept," "unworthy" than the nativity of Christ in real flesh. I conjure you, therefore, to recognize the manifest difference between God's thoughts and man's thoughts, His ways and our ways, His point of view and ours. Your wisdom is human, not divine. Correct it by the antidote of St. Paul, who has told us that "the foolish things of this world hath God chosen that He might confound the wise." The "necessary dishonor of faith," which you seek to escape from, is in reality that dishonor which a

Christian must lovingly embrace. The Son of God was born—is this shameful? Then the more gladly I accept the fact, for I see in it a part of the "necessarium dedecus fidei." And the Son of God died—is this inept? Then the more credible is the fact, for the very reason that I recognize in it an illustration of that "foolishness of God which is wiser than men" (I. Cor. i. 25). And having been buried, He rose again—is this impossible? Then it is an assured fact, for the very reason that "the things that are impossible to men are possible to God" (Luke, xviii. 27). You perceive, therefore, that what may seem to the "wisdom of men" to be ineptitudes, absurdities, impossibilities, may in reality be the most powerful illustrations of the fact that God's ways are not our ways. Assuming, then, that you concede all this, I ask you, how shall these things (the birth, death and resurrection of Christ) be properly construed as facts unless He had had that real flesh which alone could be born, could die, could rise again?

The reader who has followed attentively the course of Tertullian's argument must perceive that Tertullian does not bear himself like a fanatic who defiantly asserts the prerogatives of the *impossible*, the *foolish*, the *inept*, as against those of reason and common-sense. He is not flying an ecstatic pitch towards that *O altitudo* (Rom. xi. 33) quoted by Sir Thomas Browne. Rather is he appealing to Reason to correct her own false principles and to recognize her own limitations. And all the *Credos* attributed to him are but vague phantasms and hallucinations of his real attitude; are caricatures of his mental features; are, in effect, *dissecta membra* which should first be correctly collocated in their context ere they may warrant an estimate of the whole man. *Ex pede Herculem* is not *always* a safe conclusion; but it becomes a travesty of logical induction when the *pes* is not that of Hercules.

The Traditionalists (condemned in 1855 by the Holy See) caught the fine element of truth in the paradoxical argument of Tertullian; but, stretching it out into the extremest attenuation of logic, reduced the paradox to a practical absurdity—a real *Credo quia absurdum*. Mr. Wilfrid Ward, in his *Life and Times of Cardinal Wiseman* (Vol. II., p. 214), has given to the oft-quoted *Credo quia impossibile* its gentler construction, although plainly he does not succeed in representing the argument of Tertullian. He was not, however, striving to do this—probably had it not even in mind—and the passage is reproduced here merely as a Catholic's use of the dictum:

"M. Gaume, accepting the situation that all traditional beliefs useful to the devotional life should be admitted, multiplied endlessly the marvellous legends submitted for the acceptance of the

pious. . . . Consequently, a thoroughly 'loyal' Catholic was expected to believe without difficulty every wonder which the populace reported. Improbability in the ordinary sense was a ground of probability to the religious mind. *Credo quia impossibile.*"

We shall close our sketchy notice of the *Credos* and the *Impossibile* with a brief account of a book which, taking its inspiration from Tertullian's paradoxes, built up a whole argument on a kindred expression: *Incredibile, ergo divinum.*

IV. CONCLUSION.

There appeared in Paris, in 1843, a book entitled: *Onguent contre la Morsure de la Vipre Noire*, and purporting to be written by a certain Dr. Evariste de Gypendole, "First Surgeon Major of the Old Guard, Physician in Ordinary to the King of Lahore, Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, etc., etc." Dr. Brownson, in his *Review* (July, 1845), gave the book a notice (which was printed as an article), and made most copious extracts. In 1852 a translation of the book was made by V. D. Barry, LL.D., (published at Louisville: Webb and Levering). Its title appeared as "A Salve for the Bite of the Black Viper" . . . translated from the French of the Abbe Martinet. To Dr. Barry's English version we are indebted for the extracts given below.

The Black Viper is Atheism, and, in general, all that *rudis indigestaque moles* comprised under the name of "Philosophism." The "Salve" is a quintessence of all the objections against Catholicity. Its special virtue lies in its concentrated venom. For instance, Dr. Gypendole admits the "Absurdity" of Catholic doctrine. We need no great powers of discernment to surmise that Tertullian's *ineptum* is fashioning the argument: "In its doctrine," says Dr. G., "Christianity is but a tissue of myths, of fables, of inconsistencies, repugnant to reason. It teaches that Jesus Christ is God: absurd! That he is born of a Virgin, even a Virgin: absurd! . . . That the Son of God was born in a stable, that he died upon a cross, between two criminals: absurd! . . ." Next comes Tertullian's *impossibile*, as witnessed by the *Morality* of Christianity: "By its first commandment Christianity requires me to believe all the absurdities which compose its doctrine: Impossible! It requires me to forgive my enemies, to love them as myself: Impossible! . . ." After writing the "Impossible!" seven more times, he concludes: "Morality of Christianity a total impossibility!" Under the head of *Worship* he writes "Superstition" six times; and concludes: "Worship of Christianity an entire Superstition." The application of the Salve, thus compounded of all the venomous objections against Chris-

tianity, consists in requesting the philosopher who has been bitten by the Viper, to explain the spread and duration of Christianity. Dr. G. arrives at the conclusion: "Since the establishment of Christianity is wonderfully incredible and prodigiously impossible, it is as clear as that two and two make four, that God has wonderfully concerned himself in it; then the faith of the Universe is wonderfully divine. *Incredibile, ergo, divinum. Incredibilissimum, ergo divinissimum!*" (p. 77). On the next page he again repeats: "*Incredibilissimum, ergo divinissimum*: it is prodigiously incredible, therefore, wonderfully divine." The viperine poison in the philosopher's blood is being gradually counteracted by this antidote—on the principle, doubtless, of *similia similibus curantur*; until the philosopher is forced to cry out: "Doctor, your devilish salve is a snare. With that, I understand how the most insignificant old woman, who is provided with it, may live, without fear, among Infidels; and, what is stranger yet, be an *apologist as formidable as Tertullian*" (p. 82).¹⁴

Dr. G.'s insistent harping on this string is noticed in the following illustrations: "Behold then the phenomenon explained: *Incredibile, ergo divinum* (p. 110). "*Incredibilissimum, ergo divinissimum*" (p. 112); "*Incredibile*," etc. (pp. 117 and 119); "And nevertheless, millions of men, young and old . . . have, in spite of these millions of difficulties, a single one of which terrifies me, faithfully practiced the morality of Christianity. I know better than any one, how much that is above human strength, therefore—" (p. 120). Both phrases (in the *positive* and the *superlative* degree) appear on p. 122. The *Incredible* appears again on pp. 124, 129, 135, 137. Perhaps we shall be prepared, by this frequency of repetition, for the final rhapsody: "*Incredible, therefore Divine! alone Incredible, therefore alone Divine! most perfectly Incredible, therefore most perfectly Divine! ! !*" (p. 141).

The "Salve" of the Abbe Martinet is not too rudely applied with the rhetoric of Tertullian. The argument *ad hominem* was used by him against Marcion: Dr. Gypendole used the same argument against atheists: "Meanwhile, go on, if it suits you, and when you shall have sufficiently wrangled, disputed, cavilled, declared in the loudest strains your little victory, enlightened faith, which already laughs and lets you go on, will come to drive you, armed with an unanswerable argument *ad hominem*; and defeating you with your own weapons, it will say to you: That is all very well, but now, wretches that you are, withdraw, you have only labored for us" (p. 138). And, finally, we perceive in the Doctor's paradox a professed admiration for that of Tertullian: "What shall I do, then, to shake

¹⁴ Italics ours.

off the humiliating winding-sheet of Christianity, in which I am enveloped? Without entering into any discussion, either with myself or with others, I will choose the most incredible of all the mysteries of Christianity. Transporting myself in thought, or what will be better, in person, to the foot of the consecrated Tabernacle, to the sight of those weak symbols in which the Christian world adores the body and blood of a God, I will say to myself, with a celebrated man: 'No! there was no one but God, who could have imagined a morality so incomprehensible, so completely removed from human thoughts; there was no one but God, who could have the boldness to propound it as an indisputable truth; there was, above all, no one but God, who could succeed in causing it to be believed, with such facility, such universality and such constancy.' Then, making the noblest use of my reason, I will exclaim, with Tertullian: 'That is truly incredible, and yet the Universe has believed it; therefore, it is truly divine.' *'Incredibile, ergo divinum.'*"

In concluding this hasty glance at the paradoxical argumentation of Tertullian, with the Abbe Martinet's ingenious though inexact application of it, we venture a surmise that the whole idea of the attractive title "Salve for the Bite of the Black Viper," as well as the paradoxical form of the phraseology, was an inspiration caught from Tertullian. In his *Adversus Gnosticos Scorpiace* the African Father begins his long essay with a description of the bite of the Scorpion, and then by an easy transition leads the reader into a discussion of the spiritual treatment to be used as an antidote for the spiritual venom metaphorized by the Scorpion. From this work of Tertullian we have borrowed the text of our present paper; and as our discussion has been one of the meaning rather of Tertullian than of the mere paradoxes uttered by him, we shall conclude with that text: *Verba non sono solo sapiunt, sed et sensu: nec auribus tantummodo audienda sunt, sed et mentibus*" (*Adv. Gnost. Scorp.*, cap. 7).

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IRISH SURNAMES.

The ruins of religious edifices which during centuries have been landmarks in the fairest regions of Ireland, are suggestive of an era when an intelligent Christian people dwelt in the land; recalling to the reflecting mind the brightest centuries in her history and the sad story of her misfortune. The corner-stones of these grand old ruins of cathedrals, of monasteries, of cloisters and of universities, whose vast outlines and whose great architectural beauty excite our wonder, were laid amidst surroundings of religious pomp by saints and venerable prelates during those centuries when the Roman Catholic Church held religious sway over all Ireland. No North, no South, no East or West, had its dark region; Christianity prevailed throughout the Island. During that "golden period" long lines of saintly ecclesiastics had sanctified the churches and shrines; successive lines of holy abbots and of abbesses had presided over monastic communities of men and of cloistered women; apostolic delegates from Rome had periodically presided in the councils of the Irish hierarchy; learned professors had in succession filled the cathedras of her universities, whose fame had attracted students from all parts of Christendom, as well as from unchristian centres of the Orient; while in the meantime there went forth from the "Island of Saints," inspired and holy missionaries, who carried the light of Christianity to some of the barbaric peoples of unchristian Europe.

This was indeed, the "golden period" in the history of the fated Island—the reign of Christian light; but alas! it preceded a long night so dark with misery, a period of such destructive vandalism so terrible in extent, that in the history of civilization, there will probably be found no parallel. Invading vandals came from a sister island and they were Christians; but after a struggle of 4 centuries, when finally the English yoke was fastened on the necks of the Irish people, there was but little left to remind of the "golden period" but spacious ruins which lent attraction to some romantic valley, or crowned a rock like Cashel. Chaos prevailed where religion had so long presided. But with the ruins of temples and shrines visible on every side, the native Irish clung to the faith and to the language of their forefathers; which faith was their greatest solace in their misery. Amidst all the temptations of money and power and during periodical persecution, compared to which the drastic Russian crusade against the religion, the language and the patriotism of the

unfortunate Polish people, during modern times, has been mere child's play.

The study of the Irish language, which was in universal use during the "golden period," has been taken up by literary men during recent decades in England. This study has for some time attracted the attention of intelligent minds in America; while some rare, some valuable, and some costly and extensive collections of Hiberniana may be found in the libraries of the latter.¹

It is among the curious phases in the history of literature, which is so rich in perplexities, that a language so rigidly proscribed in penal enactments by English legislation, during previous centuries, should in modern times have become a fascinating study for many eminent English scholars, when the inherent prejudice existing in the average English mind against the Irish race is taken into consideration. While in the pursuit of this study, it has become evident that the Church in Ireland during the "golden period," held close relations with Rome, from the fact that before and after the invasion of Strongbow, the most precious collection of manuscripts in the Milesian language, which constitute a chronicle of religious events during these centuries, is to be found in the archives of the Vatican at Rome.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to define the origin of the people of Ireland whether of Milesian or of alien stock.

The former possessed the soil during the "golden period;" the parent stock of the latter acquired a foothold by conquest or were colonized by right of conquest.

This purpose may be developed by a classification of the names of existing families.

"Many Irish names appear strange," writes the distinguished Irish scholar, Dr. Philip MacDermott, "and uncouth to the average English reader, though if their etymology and pronunciation were perfectly understood, they would be found truly beautiful and euphonious."² The names of the ancient Milesian families were prefixed with "Mac," and "O;" the latter apparently predominating with princes and distinguished men. Although the use of Irish surnames was forbidden under severe penalties by English Parliament they were nevertheless retained, and they continued to be used. The prefix to surnames of the "Mac" and the "O," has also been retained to a great extent and thus united have been borne not only in Ireland but throughout the civilized world.

¹ From personal knowledge we venture to assert that the most extensive, the most valuable and complete collection of Hiberniana in America, is to be found in the library of Hon. W. J. Onahan, of Chicago, Ill.

² The Annals of Ireland, Translated from the Original Irish of the Four Masters, by Owen Connellan, Esq. Irish Historiographer, Etc. With Annotations by Philip MacDermott, M. D., and the Translator. Quarto. Dublin. 1846.

It is apparent that in countries which have been more or less identified as Catholic, such as Austria, France, Portugal and Spain in Europe, and the Spanish-American nations, Milesian family names are prominent at the present day, whose ancestral stock had been deprived of their landed possessions by political and alien oppression and forced into exile in the countries named, where their abilities and their swords have acquired recognition and honorable reward.

How many such names have become honored in America and are cherished with the highest regard?

In the glorious history of our wars during more than a century; in the formation of our territories and states as well as in the building up of our cities; in the development of our judicial system; but more particularly in the building up of our commercial, our banking, and our manufacturing interests; in the learned professions and in the development of political science; the "Mac's" and the "O's," representing the old Milesian stock, have held their place in the hierarchy of renown.

In no nation in the world, during the passing century, has there been such a development of religion, which in its progress, dwarfed the old Puritan systems, and to a great extent, severed the connecting links which bound America to the Established Church of England. In religious work, including all creeds, men with the prefix of "Mac" and "O," have been prominent factors. During this same period the marvelous progress of the Catholic Church, the creation of her hierarchy, the formation of her provinces and sees; the foundation of her universities and of other institutions of learning, the establishment under her auspices of asylums, and of resorts where the decrepit poor, the sick, and the fallen of the sex may be cared for, has been so marvellous in number and so great in extent, as to excite the wonder of co-religionists in the old world, and to suggest to eminent ecclesiastics in Europe, functioning under state supported systems, the suspicion that the Catholic religion which so expands and which so develops the Divine attributes of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, under a democratic system of government, and without state aid in construction, and without government support in operation, must be tainted with unorthodox liberalism.³ This, however, is not the conception of the status of religion in North America, entertained by the present venerable Pontiff, Leo XIII. But while there may be claimed for the "Mac's" and the "O's" such a prominent place in the front of religious work

³ In support of this proposition, we may cite the personal testimony of the late Rt. Rev. Casper H. Borgess, as related to us; and *in re*, the life of the Very Rev. Isaac T. Hecker.

in this country, we cannot ignore the important part played by those of Irish birth and of Irish descent, in America, whose lineage is not of Milesian stock.

The great extent of this element in the population of the American Union, and in the provinces of Canada, constituting the Western Empire of British America, may not be generally appreciated. In relation to both America's, however, the study of the nomenclature in the text of this article may facilitate the appreciation of what we venture to suggest. At the close of the 18th century and *omitting* the names of Milesian stock having the prefix "Mac," the following Milesian family names which should have had this prefix, were in general use among prominent families:

| | | | |
|-----------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Brady, | Corcoran, | Gilmore, | Reynolds, |
| Breen, | Costello, | Kenney, | Scanlon, |
| Brennan, | Coughlan, | Keogh, | Shane, |
| Campbell, | Curtin, | Lysaght, | Shanley, |
| Casserly, | Dunlevy, | Martin, | Sheehan, |
| Cassidy, | Eagan, ¹ | Maurice, | Teige, |
| Clancy, | Gaffney, | Patrick, | Thomas, |
| Coggan, | Gilduff, | Philip, | Tully, |
| Cogan, | Gilfoyle, | Pierce, | Ward, |
| Colman, | Gilligan, | Rafferty, | and |
| Conroy, | Gilmichael, | Rannall, | Williams. |

The proper Milesian designation would be Mac Brady, Mac Breen, Mac Brennan, Mac Cassidy, Mac Gilmore, Mac Patrick, Mac Thomas, etc.⁴

⁴ The figures 1 and 2 affixed to certain names, point to a sad event in Ireland's history—the extinction of her Parliament in 1800, comprising a House of Lords and a House of Commons; which had been enfranchised from English control by the pressure of the Irish Volunteers under command of Lord Charlemont in 1782. "This Parliament," said Grattan, "in spite of its defects, did more for the country in the short space of time it was allowed to exist, than England had effected in all her long and varied struggle for liberty. Ireland had to create everything out of chaos. It was a Godlike work, and like the Divine Creation, required fiends to destroy it." As England could not control the "Godlike work," her minister Pitt determined to destroy the Irish Parliament. The Lords Clare and Castlereagh were given *carte blanche* to effect this fiendish project to crush the liberty of their own country.

"An act to unite England and Ireland" under the control of the British Parliament and to abolish the Irish Parliament was introduced in the latter by Lord Castlereagh, which was defeated in January, 1799. During all that year the purchase of votes to carry the "Union," as the measure was called, proceeded. Titles of nobility, judiciary positions, commissions in the army, lucrative appointments, official patronage, fat pensions and sums of money varying from \$20,000 to \$100,000, were among the inducements given for votes. By this infamous process, a scandal unparalleled in political history, was the "Union" carried June 7, 1800, when, as Grattan said, "Ireland ceased to be a Nation."

The names of the incorruptible who cast their votes in the Irish Parliament against the "Union," is known in Irish history as the "Red List." The names of those who sold the freedom of their country is known as the "Black List;" the reward these renegades received for their respective votes may be seen in detail in the "Memoirs of the Life and Times of Rt. Hon. Henry Grattan, by his Son." Vol. V., pp. 181-196. London, 1849.

In like manner as with the Milesian "Mac's," the Milesian "O's" about the same period had changed their names to a considerable extent; the following prominent families, omitting the prefix "O," had for their surnames:

| | | | |
|---------------------|------------|-----------------------|------------|
| Ahern, | Dempsey, | Fury, | Kelly, |
| Bannon, | Devine, | Gallagher, | Kenally, |
| Behan, | Devlin, | Garvey, | Kennedy, |
| Bolger, | Dinnan, | Gormly, | Kenny, |
| Boylan, | Dogherty, | Gormon, | Kernaghan, |
| Breen, | Dolan, | Gowan, | Keveny, |
| Brennan, | Dooley, | Grady, ² | Killeen, |
| Brien, | Donnegan, | Hagan, | Kirwan, |
| Carberry, | Donnellan, | Hagarty, | Kirwich, |
| Carey, | Donnelly, | Halloran, | Lane, |
| Carroll, | Donoghoe, | Hammil, | Lanigan, |
| Casey, ² | Donovan, | Hanley, | Larkin, |
| Cashin, | Devany, | Hanrahan, | Laverty, |
| Cassidy, | Doran, | Hanratty, | Lawler, |
| Coffey, | Dowling, | Harney, | Leahy, |
| Coleman, | Doyle, | Hart, | Leary, |
| Colgan, | Drinnan, | Healy, | Leddy, |
| Connaghton, | Driscoll, | Heany, | Lenaghan, |
| Connelly, | Duff, | Heffernan, | Lennan, |
| Cooney, | Duffey, | Hanlon, | Lonargan, |
| Connor, | Dugan, | Hennessy, | Longan, |
| Considine, | Dunlevy, | Henry, | Lynch, |
| Corcoran, | Dunn, | Herlihy, | Mahony, |
| Cosgrove, | Dwyer, | Heyne, | Malone, |
| Cowhey, | Early, | Higgins, | Manning, |
| Creedon, | Fahy, | Hogan, | Marky, |
| Crotty, | Falvey, | Hoolaghan, | Masken, |
| Crowly, | Farrell, | Horan, | Meagher, |
| Cullen, | Fay, | Hosey, | Mearn, |
| Cullinan, | Flaherty, | Hurley, | Madden, |
| Curry, | Flannery, | Kane, | Meehan, |
| Daly, ¹ | Flannigan, | Kean, | Meeny, |
| Danagher, | Flattery, | Kearney, ² | Melford, |
| Deas, | Finnegan, | Keely, | Mellan, |
| Delancy, | Fogarty, | Keenan, | Milliken, |

It should be stated that the Irish Parliament which had done so much "Godlike work," was *exclusively non-Catholic*; gentlemen of the Catholic faith were debarred by their religion from sitting in either house. The figure 1, is annexed to names in the "Red List," and the figure 2, to those in the "Black List." *Very few are thus designated in the table, of Milesian names*; the great majority will be found among the names of alien stocks.

| | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|----------------------|-----------|
| Moloney, | Muldoon, | Nelligan, | Ryan, |
| Mooney, | Mulledy, | Nolan, | Scanlon, |
| Moore, ¹ | Mullin, | Quinn, | Scully, |
| Monaghan, | Mulligan, | Rafferty, | Shea, |
| Moran, | Mulloy, | Regan, | Sheridan, |
| Moriarty, | Mulready, | Reilly, ¹ | Shiel, |
| Morny, | Mulroony, | Riordan, | Spillane, |
| Morrissey, | Mulvey, | Roony, | Sullivan, |
| Mulally, | Murphy, | Roman, | Tiernan, |
| Mulcahy, | Neenan, | Ronayne, | Tierney. |

The proper designation of these Milesian names would be, for example; O'Ahearn, O'Halloran, O'Sullivan, O'Tierney, etc.

But the reader should not lose sight of the fact that the examples of Milesian surnames given from which the prefix "Mac" or "O" has been dropped, is, in extent, as to their number, small in comparison with the greater number and variety of surnames having such prefix; names which have become familiar in Europe and in America, and which figure largely in the population of the United States and the larger portion of Canada.

Twice were the lands of Ireland seized by English spoilers, of Catholic and of non-Catholic faith. In both outrages, the legitimate owners were dispossessed; whether peasant, or of gentle blood, the occupants of the soil were forced to seek shelter; the lowly in the uncultivated mountainous regions available—the well born in such refuge as their means might afford, or in exile across the sea. After the defeat of the Milesian kings, and to a considerable extent of their chieftains, their depopulated possessions were given in reward to English court favorites, whether nobles, partizan officers, or political adventurers; some of these sold their acquisitions but many others brought from England Anglo-Norman colonists who were assigned land for cultivation on liberal terms.

Some of these English Catholic settlements which were planted in the "Golden Vale" in the south and in the fairest regions of Ireland flourished, and several generations were born and lived upon the soil, and thus was founded the race of the Anglo-Norman Irish.

But under Henry VIII, and Elizabeth, the Anglo-Norman Irish, noble and plebeian alike, were called upon to conform to the "reformed religion" and to renounce their ancient faith; this they refused and an aggressive war of extermination ensued, which was continued under succeeding dynasties.⁵

⁵ 65,000 native boys and maidens, many of whom were well born, Christian youth and virgins alike, were reft from their homes, sold to slave dealers in London, who sold these unfortunates as slaves to the planters in the West Indies, or wherever elsewhere in the American regions a market for them could be found.

When this was ended the Anglo-Norman Irish, both high and low, had paid the penalty of the spoliation of the Milesian possessors of the soil by their ancestors. Cases of apostacy enabled some to retain their titles and others their possessions; many were put to death; others were banished, but with retributive penalties, the second series of spoliations ensued; the victims of which were the descendants of the perpetrators of the first series.

Ireland was desolated to such an extent that in the province of Munster, one might travel 20 or 30 miles without meeting a living being.

By a repetition of history the principalities were divided among the favorites of the English court, and the baronies and townships among military and political adventurers, resident and non-resident, and the lands among needy soldiers. All the possessions of the Catholic cathedrals, churches, universities, monasteries and convents, with miles upon miles of productive domain, were confiscated and bestowed upon the Protestant Irish Church, which was established in place of the ancient church founded by Saint Patrick; an Irish Protestant hierarchy with parochial functionaries created at the same time, were endowed with the confiscated domain, which comprised the fairest and most productive lands in Ireland. This was the origin of the second general accession of alien population from the nearby Kingdom of England.

Besides, the Protestant bishops and functionaries were assigned exorbitant salaries, to be paid in part by revenues from the confiscated domain and principally from tithes of the products of the soil.

An additional influx of English colonists succeeded; with the exception of the province of Ulster, whose chieftains and noblemen had not been entirely subdued and a comparatively small number of Milesian chieftains elsewhere who had succeeded in retaining their possessions, all Ireland had been placed under control of the established Irish Church dignitaries, the "reformed" Anglo-Irish nobility, of alien office holders, of rewarded English partisans and of such of the absentee court favorites as had not sold their grants in the ill-fated kingdom; while the indigenous Milesian population had been reduced to beggary or had found a refuge in more congenial countries on the continent and peninsulas across the sea. In other words, Ireland had passed into the hands and under the control of English aliens.

This completed the foundation of the Anglo-Irish element of population which at the close of the 18th century was represented principally by the families whose surnames follow:⁶

⁶ Alphabetical list of the Mayors or Provosts of Dublin from 1308 to 1664, and of the Lord Mayors from 1655 to 1817.

| | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Agar, | Bagg, | Berresford, ² | Bolton, |
| Alcock, ¹ | Bagwell, | Berrill, | Botet, ² |
| Aldrich, ² | Ball, ¹ | Berwick, | Bourke, |
| Allan, | Barker, | Bingley, | Boyce, ² |
| Ameas, | Barnett, | Bingham, ² | Boyle, ² |
| Annesley, | Barrington, ¹ | Bird, | Brabazon, |
| Anthony, | Barron, | Bissett, | Brereton, |
| Archbold, | Barnwall, | Blackney, ¹ | Brett, |
| Archer, | Barry, ¹ | Blackwood, ² | Broderick, |
| Astle, | Beaumont, | Blake, ² | Brooke, ¹ |
| Athy, | Beamish, | Blaquier, ² | Browne, ² |
| Audly, | Beecher, | Blennerhassett, | Brownell, |
| Aylmer, | Bellow, | Bligh, | Bruen, |
| Aylward, | Benson, | Blount, | Burbarry, ² |
| Bagot, | Berkley, | Bloomfield, | Burdet, ² |
| Bagnall, | Bermingham, | Blundel, | Burrowes, ¹ |
| Bagnoll, ² | Bernard, | Bodkin, | Burke, |

Adamson, Adrianverner, Alcock, Alexander, Allen, Alley, Andrews, Aldrich, Archer, Arthur, Bailie, Ball, Barby, Barker, Barkey, Barlow, Barnell, Barry, Barfet, Bath, Beake, Bee, Bellow, Bellington, Bell, Benett, Berle, Beresford, Bermingham, Best, Bevan, Billington, Bishop, Blackhall, Blake, Bloxham, Bolton, Booker, Boys, Brewster, Brice, Browne, Burke, Burnell, Burren, Burrowes, Burton, Calloner, Cantrall, Carlton, Carroll, Cash, Castleton, Chamberlain, Chambers, Cook, Cooke, Collier, Couran, Cosgrove, Craddock, Crampton, Cramp, Cranwell, Creagh, Curtis, Cusack, Darley, Darragh, Decy, Dermot, Desmyniers, Devinish, Dew, Dickson, Dixon, Douce, Dovewicke, Dowdall, Dows, Drake, Duff, Duffy, Eastfood, Ebb, Eccles, Elliot, Emerson, Empron, English, Eustace, Evans, Exshaw, Falkiner, Featherstone, Fegan, Field, Finglas, FitzHenry, FitzLeones, FitzRery, FitzRoberts, FitzSimons, Fleming, Forbes, Forrest, Forster, Fownes, French, Gallan, Galleon, Gaydon, Geale, Gerald, Gibbons, Gilbert, Golding, Goodwyn, Gore, Gough, Grattan, Green, Hacket, Hamilton, Hancock, Hart, Hatfield, Herbert, Highgreen, Hodgison, Hodson, Hone, Horan, How, Howison, Hull, Humphrey, Hunt, Hutton, James, Jenkin, Jervis, Jones, Kane, Kelly, Kilberry, King, Knox, Lawless, LeDecer, Lenon, Lightburne, Long, Longhran, Lovett, Lovestock, Lowther, Macarrell, Malone, Manders, Marks, Marechal, Mead, Meilier, Mereward, Mitchell, Moncrieffe, Money, Mornes, Motley, Motygan, Murray, Newberry, Newman, Nottingham, Nuttall, Ottrington, Page, Passavant, Pearson, Pemberton, Pembroke, Pentony, Peppard, Philips, Piercy, Pigot, Plunket, Poole, Porter, Preston, Pugh, Quail, Quaitrot, Quin, Ram, Ransford, Reader, Reed, Reysin, Reynolds, Ripton, Roach, Rochford, Rogers, Rogerson, Ross, Rose, Rossell, Rouncelle, Sarsfield, Savage, Sedgrave, Sergeant, Silliard, Shelton, Sherman, Shillingford, Shortall, Somervell, Spenfield, Stackbold, Stanihurst, Squire, Stevens, Stoyte, Sutton, Talbot, Tanner, Taylor, Tew, Tigh, Totty, Tue, Tyrrell, Usher, Van Homrigh, Verdoen, Wade, Wakefield, Wakepont, Walker, Walsh, Walton, Ward, Waterhouse, Watts, Watson, West, Weston, White, Whitewell, Wiggett, Wilkinson, Woder, Wybrant, Wydon, Young.

A careful study of these 260 names of representative citizens of Dublin, shows that during 4 centuries no incumbent of the mayoralty was of Milesian stock. Could the records, during the same period, of all the other municipalities of Ireland be examined, a similar result would probably be found. Except in Ulster, the Anglo-Norman Irish stock has, during all these centuries steadily increased in the cities, and partakes largely of the Nation's population; while the Milesian stock has more than proportionally increased as a rural population.

The alphabetical list has been compiled from the chronological list, given in Appendix No. IX., in the "History of the City of Dublin, etc., By J. Warburton, Rev. J. Whitelaw, M. R. I. A., and Rev. Robert Walsh, M. R. I. A." Quarto, 2 Vols., pp. 1398. London, 1818.

| | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| Burton, ¹ | Corr, | DeVerdon, | Fitzmaurice, |
| Bury, | Corry, ¹ | DeVessey, | FitzRichard, |
| Bushnell, | Cosby, | Digby, | Fitzsimons, |
| Bushe, ¹ | Cotter, ² | Dillon, | Fitzwilliam, |
| Butler, ² | Cotton, | Disney, | Ffrench, ¹ |
| Caddell, | Craddock, ² | Denny, | Fleming, |
| Cane, ² | Creagh, | Derenzy, | Flower, |
| Canton, | Creighton, ² | Despard, | Flowerden, |
| Cantwell, | Crofton, | Devereux, | Folliot, |
| Carew, ¹ | Croke, | Dobbin, | Fortescue, ² |
| Carpenter, | Croker, | Dobbs, | Forward, ² |
| Carr, | Cromwell, | Domville, | Foster, ¹ |
| Carlton, | Crosby, ² | Dongan, | Fox, ² |
| Carroll, | Crowe, ² | Dorwelle, | Freke, ¹ |
| Cantfield, | Cruikshank, ¹ | Dowdall, | Furlong, |
| Cavendish, ² | Cuffe, ² | Down, | Gage, |
| Chamberlain, | Culme, | Doyne, | Gamble, |
| Chetwind, | Cusack, | Drake, | Gardiner, |
| Chichester, | Dalway, ¹ | Drought, | Garnet, |
| Child, | Daly, | Drew, | Garret, |
| Chinnery, ² | Darcy, ¹ | Duchet, | Giffard, |
| Cholmondely, | Dawnt, | Duff, | Ginkle, |
| Christmas, | Davis, | Dunloe, | Godfrey, |
| Clement, ¹ | Dawney, | Dunne, ² | Goold, ¹ |
| Clinton, | Dawson, ¹ | Dutton, | Gore, ² |
| Cobb, | D'Alton, | Edgeworth, ¹ | Gorges, ¹ |
| Codd, | DeBermingham, | Egan, ¹ | Gough, |
| Coddington, ¹ | DeClare, | Elliot, | Grace, |
| Cockayne, | DeCourcy, | Emmet, | Grattan, ¹ |
| Cogan, | D'Exter, | Esmond, | Green, |
| Coghill, | DeFleming, | Eustace, ² | Grimes, |
| Cole, | DeGernon, | Evans, ¹ | Gunn, |
| Comerford, | DeHereford, | Fairfax, | Hamilton, ¹ |
| Condon, | DeLacy, | Falkiner, ¹ | Handcock, ² |
| Conyn, | De La Hyde, | Fane, | Harding, ¹ |
| Conyer, | DeLoundes, | Ferard, | Hardman, |
| Cooper, ¹ | DeMassere, | Fetherston, ² | Hardy, ¹ |
| Coote, ¹ | DeMoleyn, | Field, | Hare, ² |
| Cooke, ² | DeNugent, | Fish, | Harman, ¹ |
| Cope, ² | DePepard, | Fisher, | Hart, |
| Copeland, | DeRiddlesford, | Fitzeustace, | Harvey, |
| Core, | DeSpencer, | Fitzgerald, ¹ | Hartpoole, |
| Cornwall, | De St. Michael, | Fitzharris, | Hastings, |

| | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Hatton, ² | Kingsborough, ¹ | Maynard, | Pope, |
| Hauger, | Kingsmill, | Meagh, | Power, ¹ |
| Hayes, | Kirwan, | Metge, ¹ | Prendergast, ² |
| Heatherington, | Knight, | Molesworth, | Preston, ¹ |
| Heneker, ² | Knott, ² | Molyneux, | Probys, |
| Herbert, | Lake, ² | Moneel, | Powell, |
| Hevenden, | Lambert, ¹ | Monson, | Pulland, |
| Hewitt, | Langrishe, ² | Montgomery, ¹ | Purcell, |
| Heyburn, | Lawless, | Moore, | Quinn, ² |
| Hickman, | Lea, ¹ | Morgan, | Ram, ¹ |
| Hill, | Leader, | Morris, ² | Rawson, |
| Hoare, ¹ | Lee, ¹ | Musgrave, ² | Read, |
| Hobson, ² | Leigh, | Nangle, | Redmond, |
| Hodnet, | Leeson, | Nash, | Rice, |
| Holmes, ² | Leighton, ¹ | Needham, | Rice-Spring, |
| Hollywood, | Leonard, | Nellerville, | Richards, |
| Holt, | LePoer, | Nesbit, ² | Riddall, |
| Hopkins, ² | Lesley, ¹ | Newenham, | Ridgeway, |
| Howard, ² | Lill, | Neville, ² | Roche, ² |
| Howth, | Loftus, ² | Nicholson, | Rochfort, ¹ |
| Hughes, | Logan, | Nugent, | Roper, |
| Humphrey, | Lombard, | Odel, ² | Rossiter, |
| Hussey, | Longfield, ² | Ogle, | Roth, |
| Hutchinson, ² | Luttrel, | Ormsby, ² | Rowan, |
| Hyde, | Lyster, | Osborn, | Rowelston, |
| Irving, | Macnamara, | Packenham, ² | Rowley, ² |
| Irwin, ¹ | Mahon, ¹ | Palmer, | Rush, |
| Jacob, | Mandeville, | Parcell, | Russell, |
| Jackson, ² | Mansfield, | Parsons, | Rutledge, ² |
| Jebb, | Mansell, | Penefather, ² | Ruxton, ¹ |
| Jephson, ² | Manning, | Peppard, | Sandford, ² |
| Jocelyn, ² | Marburie, | Percival, | Sarsfield, |
| Johnson, ² | Marsden, | Perry, | Savadge, ² |
| Jones, ² | Martel, | Petits, | Savage, ¹ |
| Jordan, | Martin, ² | Petty, | Saville, |
| Joyce, | Massey, ² | Phepos, | Sedborow, |
| Keane, ² | Masterson, | Phipps, | Sendamore, |
| Keating, ² | Maude, | Pigot, | Sharkey, ² |
| Kemmis, ² | Maunsel, ² | Pitt, | Shaw, ¹ |
| Kenney, | Mason, ² | Plunket, ¹ | Sheares, |
| Kent, | Marward, | Pole, | Sherlock, |
| Key, | Matthew, ¹ | Pomeroiy, ¹ | Shirley, |
| King, ¹ | Maunsel, | Ponsonby, | Shortalls, |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Sibthorpe, | Stapleton, | Trench, ² | Walshe, |
| Sinnot, | Staunton, | Trevillian, | Wandesford, |
| Sitgreaves, | Stewart, ¹ | Trevor, | Warburton, |
| Skiffington, ¹ | Stratton, ² | Tuite, | Ward, |
| Sneyde, ¹ | Stratford, ² | Tyrrell, | Warren, |
| St. George, ¹ | Supple, | Uniack, | Wellesley, |
| St. John, | Sutton, | Unice, ² | Westby, ¹ |
| St. Lawrence, | Synge, ¹ | Usher, | Westenra, |
| St. Leger, | Taafe, ² | Vandekur, ² | Whaley, ¹ |
| Smith, ² | Talbot, | Varney, | Wharton, |
| Smythe, ¹ | Taylor, ¹ | Vaughan, | White, |
| Southwell, | Temple, | Vernon, | Wilden, |
| Spring, | Tew, | Vernor, ² | Wilmot, |
| Spring-Rice, | Tighe, ¹ | Verreker, ¹ | Willoughby, |
| Stack, | Tinglase, | Vessy, | Wingfield, |
| Stackpole, | Tobin, | Vincent, | Wirrall, |
| Stafford, | Toler, ² | Wadding, | Woder, |
| Stanhurst, | Tone, | Waller, ¹ | Wolfe, ¹ |
| Stanley, ² | Tottenham, ² | Waldron, | Wynne, ¹ |
| Stannus, ² | Townshend, ¹ | Wall, | Yelverton. |
| Staples, ² | Tracy, | Walpole, | |

These names are to be found in all the Irish records prior to the commencement of the 19th century; many of them are in the pedigrees of the nobility of the English creations and the gentry of English descent.

They will also be found frequently mentioned in the history of political, of military and of naval events, and in the annals of the Irish judiciary during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries.

Those of Norman descent are easily distinguished by the prefix of "De" and Fitz," while others are of Anglo-Norman lineage. Lesley and others are of Scottish lineage dating back to the settlement of their ancestors early in the 17th century, while MacNamara and Mahon may be claimed to be of pure Milesian stock.

A study of these names *in extenso* will show to what extent this species of the Irish race has taken root in American soil.

The following Anglo-Norman and English families adopted Irish surnames: The de Burgo's or Burke's of Connaught, took the name of MacWilliam, and some of them that of MacPhilip; the D'Angelos' or Nangle's of Meath and Mayo, changed the name to McCostello; the d'Exeters of Mayo to MacJordan; the Barretts of Mayo to MacWattin; the Stauntons of Mayo to MacAveely; the de Berminghams of Connaught, to MacFeoris; the Fitzsimons of Kings', to MacRudery; the Poers of Kilkenny, to MacShere; the

Butlers to MacPierce; the Fitzgeralds to MacThomas and MacMaurice; the de Courcys of Cork, to MacPatrick; the Barrys of Cork to MacAdam, and many others in like manner. Many of the Milesian Irish, on the other hand, anglicized their names and many of them have so translated and twisted their surnames, that it is extremely difficult to determine whether these families are of English or of Irish descent; hence several of them of Irish origin are considered to be of English descent.

"In the reigns of the Henrys and Edwards many penal acts of Parliament were passed, compelling the ancient Irish to adopt English surnames, and the English language, dress, manners and customs; and no doubt many of the Milesian Irish (to use the term) took English surnames in those times, to protect their lives and properties, as otherwise they forfeited their possessions and were likely to be punished as Irish enemies."⁷

The rulers of Scotland for several centuries came from Ireland before the heel of the invader had polluted Irish soil.

The royal house of Stuart is of Norman-Irish descent—and it fell to James Stuart, first of this unfortunate line of English monarchs, to depose the hereditary Milesian chieftains and rulers of Ulster, to confiscate their titles to their lands comprising 7 counties, namely: Antrim, Armagh, Cavan, Derry, Donegal, Fermanagh and Tyrone. In order to wipe out the ancient faith, the hereditary owners of the lands in these countries were dispossessed and large tracts were conferred upon a few British noblemen, and upon Scottish adventurers, who would undertake to colonize. But the greater extent of the lands of these 7 counties was acquired by wealthy London corporations and by London Guilds, whose money, needed by the English court, enabled them to purchase English titles to the territory of this fair portion of Irish soil for nominal consideration, *which these Corporations and Guilds control at the present day*. It was stipulated, however, that the purchasers of the spoliated counties should drive out the indigenous occupants of the soil, who would be forced to seek refuge in the forests and mountains, and to replace them with colonists of Anti-Catholic belief. This drastic process was consummated with lamentable cruelty.

It is described in English history as the "Plantation of Ulster!" It is one of the most infamous transactions which stains the history of English domination in Ireland. Its epoch was 1606. The colonists who came to these 7 counties were called "planters and undertakers," many of whom came from Scotland, the latter were the disciples of Knox and intensely bigoted. It was from the immigra-

⁷ Dr. Philip MacDermott, annotations to "The Annals of the Four Masters." P. 314.

tion of this class of people early in the 17th century that Ulster was partially repopulated. Some of the descendants of these "planters and undertakers" of Ulster have in recent years in the United States sought to obtain recognition as "Scotch Irish." These should develop the Hessian-American descendants of Revolutionary times, who might claim as great ancestral distinction as the "Scotch Irish." In regard to the ancestry of the latter it is a fact that many of the original Scotch "Planters and Undertakers" were of ancient Milesian stock, who in this manner, but with alien religious belief, found their way back to the country of their ancestors.

The Province of Ulster, whose territory to a great extent was acquired and controlled at the epoch stated, by London corporations and Guilds, was, so far as the Catholic religion was concerned, partially transformed. An ultra Protestant regime succeeded the ancient faith and in time it became under English rule the petted and favored Province of Ireland.

Its coast proximity to Scotland and the large number of Scotch people who had become tenants and settlers, as stated, on its prolific lands, gave promise of a complete transformation, which, however, was never realized. New accessions of skilled mechanics from Scotch cities and towns changed the destiny of the province. English capital was furnished lavishly by enterprising men for the development of manufactures; the linen and lace factories established at an early period grew in extent, and these with other kindred enterprises, when not hampered or crushed by adverse British Parliamentary enactment, prompted by the greed and jealousy of English manufacturers and traders, as frequently happened, flourished.

In Ulster and by the process outlined was thus generated the "Scotch Irish." As late as 1840, this province was a sort of manufacturing annex to Glasgow and other Scottish industrial districts. But it must not be taken for granted that the counties of this province have become to a great extent populated by descendants of Scotch settlers, or that the ancient faith of its dispossessed people has been obliterated. The census of 1893 shows the religious status of its people to be as follows:

| POPULATION BY COUNTIES. | | |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------|
| | Protestant. | Catholic. |
| Antrim | 314,519 | 108,605 |
| Armagh | 86,385 | 75,437 |
| Cavan | 6,452 | 104,328 |
| Donegal | 38,209 | 157,224 |
| Fermanagh | 37,385 | 47,238 |
| Londonderry | 90,717 | 73,095 |
| Tyrone | 117,665 | 109,564 |
| Totals | 691,332 | 675,491 |

The population of Belfast, chief city of Antrim, is composed largely of bigoted non-Catholics; outside of this county the majority of the people of the province are Catholic and their number steadily increases.

To the eternal honor of the memory of many eminent men of English, Irish and of Scottish lineage who were prominent in this northern Province of Ireland during the last half of the 18th century, it is of record that these gentlemen were conspicuous for their opposition to the selfish and grinding policy of England in her control of Irish affairs; for their sympathy, and for their warm approval of the people of the 13 American colonies in their revolt against English rule; for their co-operation with and support of Lord Charlemont and his associates in effecting the emancipation of the Parliament of Ireland from British control; and, with some ignoble exceptions, in the opposition of their members in both houses of this Parliament to the infamous scheme of Pitt, through his unfortunate and unscrupulous lieutenant the brilliant Lord Castlereagh, to corrupt a majority of its members who voted for the act of "Union," by which Ireland was deprived of self government. And, when in the despair of resisting such corrupting influence, the great league of the United Irishmen was formed in 1798, to obtain freedom, among the most distinguished adherents of this formidable revolutionary compact were to be found Presbyterians of the Ulster province. In no province in Ireland is the prefix "Mac" so universal; but it is not among the people of Milesian lineage that this prefix prevails; it distinguishes the descendants of those who had migrated to Ulster when this province was "replanted" in the manner stated.

From the middle of the 18th century there was a continuous emigration of this people to the North American colonies, more particularly to Pennsylvania, but also to the Carolinas. In the western counties of the former state, at the present day, the prevalence of the prefix "Mac" to the surnames of families is quite notable.

Omitting, therefore, the surnames having this almost universal prefix, the following were probably the leading families of Scotch origin in all Ireland at the close of the 18th century:

| | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Acheson, ¹ | Atkinson, | Colclough, | Ferguson, ² |
| Archdall, ¹ | Babington, ¹ | Craig, | Fetherson, |
| Archibald, | Baillie, ² | Cunningham, | Galbraith, ² |
| Armstrong, ¹ | Balfour, ¹ | Davies, | Gore, |
| Asche, | Bennett, | Duff, | Grant, |
| Alexander, ² | Bruce, ² | Dunbar, | Hamilton, |

| | | | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| Hardy, ¹ | Lowther, | Murray, | Scott, |
| Hume, | Lynn, | Newcomen, ² | Shaw, |
| Irwin, ¹ | Macartney, ¹ | Prittie, ² | Stewart, ¹ |
| Kennedy, | Mannering, | Richardson, ¹ | Terrie, |
| Knox, ² | Maxwell, ¹ | Roe, | Wemyss, ² |
| Leighton, ¹ | Moreton, | Rowley, ² | Wilson, |
| Leslie, ¹ | Morough, | Saunderson, ¹ | Wray. |
| Lindsay, ² | Montgomery, ¹ | | |

Among the creations of Irish titles, we shall not say of nobility, for that would be incorrect, during the reign of the first of the George's, was Lord Southwell, 1717. With his title this gentleman acquired large tracts of territory in the county of Limerick, the indigenous Catholic people of which were dispossessed of their lands in the manner customary at the time, and forced to seek a refuge in the forest and mountains.

In furtherance of the plan to wipe out the Irish race and to obliterate the Catholic faith in Ireland, as had been carried out in Ulster, Lord Southwell, in 1725, brought from one of the German provinces of the Rhine, a colony of German Lutheran families, numbering 1,000 or more souls. To the heads of these families he assigned the dispossessed land on long leases and at a nominal annual rent, placing them near his family seat, Castle Matrix. These Germans were called Palatines. Ferrar, the historian of Limerick describes this German colony as it appeared in 1780:

"They preserve their language, but it is declining; they sleep between 2 beds; they appoint a burgomaster to whom they appeal in all disputes. They are industrious men and have leases from the proprietor of the land *at reasonable rents*; they are consequently better fed and clothed than the generality of Irish peasants.

"Besides, their modes of husbandry and crops are better than those of their neighbors.

"They have by degrees left off their sour-kROUT and feed on potatoes, milk, butter, oaten and wheaten bread, some meat and fowls, of which they raise a great many.

"They have stables, cow-houses and trim kitchen gardens; their houses are neat and clean. The women are very industrious and perform many things which the Irish women could not be prevailed on to do; besides caring for their households and children, they reap the grain, plough the ground, and assist the men in everything.⁸

⁸ The elite of the American Indians living in their normal state despised agricultural labor, which, while on the war-path or absent in the hunting field the Indian relegated to his squaw, who cultivated a soil whose richness yielded abundant crops of grain and

"In fact the Palatines are a laborious independent people, who are mostly employed on their small farms."

This was the origin of the "German-Irish." Let us see the effect of 60 years of later experience on Irish soil of the "Palatines."

In 1840, Mr. and Mrs. S. C. Hall, in their descriptive account of Ireland, describe the "Palatines" as different in character and distinct in habits from the indigenous race.

"We visited several of their cottages in the vicinity of Adare," they write, "and the neatness, good order and quantity and quality of the furniture—useful and ornamental—too surely indicated that we were not in a merely Irish cabin. The elders of the family preserve in a great degree, the language, customs and religion of their old country; but the younger *mingle and marry with their Irish neighbors*. The men are fine, tall and stout fellows, but reserved in their aspect; the women are sombre looking and their large blue eyes are neither bright nor expressive. They are in all respects the very opposite in character to the smiling, hospitable and open hearted Irish women.

"They are at present, both as regards their customs and traditions, only a relic of the past. Like the Quakers they do not interfere with politics and religion, and they have remained neutral spectators of the exciting events which have agitated Ireland since their advent upon its soil."⁹

It would appear from the Halls' account of the "Palatines," that this, the latest of the Irish colonization schemes, has failed in its main object, as was the case with the "plantation of Ulster," on a more extensive scale.

It is quite probable, that the Milesian lads and lassies may succeed, if they have not done so already, in changing the race characteristics in most respects of the descendents of Lord Southwell's

vegetables. On the Continent of Europe women share with their husbands in the tillage of the soil. While as stated, the "Palatine" women in the County of Limerick labored in the field, their neighboring Irish women disdained such work which they considered degrading to their sex. This dislike of men's work by Irish women seems to be inherent in the race.

In this country it is not unusual to find well cultivated gardens in the near vicinity of farm houses. With American, English, Irish, or Scottish farmers, such gardens are cultivated by men. But where the proprietors are from the European Continent, the heaviest share of the work is performed by the women.

Instances occur where a wealthy German, who has an Irish wife, cultivates a large farm. It is rare, however, that a vegetable garden forms a part of his establishment.

His Irish wife may cultivate flowers, but she will neither dig, rake, nor plant in the garden. Should a city friend visit this farmer in the summer, he will find substantial meals, but neither asparagus, beets, carrots, cucumbers, early corn, lettuce, tomatoes or young onions, such as he enjoys in the city, on this farmer's table.

⁹ Ireland, its scenery, character, etc. Vol. I., pp. 346-347. Mr. and Mrs. S. C. Hall. 3 Vols., octavo. Profusely illustrated. London: Hall, Virtue & Co. On p. 346, Ferrar is quoted.

importation of German Lutherans in 1725. In connection with this chapter illustrating English spoliation and misrule in Ireland during the 18th century, it remains to be stated that the successor of the original Lord Southwell of Castle Matrix, was, during the current year of 1898, received into the Catholic Church at London. The surnames of the German-Irish cannot be given with exactitude; but their ancestral Fritz's, Meta's. Ella's and Ruth's are still used.

There remains the Danish-Irish, the French-Irish, and the Spanish-Irish.

"Many families of Danish origin," writes Dr. McDermott, "took Irish surnames, prefixing "O" and "Mac," so that their descent cannot now be ascertained, while several of their chiefs took Irish Christian names. The Danes and Norwegians, being in possession of Dublin and some other parts of the country, and having maintained their colonies there for more than 300 years, there is consequently much of the Danish blood in the counties of Dublin and Meath, particularly in Fingall; and there are many families of Danish descent mixed by intermarriage with the old Milesian stock. It is traditionally stated that great numbers of the Northmen were red haired, particularly the Norwegians, who generally had fair or reddish hair and florid complexions, and to the present time red-haired persons in Ireland are considered by the popular classes to be of Danish origin."

The following are the names of Irish of acknowledged Danish descent:

| | | | |
|------------|----------|----------|-----------|
| Blacker, | Everard, | Galwey, | Sweetman, |
| Betagh, | Fagan, | Harold, | Terry, |
| Coppinger, | Godfrey, | Palmer, | Tuke, |
| Cruise, | Gould, | Plunket, | Trant, |
| Drumgoole, | Gilbert, | Skiddy, | Stack. |
| Dowdall, | | | |

The Plunkets, earls of Fingall, are a numerous and distinguished family of Danish origin.

Considering the important part played by the Danes in the early history of Ireland, it is probable there are many other families of Danish origin, besides those whose surnames have been given, in some of the maritime counties of Ireland; but the origin of these families as a rule cannot be traced, because at the present day they bear no distinctive surnames such as are familiar among Scandinavians.

It is certain, however, that the families whose surnames have been given, were at the close of the 18th century prominent in

the counties of Cavan, Cork, Dublin, Kerry, Limerick, Longford, Louth and Meath.

The revocation of the "Edict of Nantes" was followed by the migration of many Huguenot refugees into the South of Ireland. Many of these settled in Cork and became a valuable acquisition to that important seaport, assisting as they did in increasing its commercial importance.

In time, the skill of the French artisans enabled the Irish manufacturers to rival and excel English products. Their woolen fabrics especially excelled those of Yorkshire and were preferred in the English markets to such an extent, that the English manufacturers induced the British Parliament to enact repressive laws, which in their operation partially ruined their Franco-Irish competitors, who were compelled to close, not only their woolen factories, but such others as had successfully competed with English traders. In fact the only industrial enterprises permitted on Irish soil, were those of the linen and lace factories of Ulster, with which it was impossible for the English to compete. These arbitrary enactments resulting from the greed and jealousy of English competitors, proved disastrous to the trade and commerce of Ireland, which had become important, but especially was it ruinous to the commercial interests as well as to the people of the South of Ireland.

There are many families in Ireland descended from French refugees, not only those of the Huguenots, but also those of the more distinguished political exiles of 1789—who remained in the country. These have been and are still prominent in commercial and financial affairs and in professional pursuits. The surnames of most of the French-Irish will probably be found in the list of the Anglo-Norman Irish.

Some, not in this list, however, occur to us, whose names are familiar. Their Gallic etymology is marked. The La Touche family, so universally known in the banking circles of Europe, is quite prominent.

The patriotic record of this family is glorious. In the last Irish House of Commons, there were 5 La Touche's, none of whom had been polluted by contact with Castlereagh; 4 voted against the English act of "Union," and one, the Right Hon. David La Touche, cast his vote on the side of Lord Castlereagh.

There are, besides the families of De Bath, De Salis, La Vallon, Tonson and Touchet.

Probably the most perfect type of a sallow, sober-faced French Puritan, is the eminent jurist and statesman Saurin.

In the development of this study may be traced the existence of a race of Spanish-Irish.

When the Spanish Armada was wrecked off the coasts of Clare and Galway counties, many survivors of the disaster who reached the shores were kindly cared for by the Irish people, and considerable numbers of these unfortunates remained in the families of their generous hearted rescuers.

Spanish Point on the coast of Clare reminds of the disaster to the great Spanish fleet.

In the counties of Clare and Galway there is to be found at the present day, a people differing essentially from any of the distinctive races existing on Irish soil. This people are the descendants of the Spanish officers, sailors, and soldiers who had been cast ashore during the fearful storm which destroyed the Spanish fleet.

The race marks of this people are well defined. Crossed as it has been with the Milesian stock, its Spanish features offer a most interesting study, for they remain prominent. The men are tall, muscular, dark-featured, with black eyes and black hair. The women have decided Spanish traits in their physique; they are usually tall; brunettes in some cases and fair in others; with large expressive black eyes and an abundance of black hair. Their beauty reminds of the women of the Basque provinces, while among them are to be found the perfection of the female form in all Ireland.

But what of the Irish language which was in general use during the "golden age?"

It has been transmitted from sire to son during succeeding generations of the Christian indigenous race. Its use could not be suppressed by the conquerors of the Island. Its wealth of poetic expression enabled the victim of persecution to appeal with such pathetic earnestness to the Merciful God, that consolation and fortitude were vouchsafed him in his great misery.

In some districts on the coasts and islands, and in some wild regions, it is the principal if not the only language used or understood.

The Irish peasant of to-day uses this language in his home; his prayers were taught him in his native dialect; in this language he plighted his troth, in this language he confesses his sins; and when the journey of his life of trials and of sorrows approaches its termination, it is in this same language of his forefathers that the priest of the faith he has clung to utters the consoling words which encourages him to rely upon the promise of his Redeemer, for his eternal reward.

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT.

A PRE-REFORMATION MANUAL OF ANGLICANISM.

A N apology is perhaps owing to my readers for inviting their attention in the present paper to a book which has recently been studied by a master in his own field of research and expounded with a literary skill and point to which I can make no pretensions. And yet even in England Dr. Maitland's volume of essays on the Canon Law¹ has by no means attracted so much notice amongst Catholics as its importance deserves. This must be my excuse for introducing both the ancient treatise itself and the modern jurist's comments upon it to an American public. Dr. Maitland writes in a spirit of cold aloofness from all religious controversy and even if nothing more were done it would be worth while trying to indicate the exact bearing of his conclusions upon the vital questions which now divide the churches. But there are also other topics interesting to us as Catholics which it did not fall within his scope to touch upon. These though less important belong to the subject and may be used, as far as space permits, to form a kind of supplement to the main concern of this paper.

I may say, then, that my object is to give an account of the teaching of the English Church on various points of dogma and practice, just one hundred years before the Reformation. That teaching is set forth in a collection of synodal decrees, compiled and glossed by one William Lyndwood, for many years the chief "official" in the Court of the Archbishops of Canterbury and afterwards himself bishop of St. David's. If I have ventured to describe his authoritative work as a "pre-Reformation manual of Anglicanism," it is not I trust without adequate justification, although

¹ The volume referred to is entitled *Roman Canon Law in the Church of England*, by F. W. Maitland, M. A., LL. D. (Methuen & Co., London, 1898). It may be worth while to note for the benefit of my American readers that in the matter of English historical jurisprudence Dr. Maitland speaks with an authority which is absolutely unquestioned, and which belongs to no other living writer. He is Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge, and the *History of English Law before Edward I.*, which, in conjunction with Sir Frederick Pollock, who holds a corresponding professorship at Oxford, he published a few years since, is universally regarded as the most important English work of its class which this century has seen. Like Dr. Maitland's numerous contributions to the Record Series, and to the publications of the Pipe Roll and Seldon Societies, the book is a monument of erudition and of painstaking research. As for the volume of Essays on the Canon Law, it is no exaggeration to say that it deals a more destructive blow to the theories of English Church History now in favor with Anglicans, than any work which has hitherto appeared.

the Anglicanism is of a rather different type from what we now commonly understand by that term.

Lyndwood's treatise is in the first place a text-book written exclusively for the use of the *Ecclesia Anglicana*, the Church of England. It could have no possible interest outside England, for it is altogether occupied with the decrees of English synods, which had force of law in the Province of Canterbury and nowhere else. It must not be supposed of course that Lyndwood regarded the Church of England as a distinct entity separate from and opposed to the *Ecclesia Romana*, the Church of Rome. For him and for all his contemporaries the phrase *Ecclesia Anglicana* was not a doctrinal but a geographical expression, a compendious way of referring to that portion of Christ's Church which lay within the dominions of the King of England. It would no more have occurred to him to speak of Anglicanism as a distinct creed than it would occur to a modern English churchman to speak of Cambrianism as a distinct creed, representing the doctrine of the Church of Wales. Hence in using the term "pre-Reformation Anglicanism" I am simply coining a phrase, to represent compendiously the sum of those beliefs and traditions of which Lyndwood makes himself the mouthpiece. But for ascertaining the teaching of the *Ecclesia Anglicana* of that epoch, there is nothing more national, nothing more complete, nothing more authoritative than Lyndwood's Provincials. Lyndwood was the chosen representative of the clergy in the synods held in London to discuss the relations of the spirituality with the Crown in 1419, 1421, 1424, and 1425. In 1425 again he was sent to Oxford by Archbishop Chichele to report upon the orthodoxy of the teaching there, and, if need were, to correct "heretical pravity." In 1426 he was made Dean of Arches, in 1433 Rector of Wimbledon and Archdeacon of Oxford. As a canon lawyer he held the great prize of his profession; as a diplomatist he was repeatedly employed as ambassador by the King of England in special missions to foreign courts;² as an ecclesiastic he was made Bishop of St. David's, while retaining at the same time the office of Keeper of the Privy Seal. It is sufficiently obvious therefore that he was no mere bookworm or ascetical enthusiast. It may be added that for his private char-

² As early as 1417 Lynwood took part in the negotiations with the Duke of Burgundy at Calais. In 1422 he was sent on a diplomatic mission to Portugal. In 1423 he was appointed to be of the Privy Council of the young king, Henry VI., while sojourning in France. He helped to arrange the truce with Spain in 1430, and presided over the negotiations with the Duke of Brittany in 1433. Later on he played a most important part in arranging commercial treaties with Flanders, Holland and various States of Germany. Hardly any name occurs more frequently than his in the *Proceedings of the Privy Council* in the reign of Henry VI., published by Sir Harris Nicolas. Vols. III., IV., V.

acter he seems to have held a very high place in the esteem of his contemporaries, and he was recommended for a bishopric to Eugenius IV by his own sovereign in terms of the highest eulogy. His body is believed to have been discovered roughly embalmed and incorrupt in St. Stephen's Chapel, Westminster, in 1852. As for his great work, the gloss upon the Provincial Constitutions,³ it seems to have been accepted during his lifetime and after his death as of absolute and almost unique authority. It appeared under the direct sanction of Henry Chichele, Archbishop of Canterbury, to whom it was dedicated. It was one of the first works printed at Oxford and among the earliest printed in England, and in the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, until the breach with Rome, edition succeeded edition, both of the text separately and of the text and gloss together. If any one ever protested against Lyndwood's doctrine as not being English enough, and as accepting too unreservedly all papal pretensions, history is absolutely silent on the point. For anything now known to us Lyndwood's teaching passed unchallenged, and was accepted as the one authoritative text book, for the hundred years that elapsed between its first appearance and the beginning of the Reformation. It would be impossible therefore to find a work which could claim to be more fully representative of "Anglicanism," i. e., of the contemporary teaching and practice of the English Church at the period with which we are mainly concerned.

It will perhaps seem to some of my readers who may have rather hazy ideas about the Canon Law and the topics with which it deals, that a legal text book is not exactly the source to which one would go for information about religious beliefs. The matter presents no difficulty, however, when the nature of Lyndwood's work and his love of digression are more clearly understood. The Canon Law, it must be remembered, concerns itself with almost every detail of the life and organization of the Church. Not only does it regulate the powers of the various grades of the hierarchy, the jurisdiction and procedure of the Courts Christian, the misdemeanors of clerics, the penalties to be imposed upon them, the payment of tithes, but it deals with the broader features of public worship, the administration of the sacraments, the honor to be paid to relics and images, the festivals of the Church, etc., etc., and above all with the great matter of Faith and Heresy. The very

³ The most convenient edition to use is that published at Oxford in 1679, the only one printed since the Reformation. My own notes have been made principally from the edition of F. Brickman, 1525, in which the title runs *Provinciale seu constitutiones annotationibus, politissimis Angliæ, cum summariis atque justis caracteribus summaque ac curatione revisæ atque impressæ.*

first section in Lyndwood's compilation is entitled by him, after the *Corpus Juris*, *De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica*. Of the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith; and in five hundred ways directly and indirectly he sheds the clearest light upon the principles according to which all questions relating to jurisdiction and religious belief were decided in the highest ecclesiastical court of his native land.

It is for this reason that Lyndwood's book seems to me so supremely interesting. It enables us to judge better than any other work with which I am acquainted whether the belief of Englishmen in the Fifteenth Century can in any sense be considered identical with what is now held, or said by a school of High Church writers to be held, by modern Anglicans. In a word, Lyndwood provides us with materials for forming a judgment on the great topic of controversy debated in our day—the Anglican claim to continuity. I am not going to attempt any elaborate discussion of continuity. With the best will in the world to understand the Anglican position, I have found it a very elusive conception, and it is by no means easy to form a clear idea of what precisely is claimed under that name. The upholders of continuity will hardly be content to base their contention upon what has been nicknamed "cuckoo continuity;" the succession of the intruding bird who by force has turned out the rightful proprietors and settled himself comfortably in their place. Their aim is to show that at least in one most important point which divides the Church of England from the Church of Rome, the English Church of the Fifteenth Century thought with them and not with us. It seems to me that this is almost the only definite issue to which it is possible to narrow the debate. What with attributing to the modern Church of England an almost indefinite comprehensiveness, so that in a sense not contemplated by the catechism she indeed "teaches all doctrine," and what with attributing to the pre-Reformation church an almost indefinite vagueness which committed her to nothing very positive beyond the Nicene Creed, until the Council of Trent cleared up her ideas, it is easy to sketch out two nebulous forms which resemble each other very closely. The main difficulty lies in the question of Papal supremacy and there the verdict of history, we are assured, cannot be doubtful. The pre-Reformation church assumed that the recognition of the papal claims was a purely optional matter, and maintained "that papal law was not binding in England even in questions of faith and morals unless it had been accepted by the National authorities."⁴

⁴ *Report of Ecclesiastical Courts Commission*, 1803. Vol. I., p. xviii.

So the *Ecclesiastical Courts Commission* of 1883, which numbered amongst its members such eminent students as Bishop Stubbs and Professor E. A. Freeman, and was largely inspired by their reading of history, in drawing up its report, proclaimed that: "The Canon law of Rome although always regarded as of great authority in England was not held to be binding on the Courts,"⁵ and added that the commentators "on the provincial decrees introduced into their notes large extracts from, and references to, both the Canon and civil law of Rome but they were not a part of authoritative jurisprudence." Similarly Mr. Ingram⁶ has even ventured to apply to the state of things in the Fifteenth Century the language of convocation in 1534 to the effect that "the Pope of Rome was possessed of no greater jurisdiction in England than any other foreign bishop." But perhaps I can find no better passage to illustrate the point of view with which we are now concerned than the following paragraph from the recent and very popular *History of the Church of England* by Mr. H. D. Wakeman, Fellow of All Souls, Oxford. Speaking of the change of religion in the Sixteenth Century, he says: "An apostasy so universal is in itself incredible. "There is one theory and one theory only, on which the Church "of England can be said to have fallen from the Catholic Faith "in her repudiation of the authority of the Pope. It is the modern "ultra-montane theory of the Papacy, which looks upon the Pope "as the source and fountain of all true ecclesiastical authority. "No archbishop or bishop has, according to this theory, rightful "jurisdiction, unless he exercises it under the direction of the Pope. "It is obvious that if this theory is true, the Church of England "which proceeded avowedly on the exactly opposite theory, must "fall. But the theory is one which was unknown in the primitive "ages, unrecognized by the undivided Church, strongly protested "against in the Middle Ages, unacknowledged to this day by the "orthodox Churches of the East, and unaccepted even by the "Church of Rome in its fulness until the Vatican Council of 1870. "If the Church of England is to be condemned on a theory like this, "she is content to remain condemned in company with the vast "majority of saints and doctors and confessors of the Church in "all ages."⁷

It does not seem an unfair inference to draw from this passage, that if the "modern ultramontane theory" of papal jurisdiction so far from being unknown was held by the Church in the Fifteenth Century as a law which no man could dream of questioning, then

⁵ *England and Rome*. I have for the moment mislaid the exact reference.

⁶ Wakeman's *History of the Church of England*. pp. 226-227.

⁷ Preface, p. vi.

we are justified in thinking that the Church of England did "fall from the Catholic Faith in her repudiation of the authority of the Pope."

In the volume of Professor Maitland to which I have already referred, this question of papal jurisdiction is taken up and dealt with in the light of Lyndwood's teaching, and that of the English canonists. Professor Maitland holds no brief for any religious creed and is careful to tell us so in his preface.

"At a time," he says, "when the perennial stream of Anglo-Roman controversy has burst its accustomed channels and invaded the daily papers, the assumption will be readily made that anyone who writes about those matters of which I have here written is an advocate of one of two churches, the English or the Roman. Therefore, it may be expedient for me to say that I am a dissenter from both and from other churches."⁸

The question he puts to himself is whether the Canon Law of Rome, in other words, the decrees and answers of the Popes, were looked upon as claiming the *obedience* of English churchmen or only their *respect*, whether they were held as merely of high authority, as English judges would now regard a verdict on a point of fact arrived at by some court of law in the United States or Ireland, or whether they were conceived of as absolutely binding statute law. Professor Maitland's answer is most unequivocal.

"I have been unable to find any passage in which John of Ayton⁹ "or Lyndwood denies, disputes, or even debates the binding force "of any decretal.¹⁰ Of course there are portions of the Canon law "which, as a matter of fact, are not being enforced in England, "because the temporal power will not suffer their enforcement. But that is quite a different matter. Here we are speaking of the "law which our courts Christian applied whenever the temporal "power left them free to hear and decide a cause, and I have looked "in vain for any suggestion that an English judge or advocate "ever called in question the statutory power of a text that was "contained in any of the three papal law books."¹¹

Again, to come to specific instances, Prof. Maitland points out that John of Ayton is committed to the proposition that "the Pope is *dominus* of all the churches in the world so that he can take

⁸ L. C., pp. 8-9.

⁹ John of Ayton was another English Canonist, we might almost say the only other English canonist whose work has been preserved to us. He was a canon of Lincoln, a friend of John Stratford, Archbishop of Canterbury, and he wrote his gloss upon the legatine constitutions of Otho and Otoboni between 1338 and 1348. He lived consequently about a century before Lyndwood's time.

¹⁰ A "decretal" (*epistola decretalis*) is an authoritative reply given by the Pope to any question of law submitted to him by some one of the bishops of Christendom. The *corpus juris canonici* is largely made up of such decretals.

from one and give to another;" that Lyndwood holds, that "no general council can be summoned without the authority of the Apostolic See," that "he cites with approval," even on the eve of the Council of Basel, "the opinion of those doctors who maintain that the Pope is above a general council." But, however that may be, Lyndwood is clear that "the Pope is above the law;" that "to dispute the authority of a decretal is to be guilty of heresy, at a time when deliberate heresy is a capital crime."¹²

"The last," Dr. Maitland continues, "is no private opinion of a glossator, it is a principle to which archbishops, bishops, and clergy of the province of Canterbury have adhered by solemn words. Any one who calls in question the authority of a decretum, a decretal, or of a provincial or synodal constitution is a heretic and unless he will recant and abjure must be burnt alive."

But though the authority of a decretal and of a synodal constitution are there seemingly placed upon an equal footing there is nothing which is more clearly emphasised by Lyndwood than the subordination of one to the other. The whole plan of his book in fact proceeds upon the recognition of this principle. It is not a complete treatise of Canon law that our author is providing in his compilation of provincial constitutions and his gloss. It is only a supplement to the *jus commune* of the Church at large; the *jus commune* in ecclesiastical Latin, as Prof. Maitland reminds us, not being contradistinguished against statute law but against the constitutions which were limited in their application to a particular province or diocese. These decrees were essentially "bye laws" in the modern sense of the term. "Lyndwood's position in glossing the canons of the English synods is that of a lawyer commenting on the edicts issued by a non-sovereign legislator." Hence he may always raise the question concerning any of these English decrees whether it be not *ultra vires statuentis*. If it conflicts with the common law of the Church, i. e., with the papal decretals, the legislation is void; and Lyndwood in several instances picks holes in the canons that he is interpreting and shows that they have been rendered nugatory either by the pre-existing text of the *decretum* or by subsequent papal pronouncements. To take a matter of minor importance for the sake of its brevity, a constitution of Archbishop Peckham while strictly prohibiting nuns under pain of excommunication to remain outside their cloisters contemplates at the same time certain exceptions. What Peckham lays down is that under no circumstances may a nun be absent from her convent for more than 6 days altogether, nor spend more than 3 days

¹¹ L' C., pp. 13, 14, 17, etc.

¹² Lyndwood Blk. III., Tit *De Statu Regul., cap., Sanctimoniales*, ad v. *cum socia*.

with her family *recreationis causa*. To this measure of indulgence Lyndwood demurs: "Whatever the statute may say," he remarks, "the common law is that nuns ought to remain perpetually in cloister and ought not to go out for any cause except the two laid down in the Sext., and therefore this constitution (of Peckham's) has but little authority (*modicam vim obtinet*) as against the common law which cannot be abrogated by the constitution of an inferior."¹³

The inferior of course is the Archbishop of Canterbury as contrasted with the Pope.

I do not follow up the further comments which Prof. Maitland finds occasion to make on this constitution, but it may be worth while to note in passing that while Lyndwood admits that in practice its observance was much neglected and throws the blame upon the bishops he also clearly makes a distinction between two different classes of nuns—those that are under the rule of religious, and those subject to the bishops. The former, he tells us, for the most part are enclosed, and, as he obviously implies, keep their enclosure.

Again, there was a constitution of Archbishop Richard which forbade the consecration of pewter chalices. Commenting on this Lyndwood remarks that this edict must be understood *secundum canonem De consecrat. dist. 1., Et calix* which allows even pewter chalices to be consecrated in cases of extreme poverty.

Similarly in the title *De Locato et conducto* cap. *Licet bonae* we find some sweeping enactments of a council held under John Stratford about putting out benefices to farm; Lyndwood tones down, qualifies and limits these enactments, saying in substance, we are forced to limit and understand them so, otherwise the constitution would be void and of none effect, contradicting the common law, "against which can prevail no decree emanating from an inferior (i. e., the Archbishop of Canterbury) who is powerless to set aside the legislation of his superior."

I have been making these statements largely in the words of Professor Maitland because the eminence of one who is avowedly the highest authority in England on mediaeval law is a guarantee of their accuracy. At the same time I have myself made notes of almost all the passages he refers to and many others, at a time when his essay was inaccessible to me. Moreover it must be remembered that the Professor's conclusions are very far from being

¹³ A still more striking instance taken from Lyndwood Tit. *de Praebendis*, cap. *Audistis Fratres*, ad v. *nos misericordiam* is discussed by Dr. Maitland, pp. 20-24. It is too long and intricate to summarize here. cf. Tit. *de cler non resid.*, cap. *Praeterea*, ad v. *Praedicat verbum*, fol. 97o.

based upon Lyndwood's manual alone. There are five hundred facts and records of English history which point in the same direction. The great collections of documents connected with the Church of England published by Wilkins under the title of the *Concilia Angliae*, bears upon almost every page, it seems to me, the imprint of Papal supremacy. In this and similar collections we find Archbishop Peckham telling Edward I¹⁴ that "the Emperor of all has given authority to the decrees of the Popes, and that all men, all kings are bound by those decrees." We find an Archbishop of Canterbury writing with all his suffragans a joint letter to the Pope and telling him that all bishops derived their authority from him as rivulets from the fountain head;¹⁵ we find the Pope carving out a big slice from the jurisdiction of English bishoprics as in the case of the Abbey of St. Albans or Bury St. Edmunds and making it absolutely and entirely exempt from every form of episcopal authority; we find the very kings who are supposed by their statutes of provisors and praemunire to have shaken off all allegiance to Rome begging the Sovereign Pontiff in most respectful language to issue letters of provision or bulls of confirmation in favor of such and such an ecclesiastic who enjoys the royal favor. Thus as Professor Maitland himself has shown in other essays, which I am not here dealing with, not only did the Pope claim and obtain recognition of his right to take into his own hands the judgment of every ecclesiastical cause over the heads of the bishop, but it was largely through the questions and appeals of English Bishops to Rome asking for decisions that the fabric of Roman canon law was built up.¹⁶ The most independent of English prelates, and those who ranked highest in personal holiness, while they frequently in vigorous terms denounced the abuse of Papal power, as did St. Bernard and many other saints at other times and in other countries, never questioned for a moment the reality or the rightfulness of the power so abused. No name has been more in honor with our Anglican friends than that of the famous Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Grossteste, on account of his supposed resistance to the Papal supremacy, but it is Professor Maitland who reminds us that this great Bishop had proclaimed in the strongest terms his belief in the plenitude of the Papal power. "I know," he had said, "and I affirm without any reserve that there "belongs to our lord, the Pope, and the Holy Roman Church, the "power of disposing freely of all ecclesiastical benefices;" and again, "in respect of our lord, the Pope, all other prelates are like the

¹⁴Wilkin's, *Concilia*. Vol. II. pp. 64-65.

¹⁵ See Mr. Baijant's *Winchester Episcopal Registers*, Sandale, pp. 90-93.

¹⁶ Maitland, *Canon Law in Ireland*, pp. 53, 66, etc.

"moon and stars, receiving from him whatever powers they have "to illuminate and fructify the Church." In Professor Maitland's paraphrase: "The bishop shines with a reflected light which will pale and vanish whenever the Papal sun arises." So Grossteste speaks of our lord, the Pope, "who has received the plenitude of power from Jesus Christ whose place he holds,"¹⁷ and Archbishop Arundel of Canterbury in a constitution published to all the English Church under his primatial jurisdiction, long after the time of Provisors and Premunire describes the papal decrees as duly emanating from him who bears the keys of eternal life and death, who supplies the place on earth not of a simple man but of the true God, and to whom God Himself has entrusted all the rights of heavenly empire."

I say that we turn from this language and these facts which may or may not be rhetorical or exceptional, to examine for ourselves in the text-book of canon law used in all the ecclesiastical courts of England what light Lyndwood the sober-minded jurist and man of affairs can throw upon actual practice. Perhaps the English Church held one language in public pronouncements and quite another when it came to deciding causes in the courts of Christianity. There interests of native prelates were by no means identical with those of the Pope. There Rome was only a far off shadow, while the jealous eyes of the king's officials were close at hand and watched very narrowly for any fancied encroachment on the royal prerogative.

The Ecclesiastical Courts Commissioners echoing the ideas of their most trusted adviser, Bishop Stubbs, and with them Mr. Wakeman, Mr. Ingram, Dr. Creighton, the present Bishop of London, and many more, all assure us in chorus that the Canon Law of Rome was not binding upon the ecclesiastical judges of England. But what says the expert, the Professor of Jurisprudence, who has really studied that Canon Law, and the working of those courts.¹⁸ "It seems to me," writes Professor Maitland, "that

¹⁷ That Professor Maitland does not stand alone in his interpretation of the authority of the Canon Law in the ecclesiastical courts may be seen from the criticism of his book published in the *English Historical Review* for January. The author of the notice is the Rev. H. Rashdall an Anglican clergyman, a University preacher and a first rate authority on mediaeval history. He writes: "There is not a trace (in Lyndwood) of the theory that the English Church enjoyed any mysterious exemption from the law of the Catholic Church of which it was a part. There were, as Lyndwood hints, parts of the law which could not practically be enforced in England, owing to the attitude of the English Parliament and the English courts. But the same was the case all over Europe, except, perhaps, in places more or less directly under the temporal government of ecclesiastics. Not only is the theory in question (that of Bishop Stubbs, Wakeman and the rest) one which is refuted by well-known and easily accessible facts but there is literally not a vestige of evidence in its favor." p. 145.

¹⁸ L. C., p. 45.

if Lyndwood had been asked whether the Canon Law of Rome was binding upon him and the other ecclesiastical judges in England, he would in the first place have taken exception to the form of the question. He would have said something of this kind.

"I do not quite understand what you mean by the 'canon law of Rome.' If you mean thereby any rules which relate only to the 'diocese of which the Pope is bishop, or to the province of which the Pope is metropolitan, then it is obvious enough that we in England have not to administer the Canon Law of Rome. But even if this be your meaning, you must be careful to avoid a mistake. I, whatever else I may be, am the official of a papal legate; the archiepiscopal court, over which I preside, is the court of a papal legate. It is the duty of a legatine court to copy as nearly as may be the procedure of a Roman court. The *mos et stylus Curiae Romanae* are my models. They are my excuse, or rather my warrant, if, for example, I cite any of the archbishop's *subditi* to appear before him, 'wheresoever he shall be within his province' without naming any particular place for their appearance. In so doing, I am exercising a legatine and Roman privilege, and am administering specifically Roman rules. However I very much fear that this is not your meaning, that what you call the canon law of Rome, is what I call the *jus commune* of the Church, and that you are hinting that I am not bound by the statutes that the Popes have decreed for all the faithful. If that be so, I must tell you that your hint is not only erroneous but heretical. That you will withdraw it I hope and believe, for otherwise, though we are sincerely sorry when we are driven to extremities, the archbishop may feel it his painful duty to relinquish you to the lay arm, and you know what follows relinquishment. Your case, though sad, is not unprecedented. The test that I must exact of you and others suspected of Lollardy has been already formulated. It is this: you must declare that every Christian is bound to obey all the constitutions and ordinances contained in the Decretum, the Decretals, the Sext, and the Clementines, in such wise as obedience is demanded for them by the Roman Church."

The question of Papal supremacy naturally comes in for the greatest share of attention, when we look critically with modern eyes into this manual of Anglicanism, as Anglicanism was known to our forefathers. If one could imagine even the highest of High Church Bishops reading steadily through the pages of Lyndwood and calling attention with a red pencil to all the propositions to which he could not assent, there would hardly remain a page, I

think, that would not be scored and ensanguined out of all recognition. There is papalism in every line of it. At a very rough calculation we may say that there are twenty-five thousand quotations in the 500 odd pages of Lyndwood and John of Ayton together. I doubt if one per cent of them comes from any English source. The authority of the Roman canons and the Continental canonists was, in the eyes of these English officials, supreme and unquestioned. To the civil law of England, to the customs enforced by the authority of the king or parliament there are but scanty references, and if Lyndwood ever for a moment turns aside to notice such matters it is nearly always to stigmatise them as abuses, or to imply that they have obtained that tacit recognition of the Apostolic See which alone justifies their observance.

I have said in an earlier part of this paper that our Anglican friends whose position requires them to show that the Church of England of the present day is the twin sister of the *Ecclesia Anglicana* of Lyndwood's time, find it necessary to soften many features in the latter portrait and to represent that earlier Church as a sort of vague and embryonic protoplasm which only took definite form in the Council of Trent. I have not much space to develop this part of my subject but I should like to dwell a little upon some of the many doctrinal matters which Lyndwood introduces, and to bring them into relation with the authoritative teaching of the Church of England by law established as expressed in its formularies—the Articles, the Prayer-Book and the Homilies. Let us begin with the thorny question of Indulgences.

In two of the archiepiscopal constitutions issued by Peckham the word *Indulgentiae* is to be found occurring. On both occasions Lyndwood takes occasion to write a little dissertation on the subject, and I may say that I do not anywhere know a better treatment of this question in equally compendious form. I should like to translate it and to place it in the hands of every convert as a statement of the doctrine of Indulgences authoritatively put forth by the *Ecclesia Anglicana* more than a century before the Council of Trent.

Lyndwood begins his dissertation in proper scholastic form with a series of difficulties. It may be objected, he says, that an inferior cannot relax or diminish a punishment imposed by a superior, for instance if a penance is imposed upon anyone by the Pope, no bishop can commute it, and if a penance be imposed by a bishop it is useless for the culprit to apply for a remedy to any inferior prelate. Hence if God in forgiving us our sins appoints a certain atonement required by His justice it would seem that no human power can grant any relaxation of such a penalty. This is only

a specimen of several of the plausible objections which our canonist raises, including amongst the rest the difficulty caused by the absence of any reference to Indulgences in Holy Scripture, and that of the presumably deleterious effect of Indulgences in encouraging rather than diminishing sin and crime. "From all which," as he finally concludes, "it seems to follow that Indulgences are contrary to the sovereign rights of Almighty God and to the sacred canons and laws." "On the other side, however," he continues, "in favour of the validity of such indulgences, we have to take into account the fact that all theologians admit them, as is clear from their writings, similarly all the canonists, as appears in such and such sections of the *corpus juris*. Moreover this has been the practice of the Church from a time beyond which the memory of man knoweth not the contrary. And blessed Gregory, who was a saint, observed the practice; neither can we believe that the whole Church has fallen into error. For it was said to Peter as the representative of the whole Church 'I have made supplication for thee that thy faith may not fail.' Further this is proved by the privilege given to Peter and his successors 'Whatever thou shalt bind, etc.' Again in Exodus we read of the indulgences or remissions granted in the year of Jubilee . . . Moreover the most fundamental ground which establishes the validity of such indulgences is the unity of the Church, which is the mystical body of Christ, in which many holy men have performed (supererogaverunt) works of piety and mercy over and above the measure of their own transgressions, patiently enduring scorn and contempt and infinite sufferings and torments which they have not deserved. These do not cease to pray for us and the Church pours forth prayers to them that they may intercede for us, as we see in the Litanies. Moreover, leaving all these out of account the merit of the Death and Passion and Bloodshedding of Christ worketh the remission of sins. For He offered Himself as a victim for sin, and that pain and martyrdom which He unjustly bore, nay even the least drop of His blood was sufficient for the washing away of all our offences. Communicating, therefore, to us His merits and those of His saints, he gave the power of binding and loosing to Peter and his successors. Accordingly this remission of the penalty to be inflicted for sins is granted to all who are truly penitent and who have made their confession, is a reward which the holy martyrs have won for us, as thoroughly solvent debtors, who by making satisfaction in our place set us free also from our penalties. And the dispensing of these merits by which we may be set free from the penalties due to our sins, Christ, as I have said, entrusted to Peter and his successors, who also in

"turn committed such powers to the Bishops, that have been called "to share a portion of their solicitude; and they (the Popes) have "likewise entrusted to the Bishops other similar powers.¹⁹

I cannot, I think, exaggerate the importance of these words as an illustration of Lyndwood's whole attitude towards the papacy. "The Pope," he says again, a little further on, "who has supreme power and in whose person the Church is represented, in granting an indulgence, communicates to us as it were the good works of the saints and of the Passion of Christ, and so satisfies and discharges the penalty which must be imposed on the sinner for his sin." In more than one place does Lyndwood draw a distinction between the power of order and the power of jurisdiction. The power of order is given in the rite by which a man is raised to the dignity of the priesthood, but the power of jurisdiction is not bestowed upon all, and in this matter of indulgences at least is communicated, as Lyndwood plainly teaches, only through the Sovereign Pontiff. "It is true," he says, "that this faculty of binding and loosing belongs fundamentally to every priest in virtue of the sacred order which he has received, but it is not all priests who have the use of this faculty for they lack the power of jurisdiction which supplies the requisite matter,"²⁰ the matter that is, for the exercise of those powers. If the comparison may be used without irreverence, in Lyndwood's idea a priest without jurisdiction is like a man with a gun and a gun license, but without any game of his own. He has everything that he needs for a successful day's sport except something to shoot at. None the less he is not free to invade another man's property and kill his birds. Lyndwood's teaching is identical with that now everywhere received in the Catholic Church, which finds its practical importance in the question of faculties for confession. Our Ritualist friends absolutely ignore the point which to Lyndwood and to every Catholic priest seems of all matters most fundamental. To him the first question to be asked of a priest who proposed to set up in any church his *sedem confessionalem*, the tribunal wherein he sits in judgment on the penitents who present themselves, would be: what jurisdiction does he possess? Who has commissioned him, and for whom? Thus he lays down that only the parish priest has faculties to hear confessions *ipso jure* and that only for his own parishioners. All others need to be specially licensed to that purpose. The Pope, he says, may give faculties to any priest anywhere, and in Lyndwood's day the confessors of religious orders derived their faculties not from the bishop but from the Pope alone. A papal legate

¹⁹ *De Poenit.*, c. *Cum Salubriter*, s. o. *Claribus*.

²⁰ *Tit. De Poeniten.*, cap. *in confessione*, ad v. *legatus*, fol. 2382.

similarly may give faculties to any priest throughout his province, a bishop only in his own diocese. But even these faculties are limited. It is not only Lyndwood but a Provincial constitution passed by St. Edmund of Canterbury and his suffragans, which lays down that "there are cases in which no man but the Pope alone, or his legate has power to absolve," and Lyndwood in his gloss appealing to two decretals in the *corpus juris* points out that the legate thus referred to, does not mean any ordinary *legatus natus* such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, but only a legate *a latere* specially sent from Rome.²¹ In other words if any culprit, *sua dente diabolo*, inflicted grievous bodily harm upon a cleric or a religious, or forged or tampered with apostolic bull, or did a good many other things enumerated by Lyndwood there was no man in the length and breadth of England who, ordinarily speaking, had powers to absolve him. If he wished to be reconciled with God and Holy Church there was nothing for it but to set off on a pilgrimage to Rome. Repeatedly again does Lyndwood assert that for sundry irregularities *solus Papa dispensat* the Pope alone can dispense, as for instance the case of a man twice married who wants to take orders. So again when our author lays down that in those constitutions which impose excommunication as a penalty, the penalty is not incurred where there is ignorance of the law imposing it, he is careful to point out that papal decrees are on quite a different footing.²² "This is true enough," he says, "as far as regards the constitutions of those who are the Pope's inferiors," such as the Archbishop of Canterbury (it is a decree of Peckham's he is discussing), "but a papal constitution, when two months have elapsed from its publication made in general form in consistory binds even those who are ignorant of it."²³

It would be interesting to go into detail upon Lyndwood's doctrine of the sacraments, but space fails us. Let me say, in brief, that as far as I have been able to study it his teaching is as clear

²¹ Again, in a long note about the deanery of St. Martin's le grande, which was held, it seems, absolutely by the King's appointment without any institution from the Bishop, Lyndwood is trying to determine whether such an incumbency is technically to be regarded as a benefice or not, and he supposes as one solution that the king may be held to base his right to appoint on the authority of the Holy See. In such a case Lyndwood seems to hold there is no difficulty about the absence of episcopal institution. "If the king makes such an investiture by the privilege or authority of the Pope, I take it for granted (pono pro expedito)," says Lyndwood, "that even without the consent of the Bishop this suffices for a canonical title, and the investiture by the king takes the place of canonical institution," and he goes on: "For it would be a kind of sacrilege to doubt whether that man be worthy whom the Pope has chosen especially if he act from his own certain knowledge." "*Instar namque sacrilegii est dubitare an sit dignus quem papa elegerit, maxime si hoc fiat ex certa scientia.*" Lyndwood, *De Cohab Mul*, cap. *Ut Clericalis s. v. Beneficiati*, fol. 92 vo.

²² *De Officio Archidiaconi*, cap. *Eisdem*, s. v. *Excom'n*, fol. 37 vo.

²³ *Tit. De Sacrament. iterand.* cap. *Ignorantia ad v. poenitentia*.

and positive as such teaching can be and it is in accurate agreement with the Council of Trent and with what every Catholic priest now holds and explains to his flock. Compare such utterances as the following with the pronouncements of the Bishops of the Established Church at any period of her history. "Penance is the sacrament of those who return to God, and it is the only means of salvation (*est de necessitate salutis*) for all who have fallen under the empire of sin."²⁴ Or again:

"A man who is in mortal sin ought not to celebrate mass without 'previous confession (under pain of incurring fresh mortal sin). 'This confession must be made by word of mouth in the tribunal 'of the sacrament of penance, for although before Christ's incarnation mental confession made to God alone was sufficient, now 'since God has become man, confession by word of mouth must 'be made to man who stands in the place of Christ."

So we find our author quite clear in his own mind about the doctrine of *intention*. A constitution of Archbishop Walter requires that the words of consecration are to be pronounced by the priest "with the utmost devotion of mind" (*cum summa animi devotione*), on which the author comments "that is to say the intention of the mind must be firmly fixed on God and on the uttering of the words. For intention is always necessary, whether it be a special intention or a general intention and not only must there be the intention of the consecrator, but also the intention of Him who instituted the sacrament. Hence if a priest stood up in the market place and pronounced the form of the words of consecration over all the bread there exposed for sale, even though he had the intention of consecrating, there would be no transubstantiation in such a case, and this would not be from any lack of power in the words, but from the lack of that intention which was in the mind of Him who instituted the sacrament, who did not intend that consecration should take place with such mockery and folly, but only for the utility or need of the Church in general or particular." Lyndwood then discusses an adverse view as to the validity of such a consecration of loaves in the market place but he appeals to the authority of two other schoolmen, adding: "A priest can consecrate any required amount of matter provided he intends to consecrate for the use and nourishment of the faithful. But without this intention he cannot, for there is wanting the intention of doing what the Church does."²⁵

So I should like to quote much of what Lyndwood says about

²⁴ Tit. *De Celeb. Nuisarum* cap. *Lintheamina*, ad v. *devotione*

²⁵ Book V., Tit *De Haeret.*, cap. *Reverendissime*, s. v. *declarentur*, fol. 211 vo.

heresy and the Catholic faith. Englishman as he was, the highest legal functionary in the court of the Archbishop of Canterbury, to whom he dedicates his work, before he himself was made an English bishop, it is the *Ecclesia Romana* to which he invariably refers when there is any question of doctrine, not the *Ecclesia Anglicana*. What has the English Church, *quâ* English Church, to do with doctrine?

"I say," he tells us, "that if any man implicitly holds and follows, what the holy Roman Church teaches and proclaims, even though he may err in explaining his faith still he will stand excused." Or again, "for I repeat, that man is most absolutely to be accounted a heretic who does not hold what the Holy Roman Church teaches and follows;" or again, "he also is called a heretic who out of contempt of the Roman Church scorns to observe those things which the Roman Church has determined, and also he who despises and neglects to observe the decretals (the decisions of the Pope) on the plea that they seem to run counter to the keys."

Or again, "he also is called a heretic who tries to wrest the privilege of the Roman Church from *the supreme head of (all) Churches*" (*summo capiti Ecclesiarum*).²⁶ These things Lyndwood draws from the utterances of the *Corpus Juris*, and there is not a syllable to show that he for a moment dreams of questioning any one of them. This is the *law*, the Church law made for all Christendom, which the English Church constitutions may supplement but not derogate from.

And if on the one hand Lyndwood is strong in vindicating what Mr. Wakeman would call "the modern ultramontane doctrine of papal supremacy," he is equally strong in repudiating from his religious system those abuses which were charged against the Church by the reformers a century later. Penance and indulgences and the other sacraments demand, as he insists, for their primary condition the sincere repentance of the penitent. If a man is out of charity with God, he explains, none of the good deeds which he may do avail anything for an eternal reward. He is not indeed to be driven away from confession even if he be not properly penitent, for he can be counselled and exhorted to do such good works as he will. The good works may move God to grant him in the end the grace of a true conversion and they may help to atone for his sins, and to diminish the power which the devil has over him.²⁷ Again, Lyndwood's doctrine of the secrecy of confession is exactly what is taught in our own day. Suppose, he asks, a man makes

²⁶ Tit. *De Poenit.* cap. *sacerdos*, and cap. *prebemus*, fol. 240, 241.

²⁷ Tit *De Poemf*, cap. *prohibemus*, etc., fol. 241 seg.

confession of some crime not already committed but to be committed, say a plot to assassinate somebody, declaring that the temptation is greater than he can resist, is the priest bound to keep it secret? The common teaching of theologians, he replies, is that he ought by all means to keep it secret and not to disclose it. The priest should do what he can to prevent the evil without betraying the penitent, but, unless the penitent give his consent, no information can be given of the intended design. This, it will be remembered, was the exact doctrine which cost Father Garnet his life in the matter of the Gunpowder Plot nearly two centuries later. If in such a case, Lyndwood goes on, a judge should question the priest as to his knowledge of the conspiracy and the priest cannot evade the question, he may answer that he knows nothing of it, because the words "as a man" are understood; or he may even say roundly I know nothing of it in confession, because the words are understood: "Nothing that I can reveal to thee." And then Lyndwood appeals to the passage in the Gospel of St. Matthew (c. xviii) where Christ, our Lord, says: "Of that day (of judgment) no one knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son," in which we must understand," says Lyndwood, "that the Son knows nothing that He can reveal to us."²⁸

Again I wish I had time to analyse the admirably clear and satisfactory little disquisition of our author on the adoration of the cross and the honors paid to relics and images, but what has gone before must suffice as illustrations of the excursions which our canonist constantly makes into matters theological. I must confess that the fact that such views, especially those relating to the papal supremacy, prevailed in Lyndwood's time, seems to me not only incontestible in itself but very hard to reconcile with current Anglican theories. The line of defence taken by such popular writers as Messrs. Wakeman and Ingram, does not in my humble judgment meet the facts fairly. It is impossible at the tail end of a paper like the present to indicate all the misconceptions which seem to me to underlie their presentment of the case, but one or two words must be said upon the subject before concluding.

If I have insisted a good deal upon the representative character of Lyndwood's work—the high position of the writer, the unique

²⁸ The question of *Provisors* and *Premunire* is much too intricate to be discussed here, but I may refer my readers to the extremely able discussion of the subject by the Right Rev. Mgr. Moyes, in the *London Tablet* for December 2, 1893. Mgr. Moyes calls my attention to the fact that the act of Provisors professed to be passed in the interest of the Pope to protect him from the importunities of Rome runners. The real motive which underlay this legislation was not any rebellion against papal supremacy, but the wish to safeguard the interests of the patrons of livings, who were, of course, strongly represented in the English Parliament, and who suffered by the papal "Provisions."

authority attributed to it, during a hundred years, down to the time when the Reformation changed everything, the number of editions published and so on—it is because our opponents are willing to admit the existence of an extravagant papalism in individuals or on exceptional occasions, but deny that the English Church as a whole is to be identified with such views. There were constant protests, they tell us, against certain papal claims. The acts of *provisors* and *premunire*²⁹ alone were a most effectual bar to any interference from Rome with the internal concerns of the National Church. But I reply, and here again the impartial authority of Professor Maitland and Mr. Rushdall is entirely with us, these facts in themselves mean nothing until we have ascertained (1) from whom the anti-papal opposition came, (2) what was the manner of it, (3) what was the scope of it.

1. Did the *Provisors* and *Premunire* legislation originate with the Church or with the State? Surely the action of the crown even when supported by the authority of parliament is not to be taken as expressing the voice of the Church except upon some supposition of a National Church, which seems to me in the present case to involve a *petitio principii*. The same writers who tell us that we must interpret the statutes of provisors and premunire as a rejection by the English Church of Roman supremacy will be horrified at our want of candor if we identify the creed of Anglicans in our own day with the Gorham judgment and the solemnization of marriage between divorced persons. But the opposition implied in *premunire* and the rest is only the resistance which the Church has encountered from the secular power in every age and country, and during the Middle Ages quite as much in France, Germany or Italy as in England; would any one argue that French or Austrian Catholics no longer regard marriage as a sacrament and deny papal supremacy because the law of France and Austria recognises a purely civil ceremony and claims all jurisdiction over marriage cases for the secular courts. All through her history the Church has had to yield repeatedly to *force majeure* and to be thankful for small mercies in the way of concessions.

2. Again, the manner in which English protests against Roman claims were made is a matter of most vital importance. Mr. Wakeman divides these papal claims into three categories, temporal, administrative and spiritual.

a. Those of a temporal nature, e. g., the so-called deposing power. The existence and nature of such claims were always a matter of dispute among theologians. Rome herself has now practically surrendered them.

²⁹ *Concilia Angliae*. Vol. II., p. 539 seg.

4. Administrative. "These," says Mr. Wakeman, "included rights of appointing bishops, appointing and sending legates, granting of the pall, appointing to benefices by provision, granting and refusing bulls for the consecration of bishops," etc.

"These claims," according to the same authority, "never formed part of the law or custom of the constitution in England and their successful exercise depended upon the connivance of the king." The last phrase is noteworthy.

Now we may admit that these administrative claims first specified were much interfered with and protested against in mediaeval England as in all other countries. But on what ground? When we look at the text of the documents we see very clearly how the matter stood. It is not that the king or parliament are striking a blow for a free National Church. The idea of a headless church independent of the Pope entered into the minds of none but a few wild dreamers. No, the reason alleged was very different. The fact is that the line which separated these temporal and administrative claims was exceedingly narrow. The kings and their justices and the officials of the secular power, not without much excuse, affected to be unable in many instances to discern it. They declared that the papal bulls, requisitions, etc., interfered, not with the liberty of the Church, but with the royal prerogative, they derogated from the temporal authority of the sovereign. Hence they were justified in resisting them.

Let us take one or two illustrations of what this "connivance" of the king amounted to. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that we might cite hundred of examples similar in tendency though not so extreme in form.

In 1327, at the beginning of the reign of Edward III, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Walter Reynolds, died, and the Christ Church monks duly and canonically elected Simon Mepham in his room. The choice commended itself to the king, and he on Jan. 6, 1328, wrote to the Pope in most respectful terms extolling the virtues of the Archbishop-elect, and asking the pontiff to confirm the choice that had been made, and not to set it aside on any plea of reservation or provision for any candidate of his own. Two days before this the king addressed a letter to *each* of the Cardinals at the Court of Avignon, asking them to use their influence that the election might not be quashed. On the 12th of January the chapter wrote to the Pope recommending Simon Mepham in similar terms. On the 25th of March as nothing apparently had yet been heard, the king wrote to the Pope again, again humbly praying that he would give speedy effect to the election held. On the same day he again dispatched letters to each of the Cardinals to

ask their support for his urgent request. Later on the king wrote a third time to the Pope in the same sense begging that the matter might be dispatched. The Queen Mother Isabel of Castile likewise addressed a letter to the Holy See using what influence she possessed, and finally the "*magnates Angliae*," a phrase which I take to mean Parliament, wrote a collective epistle to urge the matter from their point of view. All these letters are printed at length in Wilkins,⁸⁰ and all of them contain what is equivalently a full recognition of the Pope's right to set aside the election and appoint some one else if he chose. The last letter, written by the king himself, in fact concludes as follows: "But if, most holy Father, which I trust will not be the case, it should happen that the election be invalidated because justice so requires it, and if it should seem good to your Benignity to provide some other person to the See, then I would pray you to remember the recommendation which I have on another occasion addressed to you in favour of Henry, Bishop of Lincoln." The claim to appoint bishops was one of those which Mr. Wakeman tells us "depended upon the connivance of the king." I hope I shall not seem to speak flippantly if I say that this seems indeed to be connivance with a vengeance.

And now let me give another curious illustration of the way in which this repudiation of Roman supremacy manifested itself. It is the more interesting because it has reference to our friend Lyndwood, whose book we have been discussing throughout. When in 1438 Henry VI or his advisers convinced themselves that Lyndwood would make an excellent bishop—what an odd thing by the way that a man who had expressed in his book such extreme papalist views should be promoted to a bishopric not at the instance of the Pope, but of the king whose prerogative, according to all Anglican theories, he had been so constantly attacking—when, I repeat, Henry VI's advisers desired to make Lyndwood a bishop how did they set about it? Strange to say, although they denied the Pope's right to appoint bishops and although papal provisions were illegal and the man who obtained them had to sue out a pardon, they nevertheless decided that the best thing to do was to write to the Pope and to ask him to appoint Lyndwood to the bishopric of Hereford. The Bishop of Hereford, as the King's letter itself states, had obtained the Pope's leave to resign his See on account of extreme old age, and the king most respectfully begs of the Pope to name Lyndwood as his successor. "He is 'the keeper of our privy seal,'" the king says, "and we know him 'for a man of most eminent learning, of great prudence, and ex-

⁸⁰ Wilkins, *Concilia*, Vol. III., p. 538.

"perience in weighty affairs, of upright and most pure life, a man
 "so chaste, humble and modest and inflexibly just, that into what-
 "ever place he comes, he purifies all things by the integrity of his
 "conduct; moreover we know him to be so completely a stranger
 "to all ambition that he would much rather never be made bishop
 "at all than ever solicit such a dignity or contribute to it by any
 "action of his own or to the prejudice of any one else. . . . This
 "is the man, most blessed and clement Father, whom we humbly
 "and very earnestly beseech your Beatitude, not so much in his
 "own interest as in the interest of the said bishopric, graciously and
 "favourably to adopt for this charge."⁸⁷

And here I think I had better stop, I have not said a tithe of what might be said and should be said in answer to the objections raised against the mediaeval doctrine of papal supremacy, but it is impossible in one short paper to treat adequately a subject so complicated.

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THE MEDIAEVAL CHORUS MUSIC OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: ITS STYLE, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEVOTIONAL IDEAL.

THE development of the music of the Christian Church has passed through three typical phases, each complete in itself, bounded by clearly marked lines, corresponding quite closely in respect to time divisions with the three major epochs into which the history of the Western Church may be divided. These phases of ecclesiastical song are so far from being mutually exclusive that both the first and the second persisted after the introduction of new methods, so that at the present day at least two of the three forms are in use in well nigh every Catholic congregation, and in many church centers all of them are cultivated side by side, although they never meet on precisely equal terms.

I. The period in which the unison chant was the only form of ritual music extends from the founding of the Congregation of Rome to about the year 1100, and corresponds with the centuries of missionary activity among the northern and western nations, when the Roman liturgy was triumphantly asserting its authority

over the various local uses. The unison chant grew and diffused itself over Europe with the growth and dissemination of the liturgy of which it was the inseparable associate, and like the liturgy it attained its fulness of growth and its characteristic expression in the early centuries of the Christian era, mainly under the fostering care of the monastic orders.¹

II. The period of the unaccompanied contrapuntal chorus, based on the mediaeval ("Gregorian") key and melodic system, covering the era of the European sovereignty of the Catholic Church, and including the epoch of the Counter-Reformation of the Sixteenth Century. This phase of art, like the liturgical chant, reached its culmination by regular unchecked evolution, underwent no decline or dissolution, and gave way at last to a style in sharp contrast with it only when it had gained an impregnable historic position.

III. The period of the forms now dominant in the church at large, viz., mixed solo and chorus music with free instrumental accompaniment, tending toward the homophonic as distinct from the polyphonic method of structure, and based on the modern and minor transposing scales. This style arose early in the Seventeenth Century, as the latest outcome of the Renaissance secularization of art; it was not a development from the preceding style but was a forcing into the Church of external and originally alien elements; it was taken up by the Catholic, Lutheran, and Anglican bodies, and in all of these was the sign and result of the great European impulse toward an individual and comprehensive expression in literature and art, and was moulded into its present forms and characteristic types of style under the influence of the opera and instrumental concert music.

The unison chant and the mediaeval *a capella* chorus are each essentially homogeneous, each the manifest token of the surrender of individual impulse to a generalized ecclesiastical standard of devotional expression, in which the voice of the separate personality in the worshippers is lost in the comprehensive ideal utterance of an exalted and universal institution. The modern church music, on the other hand, is heterogeneous, because in it, as in secular music (although in less degree) the law of conformity to an authoritative standard is relaxed and the demand for a subjective, vivid and definite manifestation of feeling asserts its claims. These successive changes in the ideal and form of church music were normal and inevitable, because they were the spontaneous outcome of conceptions which lay in the very heart of the human element

¹ See "The American Catholic Quarterly Review, Jan., 1898; Music in the Early Church, and Music, Dec., 1897; Jan. and Feb., 1898. The Ritual Chant in the History of the Catholic Church.

in the religious institution itself. They were the result of the adaptation of the liturgic standards of church art to the shifting aesthetic as well as religious demands of the time.

The second of these periods—the subject of the present sketch—is in many respects the most attractive of the three to the student of ecclesiastical music. Modern church music, by virtue of its variety, splendor, and dramatic pathos, seems to be tinged with the hues of earthliness which belie the strictest conception of ecclesiastical art. It partakes of the doubt and turmoil of a skeptical and rebellious age, it is the music of impassioned longing in which are mingled echoes of worldly allurements, it is not the chastened tone of pious assurance and self-abnegation. The choral song developed in the ages of faith is pervaded by the accents of that calm ecstasy of trust and celestial anticipation which give to mediaeval art that exquisite charm of naiveté and sincerity never again to be realized through the same medium, because it is the unconscious expression of an unquestioning simplicity of conviction which seems to have passed away forever from the higher manifestations of the human creative intellect.

Such pathetic suggestion clings to the religious music of the Middle Ages no less palpably than to the sculpture, painting, and hymnody of the same era, and combines with its singular artistic perfection and loftiness of tone to render it perhaps the most typical and lovely of all the forms of Catholic art. And yet to the generality of students of church and art history it is of all the products of the Middle Ages the least familiar. Any intellectual man whom we might select would not think of calling himself educated if he had no acquaintance with mediaeval architecture, poetry, and plastic art; yet he would probably not feel at all ashamed to confess total ignorance of that vast store of liturgic music which in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries filled the incense-laden air of those very cathedrals and chapels in which his reverent feet so love to wander. The miracles of mediaeval architecture, the achievements of the Gothic sculptors and the religious painters of Florence, Cologne, and Flanders are familiar to him, but the musical craftsmen of the Low Countries, Paris, Rome, and Venice, who clothed every prayer, hymn, and Scripture lesson of the Catholic ritual with strains of unique beauty and tenderness, are only names, if indeed their names are known to him at all. Yet in sheer bulk their works would doubtless be found to equal the whole amount of the music of every kind that has been written in the three centuries following their age; while in technical mastery and adaptation to its special end this school is not unworthy of comparison with the more brilliant and versatile art of the present day.

The period from the Twelfth to the close of the Sixteenth Century was one of extraordinary musical activity. The thousands of cathedrals, chapels, parish churches, and convents were increasing in their demands for new settings of the multifarious members of the Mass and offices. Until the art of printing was applied to musical notes about the year 1500, followed by the foundation of musical publishing houses, there was but little duplication or exchange of musical compositions, and thus every important ecclesiastical establishment must be provided with its own corps of composers and copyists. The religious enthusiasm and the vigorous intellectual activity of the Middle Ages found as free a channel of discharge in song as in any other means of embellishment of the church ceremonial. These conditions, together with the absence of an operatic stage, a concert system, or a musical public, turned the fertile musical impulses of the period to the benefit of the Church. The ecclesiastical musicians also set to music vast numbers of madrigals, chansons, villanellas, and the like, for the entertainment of aristocratic patrons, but this was but an incidental deflection from their more serious duties as ritual composers. In quality as well as quantity the mediaeval clerical music was not unworthy of comparison with the architectural, sculptural, pictorial, and textile products which were created in the same epoch and under the same auspices. The world has never witnessed a more absorbed devotion to a single artistic idea, neither has there existed since the golden age of Greek sculpture another art form so lofty in expression and so perfect in workmanship as the polyphonic church chorus in the years of its maturity. That style of musical art that was brought to fruition by such men as Joaquin des Prés, Orlando di Lasso, Willaert, Palestrina, Vittoria, Anerio, the Gabriellis, and Lotti is not unworthy to be compared with the Gothic cathedrals in whose epoch it arose and with the later triumphs of Renaissance painting with which it culminated.

Of this remarkable achievement of genius the typical educated man above mentioned knows little or nothing. How is it possible, he might ask, that a school of art so opulent in results, capable of arousing so much admiration among the initiated, could have dominated all Europe for five such brilliant centuries, and yet have left so little impress upon the consciousness of the modern world if it really possessed the high artistic merits that are claimed for it? The answer is not difficult. For the world at large music exists only as it is performed, and the difficulty and expense of musical performance insure, as a general rule, the neglect of musical works that do not arouse a public demand. Church music is less susceptible than secular to the tyranny of fashion, but even in this

department changing tastes and the politic compromising spirit tend to pay court to novelty and to neglect the antiquated. The revolution in musical taste and practice which occurred early in the Seventeenth Century—a revolution so complete that it metamorphosed the whole conception of the nature and purpose of music—swept all musical production off into new directions, and the complex austere art of the mediaeval church was forgotten under the fascination of the new Italian melody and the vivid rhythm and tone-color of the orchestra. Since then the tide of invention has never paused long enough to enable the world at large to turn its thought to the forsaken treasures of the past. Moreover, only a comparatively minute part of this multitude of old works has ever been printed, much of it has been lost, the greater portion lies buried in the dust of libraries; whatever is accessible must be released from an abstruse and obsolete system of notation, and the methods of performance, which conditioned a large measure of its effect, must be restored under the uncertain guidance of tradition. The usages of chorus singing in the present era do not prepare singers to cope with the peculiar difficulties of the *a capella* style; a special education and a special mode of feeling are required for an appreciation of its appropriateness and beauty. Nevertheless, such is its inherent vitality, so magical is its attraction to one who has come into complete harmony with its spirit, so true is it as an exponent of the mythical submissive type of piety which always tends to re-assert itself in a rationalistic age like the present, that the minds of churchmen are gradually returning to it, and scholars and musical directors are tempting it forth from its seclusion. Societies are founded for its study, choirs in some of the most influential church centers are adding mediaeval works to their repertoires, journals and schools are laboring in its interest, and its influence is insinuating itself into the modern Mass and anthem, lending to the modern forms a more elevated and spiritual quality. Little by little the world of culture is becoming enlightened in respect to the unique beauty and refinement of this form of art, and the more intelligent study of the Middle Ages, which has now taken the place of the former prejudiced misinterpretation of that epoch, is forming an attitude of mind that is capable of a sympathetic response to this most exquisite and characteristic of all the products of mediaeval genius.

In order to seize the full significance of this school of Catholic music in its mature stage in the Sixteenth Century, it will be necessary, as in all similar study, to trace its origin and growth. The higher criticism of the present day rests on the principle that we cannot comprehend works and schools of art unless we know

their causes and conditions. We shall find as we examine the history of mediaeval choral song, that it arose in response to an instinctive demand for a more expansive form of music than the unison chant. Liturgical necessities can in no wise account for the invention of part singing, for even to-day the Gregorian plain song remains the one officially recognized form of ritual music in the Catholic Church. It was an unconscious impulse, prophesying a richer musical expression which could not at once be realized, —a blind revolt of the European mind against bondage to an antique and restrictive form of expression. For the Gregorian chant by its very nature as unaccompanied melody, rhythmically controlled by prose accent and measure, was incapable of further development, and it was impossible that music should remain at a standstill while all the other arts were continually struggling with higher problems. The movement which elicited the art of choral song from the latent powers of the liturgic chant was identical with the tendency which evolved Gothic and Renaissance architecture, sculpture, and painting out of Roman and Byzantine art. Melody unsupported soon runs its course; harmony, music in parts, with contrast of consonance and dissonance, dynamics, and light and shade, must supplement melody, adding more opulent resources to the simple charm of tone and rhythm. The science of harmony, at least in the modern sense, was unknown in antiquity, and the Gregorian chant was but the projection of the antique usage into the modern world. The history of modern European music, therefore, begins with the first authentic instances of singing in two or more semi-independent parts, these parts being subjected to a definite proportional notation.

A century or so before the science of part writing had taken root in musical practice, a strange barbaric form of music meets our eyes. A manuscript of the Tenth Century, formerly ascribed to Hucbald of St. Armand, who lived, however, a century earlier, gives the first distinct account with rules for performance, of a divergence from the custom of unison singing, by which the voices of the choir, instead of all singing the same notes, move along together separated by octaves and fourths or octaves and fifths; or else a second voice repeats a single note while the first sings the chant melody, the second voice making a slight departure from its monotone near the end of the period. The author of this manuscript makes no claim to the invention of this manner of singing, but alludes to it as something already well known. Much speculation has been expended upon the question of the origin and purpose of the first form of this barbarous Organum or Diaphony, as it was called; some conjecturing that it was suggested by the

sound of the ancient Keltic stringed instrument, *Crowth* or *Crotta*, which was tuned in fifths and had a flat finger-board; others find in it an imitation of the early organ with its several rows of pipes sounding fifths like a modern mixture stop; while others suppose, with some reason, that it was a survival of a fashion practiced among the Greeks and Romans. The importance of the *Organum* in music history has, however, been greatly overrated, for properly speaking it was not harmony or part singing at all, but only another kind of unison, in which voices of different registers moved along side by side through the chant melody by means of exactly the same order of steps and half-steps, which in true harmony cannot occur. Even the second form of *Organum* (melody with drone accompaniment) was but little nearer the final goal, for the attendant note series was not free enough to be called an organic element in a harmonic structure. As soon, however, as the accompanying part was allowed ever so little unconstrained life of its own, the first steps in genuine part-writing were taken, and a new epoch in musical art had begun.

The freer and more promising style which issued from the treadmill of the *Organum* was called in its initial stages *Descant*, and was at first wholly confined to an irregular mixture of octaves, unisons, fifths, and fourths, with an occasional third as a sort of concession to the criticism of the natural ear upon antique theory. At first two parts only were employed. Occasional successions of parallel fifths and fourths, the heritage of the *Organum*, long survived, but they were gradually eliminated as hollow and unsatisfying, and the principle of contrary motion, which is the very soul of all modern harmony and counterpoint, was slowly established. It must be borne in mind, as the clue to all mediæval music, that the practice of tone-combination involved no idea whatever of chords, as modern theory conceives them. The characteristic principle of the vastly preponderating portion of the music of the last three centuries is harmony, technically so-called, i. e., chords, solid or distributed, out of which melody is primarily evolved. Homophony, monody—one part sustaining the tune while all others serve as the support and, so to speak, the coloring material also—is now the ruling postulate. The chorus music of Europe down to the Seventeenth Century, was, on the other hand, based on melody, the composer never thought of his combination as chords, but worked, we might say, horizontally, weaving together several semi-independent melodies into a flexible and accordant tissue.²

² This distinction between harmony and counterpoint is fundamental, but no space can be given here to its further elucidation. The point will easily be made clear by comparing an ordinary modern hymn tune with the first section of a fugue.

The transition from Organum to Descant was effected about the year 1100. There was for a time no thought of the invention of the component melodies. Not only the *cantus firmus* (the principal theme) but also the counterpoint (the melodic "running mate"), was borrowed, the second factor being frequently a folk tune altered to fit the chant melody, according to the simple laws of euphony then admitted. In respect to the words the Descant may be divided into two classes: the words might be the same in both parts, or one voice would sing the words of the office of the Church, and the other the words of the secular song from which the accompanying tune was taken. In the Twelfth Century the monkish musicians, stirred to bolder flights by the satisfactory results of their two-part Descant or counterpart, essayed three parts, with results at first childishly awkward, but with growing ease and smoothness. Free invention of the accompanying parts took the place of the custom of borrowing the entire melodic framework, for while two borrowed themes might fit each other, it was practically impossible to find three that would do so without almost complete alteration. But there was never any thought of inventing the *cantus firmus*; this was invariably taken from a ritual book or a popular tune, and the whole art of composition consisted in fabricating melodic figures that would unite with it in an agreeable synthesis. These contrapuntal devices, at first simple and often harsh, under the inevitable law of evolution became more free and mellifluous at the same time that they became more complex. The primitive Descant was one note against one note (hence the term "counterpoint," *punctum contra punctum*); later the accompanying part was allowed to sing several notes against one of the *cantus firmus*. Another early form consisted of notes interrupted by rests. In the Twelfth Century such progress had been made that thirds and sixths were abundantly admitted, dissonant intervals were made to resolve upon consonances, consecutive fifths were avoided, passing notes and embellishments were used in the accompanying voices, and the beginnings of double counterpoint and imitation appeared. Little advance was made in the Thirteenth Century, music was still chiefly a matter of scholastic theory, a mechanical handicraft. Considerable dexterity had been attained in the handling of three simultaneous, independent parts; contrary and parallel motion alternating for variety's sake, contrast of consonance and dissonance, a system of notation by which time values as well as differences of pitch could be indicated, together with a recognition of the importance of rhythm as an ingredient in musical effect,—all this foreshadowed the time when the material of tonal art would be plastic in the composer's hand, and he would

be able to mould it into forms of fluent grace, pregnant with meaning. This final goal was still far away; the dull, plodding round of apprenticeship must go on through the Fourteenth Century also, and the whole conscious aim of effort must be directed to the invention of scientific combinations which might ultimately provide a vehicle for the freer action of the imagination.

The period from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Centuries was, therefore, not one of expressive art work, but rather of slow and arduous experiment. The problem was so to adjust the semi-independent melodious parts that an unimpeded life might be preserved in all the voices and yet the combined effect be at any instant pure and beautiful. The larger the number of parts the greater the skill required to weave them together into a varied, rich and euphonious pattern. Any one of these parts might for the moment, hold the place of the leading part which the others were constrained to follow through the mazes of the design. Hence the term polyphonic, i. e., many-voiced. Although each voice part was as important as any other in this living, musical texture, yet each section took its cue from a single melody—a fragment of a Gregorian chant or a folk tune and called the *cantus firmus*, and also known as the tenor, from *teneo*, to hold—and the voice that gave out this melody came to be called the tenor voice. In the later phases of this art the first utterance of the theme was assigned indifferently to any one of the voice parts.

After confidence had been gained in devising two or more parts to be sung simultaneously, the next step was to bring in one part after another. Some method of securing unity amid variety (the basic principle of all art) was now necessary, and this was found in the contrivance known as "imitation," by which one voice follows another through the same or approximate intervals, the part first sounded acting as a model for a short distance, then perhaps another taking up the leadership with a new melodic figure, the intricate network of parts thus revealing itself as a coherent organism rather than a fortuitous conjunction of notes, the composer's invention and the hearers' impression controlled by a conscious plan to which each melodic part is tributary.

When a number of semi-independent parts came to be used together, the need of fixing the pitch and length of notes with precision became imperative. So out of the antique mnemonic signs which had done useful service during the exclusive regime of the unison chant there was gradually developed a system of square-headed notes, together with a staff of lines and spaces. But instead of simplicity a bewildering complexity reigned for centuries. Many clefs were used, shifting their place on the staff in

order to keep the notes within the lines; subtleties, many and deep, were introduced, and the matter of rhythm, key relations, contrapuntal structure, and method of singing became a thing abstruse and recondite. Composition was more like algebraic calculation than free art; symbolisms of trinity and unity, of perfect and imperfect, were entangled in the notation, to the delight of the ingenious monkish intellect and the despair of the neophyte and the modern student of mediaeval manuscript. Progress was slowest at the beginning. It seemed an interminable task to learn how to put a number of parts together with any degree of ease, and for many generations after it was first attempted the results were harsh and uncouth. After tribulations manifold, a thousand experiments that came to nothing, a logical system of musical science was evolved and composers obtained at least a knowledge of the nature of the tools with which they were to work.

The noble art of counterpoint, evolved by means of innumerable experiments, finally codified its laws, and with the opening of the Fifteenth Century compositions worthy to be called artistic were produced. These were hardly yet beautiful according to modern standards, certainly they had little or no characteristic expression, but they had begun to be pliable and smoth-sounding, showing that the notes had come under the composer's control and that he was no longer a clumsy apprentice. From the opening of the Fifteenth Century we date the epoch of artistic polyphony, which advanced in purity and dignity until it culminated in the perfect creations of the Sixteenth Century. This method of combining a number of melodious parts into a compact yet flexible harmonic texture was essentially the work of the musicians of northern France, the Low Countries, and England. So large a proportion of the fathers and nigh priests of mediaeval counterpoint belong to the districts now included in Northern France, Belgium, and Holland, that the epoch bounded by the years 1300 and 1550 is known in music history as "the age of the Netherlanders." The peculiar genius of the race which conceived the grandiose designs and the opulent detail of the Gothic architecture seems to have been especially adapted to create what may be called, without a violent stretch of analogy, a counterpart in musical structure. With a patience and ingenuity not less admirable than was shown in the labors of the cathedral builders, the French and Netherlandish musical artificers applied themselves with infinite zeal to the problems of counterpoint, producing works enormous in quantity and often of bewildering intricacy. Great numbers of pupils were trained in the convents and chapel schools, becoming masters in their turn, and exercising commanding influence in the churches

and cloisters of all Europe. Complexity in part writing steadily increased, not only in combinations of notes but also in the means of indicating their employment. It often happened that each voice must sing to a measure sign that was different from that provided for the other voices. Double and triple rhythm alternated, the value of notes of the same character varied in different circumstances; a highly sophisticated symbolism was invented, known as "riddle canons," by which adepts were enabled to improvise accompanying parts to the *cantus firmus*, and counterpoint, single and double, augmented and diminished, direct, inverted, and retrograde, became at once the end and the means of musical endeavor. Rhythm was obscured and the words almost hopelessly lost in the web of crossing parts. The *cantus firmus*, often extended into notes of portentous length, lost all expressive quality, and was treated only as a thread upon which this closely woven texture of parts was strung. Composers occupied themselves by preference with the mechanical side of music; quite unimaginative, they were absorbed in solving technical problems; and so they went on piling up difficulties for their fellow-craftsmen to match, making music for the eye rather than for the ear, for the logical faculty rather than for the fancy or the emotion.

It would, however, be an error to suppose that such labored artifice was the sole characteristic of the scientific music of the Fifteenth Century. The same composers who revelled in the exercise of this kind of scholastic subtlety also furnished their choirs with a vast amount of music in four, five, and six parts, complex and difficult indeed from the present point of view, but for the choristers as then trained perfectly available, in which there was a striving for solemn devotional effect, a melodious leading of the voices, and the adjustment of phrases into bolder and more symmetrical outlines. Even among the master fabricators of musical labyrinths we find glimpses of a recognition of the true final aim of music, a soul dwelling in the tangled skeins of their polyphony, a grace and inwardness of expression comparable to the poetic suggestiveness which shines through the naive and often rude forms of the sculptural art of the Gothic period. The growing fondness on the part of the austere church musicians for the setting of secular poems—madrigals, chansons, villanellas, and the like—in polyphonic style gradually brought in a simpler construction, more obvious melody, and a more characteristic and pertinent expression, which reacted upon the Mass and motet in the promotion of a more direct and flexible manner of treatment. The *stile familiare*, in which the song moves note against note, syllable against syllable, suggesting modern chord progression, is no in-

vention of Palestrina, with whose name it is commonly associated, but appears in many episodes in the works of his Netherlandish masters.

The contrapuntal chorus music of the Middle Ages—the most refined as well as the most distinctive of those artistic products with which the Catholic Church has adorned herself as a bride worthy of the Heavenly King—reached its maturity in the middle of the Sixteenth Century. For five hundred years this art had been growing, constantly putting forth new tendrils, which interlaced in luxuriant and ever-extending forms until they overspread all Western Christendom. It was now given to one man, Giovanni Pierluigi Sante, called Palestrina from the place of his birth,³ to put the finishing touches upon this wonder of mediaeval genius, and to impart to it all of which its peculiar nature was capable in respect to technical completeness, tonal purity and majesty, and elevated devotional expression. Palestrina was more than a flawless artist, more than an Andrea del Sarto; he was so representative of that inner spirit which has uttered itself in the most sincere works of Catholic art that the very heart of the institution to which he devoted his life may be said to find a voice in his music. His is, therefore, no factitious or accidental renown, he was one of those master minds who absorb and formulate guiding principles and characteristic traits of the age in which they live, and one who knows his works has obtained an insight into one phase which must be reckoned with in penetrating the spirit which produced the religious phenomena which appeared on the side of Catholicism in the stormy period of the Sixteenth Century.

This element to which I allude was the profound spirit of piety and devotion to the spiritual interests of the Church, which had been at heart untouched by abuses of administration and local relaxations of discipline. It is a striking fact that the music of the Church up to the middle of the Seventeenth Century was but little affected by the influences which had done so much to make other forms of Italian art ministers to ostentation and sensuous gratification. Music possessed no means of flattering the ambition of an Alexander VI., or the luxurious tastes of a Leo X., or the pride of a Julius II., and it was perforce allowed to develop unconstrained along the line of austere tradition. The period in which mediaeval church music approached perfection was not one of triumph to the

³ Palestrina was born probably in 1526 (authority of Haberl), and died in 1594. He spent almost his whole artistic life as director of music in Rome in the service of the popes, being at one time also a singer in the papal chapel. He enriched every portion of the ritual with compositions of unsurpassed depth and finish, his works including no less than ninety-five Masses, and he is universally considered the highest representative of the mediaeval school of choral art.

Catholic Church, but rather one of struggle, confusion, and humiliation. The Lutheran and Calvinistic heresy had rent from the Holy See some of the fairest of its dominions, and those that remained were in a condition of political and intellectual turmoil. That a reform "in head and members" was indeed needed is sufficiently established by the demands of many of the staunchest prelates of the time and by the admissions of unimpeachable Catholic historians, but the assertion that still persists in uninstructed quarters that the Catholic Church was wholly given over to corruption in discipline, formalism in worship, and political ambition in administration, is sufficiently refuted by the sublime manifestation of moral force which issued in the Catholic Reaction and the Counter-Reformation, the decrees of the Council of Trent, and the deeds of such moral heroes as Carlo Borromeo, Phillip Neri, Ignatius Loyola, Francis Xavier, Theresa of Jesus, Francis de Sales, Vincent de Paul, and the founders and leaders of the Capuchins, Theatines, Ursulines, and other beneficent religious orders, whose lives and achievements are the glory not only of Catholicism but of the human race. A tree is known by its fruits. The great Church composers of the Sixteenth Century were kindred to such spirits as these, and the pervading piety of the time found its most adequate symbol in the realm of art in the Masses and hymns of Palestrina and his compeers. These men were nurtured in the cloisters and choirs. The Church was their sole patron, and no higher privilege could be conceived by them than that of lending their powers to the service of that sublime institution into which their lives were absorbed. They were not agitated by the political and doctrinal ferment of the day. No sphere of activity could more completely remove a man from mundane influences than the employment of a church musician of that period. The abstract nature of music as an art, together with the engrossing routine of a liturgic office, kept these men, as it were, close to the inner sanctuary of their religion, where the ecclesiastical traditions were strongest and purest. Art forms, moreover, seemed to be under the control of a law which requires that when once set in motion they must run their course independently of changes in their environment. These two factors, therefore, the compulsion of an advancing art demanding completion, and the uncontaminated springs of piety from which the liturgy and its musical setting drew their life, will explain the splendid achievements of religious music in the hands of the Catholic composers amid the storms that buffeted the Church in the Sixteenth Century.

Under such influences and impelled by a single motive, viz, the glory of God and the honor of the Church, the *a capella* polyphony

of the Netherland school put forth its consummate flower in "the Palestrina style," as it was called in honor of its chief exponent. In the works of this later school (the "Roman school") we may distinguish three modes of treatment: (1) the intricate texture and solidity of Netherlandish work; (2) the "familiar style," in which the voices move apace, step by step, without canonic imitations; and (3) a blending of the two, which may be called the scholastic Netherland polyphony clarified and moulded into more plastic outlines for the attainment of a more refined vehicle of expression. Among Palestrina's works the best known examples of the second order are the *Improperia*, and the plainer portions of the *Stabat Mater*; his mastery of learned technical devices may be seen in the *Kyrie* and *Sanctus* of the Mass of Pope Marcellus, although even here science is held subordinate to beauty and devotional feeling; while the third of these classes gives us the "Palestrina style" strictly so called, and is characteristic of the greater portion of the Masses, motets, and hymns which have given him his unique fame. The loveliness of effect of which this style is capable may be illustrated out of scores of instances by such easily accessible examples as the *Gloria* of the Mass "Assumpta est Maria," the *Gloria* of the Marcellus Mass, the *Sanctus* of the "Missa Brevis," and the hymn "O Crux, Ave."

The marked dissimilarity between the music of the mediaeval school and that of the present era is to a large extent explained by the difference between the key and harmonic systems upon which they are severally based. In the modern system the relationship of notes to the antithetic tone-centers of tonic and dominant, and the freedom of modulations from one key to another by means of the introduction of notes not existing in the first key, give opportunities for effect which are not obtainable in music based upon the Gregorian modes, for the reason that these modes do not differ in the notes employed (since they include only the notes represented by the white keys of the pianoforte plus the B flat) but only in the relation of the intervals to the note which forms the key-note or "final." The conception of music based on the latter system is strictly speaking melodic, not harmonic in the modern technical sense, and the combinations of sounds that occur are not imagined as chords arising from a certain tone assumed as a fundamental, but rather as results of the conjunction of horizontally moving series of single notes. The harmony, therefore, seems both vague and monotonous to the ear trained in accordance with the laws of modern music, for it lacks the stable pivotal points which give symmetry, contrast, and cohesion to modern tone structure. The old system admits chromatic changes

only in order to provide a leading tone in a cadence, or to obviate an objectionable melodic interval such as the tritone. Consequently there is little of what we should call variety or positive color quality. It has no pronounced leading melody to which the other parts are subordinate. The theme consists of a few chant-like notes, speedily taken up by one part after another, controlled by the principle of "imitation." For the same reasons the succession of sections, periods, and phrases, which constitute the architectonic principle of form in modern music, does not appear. Even in the "familiar style" in which all the parts move together like blocks of chords of equal length, the principle is still melodic in all the parts, not tune above and accompaniment underneath, and the progression is not guided by the necessity of revolving about mutually supported tone-centers. The melodious element is like a series of waves; no sooner is the mind fixed upon one than it is lost in the ordered confusion of those that follow. The music seems also to have no definite rhythm. Each single voice part is indeed rhythmical as a sentence of prose may be rhythmical, but as the melodic constituents come in upon different parts of the measure, one culminating at one moment another at another, the parts often crossing each other, so that while the mind may be fixed upon one melody which seems to lead another, which has been coming up from below, strikes in across the field—the result of all this is that the attention is constantly being dislodged from one tonal center and shifted to another, and the whole scheme of design seems without form, a fluctuating mass swayed hither and thither without coherent plan. The music does not lack dynamic change or alteration of speed, but these contrasts are often so subtly graded that it is not apparent where they begin and end. The whole effect is measured, subdued, solemn. We are never startled, there is nothing that sets the nerves throbbing. But as we hear this music again and again, analyzing its properties, shutting out all preconceptions, little by little there steal over us sensations of surprise, then of wonder, then of admiration. These delicately shaded harmonies develop unimagined beauties. Without sharp contrast of dissonance and consonance they are yet full of shifting lights and hues, like a meadow under breeze and sunshine, which to the careless eye seems only a mass of unvarying green, but which reveals to the keener sense infinite modulation of the scale of color. No melody lies conspicuous upon the surface, but the whole harmonic substance is full of undulating melody, each voice pursuing its easy, unfretted motion amid the ingenious complexity of which it is a constituent part.

In considering further the technical methods and the final tech-

nical aims of this marvelous style, we find in its culminating period that the crown of the mediaeval contrapuntal art upon its aesthetic side lies in the attainment of beauty of tone effect in and of itself—the gratification of the sensuous ear, rich and subtly modulated sound quality not in the individual boys' and men's voices, but in the distribution and combination of voices of different *timbre*. That mastery toward which orchestral composers have been striving during the past one hundred years—the unison and contrast of stringed and wind instruments for the production of impressions upon the ear analogous to those produced upon the eye by the color of a Rembrandt or a Titian—this was also sought and, so far as the slender means went, achieved in a wonderful degree by the tone-masters of the Roman and Venetian schools. The chorus, we must remind ourselves, sang without accompaniment and sensuous beauty of tone must, therefore, depend not merely upon the individual quality of the voices, but still more upon the manner in which the notes were grouped. The distribution of the components of a chord in order to produce the greatest sonority; the alteration of the lower voices with the higher; the elimination of voices as a section approached its close, until the harmony was reduced at the last syllable to two higher voices in *pianissimo*, as though the strain were vanishing into the upper air; the resolution of tangled polyphony into a sun-burst of open golden chords; the subtle intrusion of veiled dissonances into the fluent gleaming concord; the skillful blending of the vocal registers for the production of exquisite contrasts of light and shade—these and many other devices were employed for the attainment of delicate and lustrous effects of sound tints, with results to which modern chorus writing affords no parallel. The culmination of this tendency could not be reached until the art of interweaving voices according to regular but infinitely flexible patterns had been fully mastered, and composers had learned to lead their parts with the confidence with which the engraver traces his lines to shape them into designs of beauty.

Notwithstanding the unique charm which this form of music exercises upon those who have entered into its spirit, it is evident, when one considers the matter, that it is not its chaste and ethical expression or the learning and cleverness displayed in its construction that will account for its survival, or for the enthusiasm which it has excited in an age so remote as our own. The aesthetic impression which it arouses can never be divorced from its religious and historic associations. Only the devout Catholic can feel its full import, for to him it shares the sanctity of the liturgy—it is not simply ear-pleasing harmony but prayer, not merely a decora-

tion of the holy ceremony but an integral part of the sacrifice of praise and supplication. One who apprehends it from the artistic point of view only will miss its real significance, and will probably disparage it in comparison with the far more varied, brilliant, and individually impressive homophonic instrumental style of the subsequent period. In order to appreciate the place which it holds in the history of religious music one must first seize the idea of ecclesiastical art as conceived by the Catholic Church and must then imaginatively and sympathetically grasp the essential motive of this music as an emanation from the same spirit that has inspired the liturgy and ceremonial of the Church. The distinctive form and purpose of the school of music which we are considering can be understood only as it is perceived as the special creation of the Church for religious ends, and as the appropriate medium for the expression of an ideal of pious emotion especially recognized and fostered by the discipline of the Catholic Church. In other words, it is a distinctive church style, and also peculiarly suited to suggest and promote a spirit of humble reverence. The idea of art as held by the Catholic Church is that it exists not for decoration of the offices of worship (although the appeal to the senses is not considered unworthy as an incidental end) but rather for edification, instruction, and inspiration. Says Jakob:⁴ "No branch of art exists for its own sake alone. Art is a servant, and it serves either God or the world, the eternal or the temporal, the spirit or the flesh. Ecclesiastical art must derive its norm and form solely from the church. . . . These rules and determinations (in respect to Church art) are by no means arbitrary, no external accretion, but they have grown up organically, from within outward, from the spirit which guides the Church, out of her views and out of the needs of her worship. And herein lies the justification of symbolism and symbolic expression in ecclesiastical art so long as this holds itself within the limits of tradition. The church of stone must be a speaking manifestation of the living Church and her mysteries. The pictures on the walls and on the altars are not mere adornment for the pleasure of the eye, but for the heart a book full of instruction, a sermon full of truth. And thereby art is raised to be an instrument of edification to the believer, it becomes a profound expositor for thousands, a transmitter and preserver of great ideas for all the centuries." In this conception liturgic music is likewise involved; it is designed to bear in upon the soul of the believer with intensified force the inspired words of Holy Writ and of the liturgy and hymns of the

⁴ *Die Kunst im Dienste der Kirche*, pp. 1 and 3.

Church, and also to blend as an essential element in the offering of prayer to Almighty God. This holy task requires that church music, like the church architecture, vestments, poetic phraseology, and all the artistic accompaniments of worship, should have a style and manner unlike that appropriated to secular and individual ends. Church music, therefore, is one thing, dramatic concert music another. Doubtless the most characteristically exclusive form of church music in this strict liturgic sense is the Gregorian chant, and next to this in these respects is the mediaeval *a capella* chorus, since it was developed from the Plain Song, retaining its peculiar spirit, and in its leading themes has adopted actual melodic phrases from the ritual chant books. It is, therefore, not its gravity and elevation alone which so unmistakably distinguish it from the rhythmical and impassioned modern music, but also this intimate relation to the liturgy.

Furthermore, this music merges itself in the very spiritual life of the Church by reason of its peculiar technical form and emotional appeal. The devotional mood that is especially nurtured under the influence of the Catholic mysteries is peculiarly abstracted, absorbed, and mystical; the devotee strives to withdraw into a retreat within the inner shrine of religious contemplation, where no echoes from the world reverberate, where the soul may be thrilled by the tremulous ecstasy of contact with half-unveiled heavenly glory. In this sanctuary of the heart peace and joy abide, for the soul illumined by faith seems for the time to be set free from its physical tenement; upheld by prayer and purified by love it communes with the Divine, and is transported by glimpses of future blessedness. It is this consciousness of the nearness and reality of the invisible world that lends such a celestial beauty to those creations of Catholic genius in which this ideal has been most directly symbolized, as in certain of the mediaeval Latin hymns, the books of pious exercises, the Gothic sculptures of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, the works of the missal illuminators, and the paintings of Fra Angelico, Giotto, and the school of Cologne. Of this spirit the church music of the Palestrina age is the most subtle and suggestive expression ever realized in art. It is as far removed as possible from profane suggestion; in its ineffable calmness, and an indescribable tone of chastened exultation, pure from every trace of struggle, with which it vibrates, it is the most adequate symbol of that eternal repose toward which the believer yearns.

Objectivity, absence of the stress and stir of individual passion, a comprehensive expression of an exalted spiritualized state of feeling which befits the whole conception of worship—this is the motive

which properly gives to church music its characteristic tone. The music is an element in the office of prayer, and in prayer, as in all liturgic acts and uses, the Church rejects a highly realistic portrayal. The Church in its art subjects the literal to the ideal, the particular to the general, the definitive to the symbolic. In the crucifix, for example, to quote Jakob again, "Christ does not appear in a strained, contorted position, with painfully disfigured countenance, with wrenched arms, with naked writhing body streaming with blood; but his earnest loving face, encircled with the nimbus and crowned with thorns, is in repose, the arms are straight, the body decently clothed, and free from an athletic coarseness as well as from emaciation." "The phrase 'emancipation of the individual from cramping fetters,' " says the same writer, "is not heard in the Church. Art history teaches that the Church does not oppose the individual conception, but simply restrains that false freedom which would make art the servant of personal caprice or of fashion." In the same manner ecclesiastical music, according to the mediaeval ideal, is the expression of the whole inner life of the Church directed toward the eternal, not the utterance of single passionate moments or of arbitrary individual determination. As in the pictures produced under the traditions of Catholic art, to employ Winterfield's⁵ comparison, no attempt is made to paint a realistic historical scene, but costume, juxtaposition of personages, facial expression, etc., are contrived in such a way as render an idea that is generalized in significance; St. Cecilia stands beside St. Paul, St. John, St. Augustine, and Mary Magdalene, with broken instruments at her feet listening to a choir of angels; St. Sebastian, pierced with arrows, shows no sign of physical suffering. Such pictures are the analogue of the mediaeval contrapuntal music; "in such strains," says Winterfield, "would these saints speak to our ears were they to pour forth their spirits in tones." "As in the case of architecture," says Ambros, "we are able to interpret the older music only after the general categories of the sublime and the graceful, the gloomy and cheerful, the ponderous and delicate, the sumptuous and the simple, while the later form of music finds commensurate tones for the most individual, unstable movements of the life of the emotion. The older music is the praying priest at the altar, expressing the deepest devotion in solemnly measured, rubrically directed actions, whereby the particular is merged in the universal, the individual and personal disappears."⁶ It is not true, however, as is often alleged,

⁵ Johannes Gabrieli und sein Beitalter; Vol. I., p. 147.

⁶ Geschichte der Musik, Vol. III., p. 29.

that the older music altogether lacks characterization, and that the style of *Kyrie*, *Gloria*, *Crucifixus*, *Resurrexit*, etc., is precisely the same, for the old masters were artists as well as churchmen, and knew how to adopt their somewhat unresponsive material to the more obvious contrasts of the text, and in actual performance a much wider latitude in respect to change of speed and force was permitted than could be indicated in the score. But the very laws of the Gregorian modes and the strict contrapuntal system kept such excursions after expression within narrow bounds, and the traditional view of ecclesiastical art, still remaining in music after it had been largely abrogated in painting, forbade anything like a drastic descriptive literalism.

Finally, the unique impression of this form of music depends largely upon locality and association. It is not music for the concert room. I have read that Allegri *Miserere*, which was written for the most solemn moment of the ceremonies of Good Friday in the Sistine Chapel, made a disappointing impression when performed at a recent concert in New York. And no wonder! To know the power of the music of this school it must be heard in the subdued light of cathedrals and chapels, to the accompaniment of the awe-compelling ceremonies, in the midst of a kneeling multitude. The hearer does not see the source whence this angelic music proceeds. The atmosphere, heavy with the prayers of vanished generations, holds it in suspense. It seems the audible transference of emblazoned windows, cloudy incense, and altar lights. This music, we realize, is not the product of an epoch of apathy and scepticism; it is the voice of the ages of faith, it bears in upon the imagination the traditions of the ancient and venerable mother Church, so wonderful in her history, so tremendous in her claims. Only the devout Catholic can feel the real grandeur of this music, for to him it is the very breath of that sublime institution which is the mediatrix between himself and God, the gateway through which alone he may enter the Celestial City.

The extreme beauty and perfection of the work of Palestrina has served to direct the slight attention which the world now gives to the Sixteenth Century music almost exclusively to him; yet he was but one master among a number whose productions are but slightly inferior to his—*primus inter pares*. Orlando di Lasso in Munich, Andrea and Giovanni Gabrieli in Venice, Nanini, Vittoria, and Anerio in Rome, Tallis in England, are names that do not pale when placed beside that of the "prince of music," and, indeed, the work of the Gabrieli surpasses that of Palestrina in pomp, vigor, and glow of color. Lotti in Venice, Allegri in Rome, and Scarlatti and Leo in Naples carried over into the new era the

grand old traditions hardly abated in their vigor. But at the very moment when this noble art was attaining its heyday of glory, its doom was sealed—a pretender which was soon to win the suffrages of the world was already snatching at its crown. The opera was invented in Italy about the year 1600, and ushered in an era so radically dissimilar in spirit and method from its predecessor that we cannot find elsewhere in art history a parallel to the sweeping character of the changes in ideal and practice which it introduced. This revolution involved the substitution of solo singing for choral, a new key system for the Gregorian, a new harmonic scheme for the contrapuntal, accompanied music for the *a capella* style, secular and dramatic for the ecclesiastical, the support of the aristocracy and the common people for the patronage of the Church. This change in musical culture was the latest outcome of the Renaissance. The self-consciousness of the individual and the recognition of the boundless arena offered to his faculties by the present world—an impulse which had already transformed painting, literature, science, and philosophy—was felt at last in music. Men demanded that music should be made a means of expressing all ranges of feeling that man can experience in his relations to the world and his fellow-men, and be no longer confined to his relations to God and to the Church. As a consequence solo song, the opera, and instrumental music arose, and the volatile, seductive aria assumed the primacy among musical forms previously held by the contrapuntal chorus. Italian melody and Italian vocalism became the reigning European sensation. Not emotional depth was required of a singer, but sensuous tone and brilliancy of technic. Nervous excitement and novelty of effect became the standards by which musical performance was judged.

The new conception of music as the expression of individual feeling and dramatic *motifs*, and the new forms of recitative, aria, and orchestral accompaniment could not be kept out of the church, and they entered the choir gallery with flourish of trumpets, and drove the stately, antiquated polyphony from its ancestral seats. It does not of course follow that the change was necessarily a degradation, but under the conditions of the time it became so. The Church could not resist the invasion of the new effects and the new idea of devotional expression; neither could she hold back the frivolous tendencies that soon began to assert themselves. The Church of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries was not the Church of the Counter-Reformation and the Reaction. Perhaps in any case it would not have been a wise policy to exclude the new art. The Catholic Church has never insisted upon a standard of music above that of the reigning taste. The liturgic chant

is her official and authorized song, and she has never formally recognized any other style, but has tolerated all. Here, as elsewhere, she has adapted her methods to the circumstances of the time and place, finding an element of strength in deferring to the preferences of her disciples, so far as she can do so without compromising her essential principle. And so, when the beautiful Italian melody, perfected by the opera composers, took the whole world captive, the Church could consistently employ it for her own purposes also, lest the allegiance of her adherents should be weakened by a counter-charm that was entirely worldly. The theoretical distinction between church music and concert and dramatic music was accordingly undermined, and the third historic form of Mass and motet, viz., the mixed solo and chorus accompanied form, succeeded the unison chant and the contrapuntal *a capella* chorus. The former severe learned style gave way to melody, often florid, sometimes flippant. The personnel of choirs was soon altered, and women took the place of boys and male sopranos. Opera singers were invited into the choir loft, and their seductive tunes, their melting cadences, brilliant runs and trills, attended by the highly colored and sharply rhythmical music of orchestra and organ, transformed the whole conception and method of ecclesiastical song. No longer a means of impressing the solemn import of the liturgic text or instilling a rapt devotional mood, the choir music was sought for its aesthetic charm, and text and ceremony became to a large extent subordinate in the thought of the pleasure loving laity to brilliant musical display. The change was precisely similar to that which passed over religious painting from the epoch of the pietistic artists of the Fourteenth Century to that of Correggio and Titian, when the natural Italian love of elegance of outline, splendor of color, and sumptuousness of decoration overcame the earlier austerity of treatment and effected a combination of Christian tradition and pagan sensuousness which quite belied the fundamental purpose of religious art in the endeavor to serve a feast for the eye and the luxurious fancy.

These tendencies ran their course unchecked in the Eighteenth century, but in the Nineteenth there has come a reaction which promises to restore the ancient distinction of style and loftiness of aim in church music. To trace the causes and determine the significance and the goal of this unmistakable upward tendency would exceed the proper scope of this article. It is enough to say that the ideal of the old Italian masters, in view of which they kept the atmosphere of the sanctuary free from profane intermixture and held their artistic genius to stern account before the tribunal

of their piety, promises to be the guide and monitor of the religious art of the future. An intellectual stress apparent in both religious and secular art, appears to be enfolding the music of the Church, and the best composers and executants are striving after a form of music which, while rejecting all profane suggestion, does not discard the means of emotional appeal which the larger art of music has evolved in the later years, and yet at the same time aims to bring the service of praise into common action with that of prayer. Such a movement as this will find healthful stimulus and practical aid in the study of that form of liturgic music perfected by Palestrina and his contemporaries. It is indeed one of the most hopeful signs of the times that these chiefs of the golden age of Catholic music are now the recipients of an honor which has not been granted them since the opera first dug their graves. The church music of the future need not necessarily imitate the forms and the manner of these ancient worthies; but it can never really advance the purpose for which the Church exists unless its practitioners imbibe the spirit of those consecrated musicians who practiced their art, as Palestrina himself once said, "not merely to produce enjoyment, but to guide and transform the spirits of men." The Catholic Church has much to hope from the revival in its churches and seminaries of the study of the religious music of the Sixteenth Century. Its practical difficulties are not so great as are commonly supposed. A right comprehension of it will infallibly avail to expel from the minds of churchmen all sympathy with whatever is trivial, sensational, and false in the musical expression of the faith of the Church. For I conceive that the admonition of the Council of Trent is still binding upon all loyal Catholics: "Let the bishops take care to exclude from the churches all musical compositions in which anything wanton or corrupt is mingled, that the House of God may both truly appear and be called the House of Prayer."

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AUTHORITY AND REASON.

IT is often assumed that liberty of the reason is a special prerogative of civilised man; that the savage blindly acquiesces in the dictates of custom or authority, while the educated man conforms his beliefs and actions to the decisions of his reason. Mr. Balfour, in the *Foundations of Belief*, has strenuously pointed to the opposite side of the shield—to the small share that reason has in any civilised community in determining the beliefs which make up the groundwork of life, and the large share which falls to authority.

I venture to make the following suggestions, dealing only with a small portion of a large subject.

The progress of civilisation steadily increases the rational element in the ascertained explanation of the universe; and in the recognised machinery of social life. But such explanations and such machinery are accepted by the individual largely (though not entirely) as authoritative, and as superseding his own free investigation or invention. Thus the increase of the conclusions ascertained by the corporate reason diminishes the sphere left for the free exercise of the individual reason, and multiplies the beliefs determined for it by authority.

In matters of scientific belief this is obvious enough. The ingenious exercises of the reason whereby the Greek philosophers attempted to explain the material world are largely superseded by the authority of modern astronomy and geology. Modern chemistry rules finally out of court Aristotle's view that the ultimate elements are earth, air, fire, and water. But the individual accepts the ruling of science partly or wholly on authority according to his capacities. The most highly gifted reason is not likely to master all the reasoning processes leading to all ascertained conclusions in every department of science. The backward schoolboy—at the opposite pole—accepts nearly the whole on authority.

The same fact holds in simpler matters of practical life. Even where all minds are fairly competent to understand the process whereby the accumulated results of reasoning are reached, those results are actually accepted on authority. The very first steps of civilisation hand over to trustworthy authority matters which in uncivilised countries are left to the laborious devices of individual reason. The American traveller soon came to use the road where his forefather, reasoning laboriously from such rough geographical indications as he could get, and often only by the help

of preternatural quickness in detecting traces of the path pursued by former travellers, found or missed the track across the waste prairie. The modern organisation of society has developed this authoritative groundwork into a rational system of the highest complexity, combining the results of science with the experience of life.

A few instances will remind us of the wide field covered by this action of the social reason. It enables us to commit to authority the care of our money and its productive expenditure which called in our ancestors for much personal reasoning and forethought. So far as we are concerned, investments work automatically, though we may have to use care in choosing them. We have no need for personal investigation or reason. We leave to the authorities of the company or of the bank the employment of our debentures or deposits, but only because of the elaborate co-ordination existing in the rational machinery of the world of finance. The sending of a message to a distant place once meant a large expenditure of planning by the reason. Now the message is given to the telegraph boy, and the result of a great scientific discovery is applied mechanically by a clerk without any scientific culture. The householder had once to take thought as to the obtaining of food, the manufacture of clothing, the carriage from place to place of the necessities of life, which the machinery of modern civilisation has now placed within his reach by the automatic action of authorities, each of which embodies a far more finished reasoning process than the rough-and-ready contrivances of his ancestors. The train brings him his provisions far more safely and expeditiously than the mediaeval mule. The butcher's supply is far more regular than the meat afforded by hunting and hawking. The loom and the spinning wheel have been driven out by the cheapness and speed, if not by the superiority, of modern machinery. A series of post cards sent from a country village to the Army and Navy Stores is purely and simply an appeal to a set of authorities, co-ordinated originally by reason, but now interacting mechanically. They bring automatically bread, meat, clothing, cooking utensils, which for our ancestors were home-made or home-provided by individual ingenuity.

In all these cases it can be said truly that the individual may trust to the authorities in question without any explicit rational process. But it would be, in most cases, very misleading to describe his trust as non-rational, or as a blind submission to authority. Indeed, the large increase of the rational element in the accepted groundwork of life, although it increases the sphere allotted to authority, correlatively imparts (in most cases) *some*

rational quality to the obedience yielded to it. That obedience is no longer quite similar to the blind deference of the savage to tribal custom. Even where at first sight it looks most mechanical, circumstances may show that there is a latent rational foundation. A youth asks his father whom he should consult as to investing the first considerable sum which has belonged to him. His father writes down the address of his broker. The youth goes to the broker, and continues to go to him for years. He has thought no more of the matter than that his father gave him the broker's name. One day he deposits, by the broker's advice, in an Australian bank. He does so simply on the broker's authority, which is accepted on the father's authority. But, returning home, he hears that the bank is unsafe. This at once reveals to him the rational element underlying his apparently non-rational obedience. He questions the premise, hitherto latent, "a broker in whom my father has confidence is practically sure not to recommend an unsafe bank." The latent reason for his trust is brought to light by the doubt now thrown on the accuracy of the premise.

In the case of scientific discoveries the best intellects can verify the whole process, and thus verify by reason the conclusion of the expert. But there is also a rational trust sufficient for a "working philosophy" which an average mind may have from so far understanding the process as to enable him to see that the expert understands it far better. In various degrees, according to his mental culture and experience, the individual is aware of the reasoning process or rational contrivance in the race which renders the various recognised authorities reliable. Much of the process of education consists in the gradual ascertainment of the rational constitution of the mechanism of social life, which is at first accepted and used simply on the parent's authority. Trust in authority is rationalised by successive stages. Education gradually transfers to the individual that share which the parents or educators have of appreciation of the rational forces which are the real foundation of the authority of human institutions. Doubtless this appreciation must vary largely, and many remain all their life in the position of children. But even for the child there is some rational basis—however inadequate—of much of his trust in authority—namely, his experience that the machinery of the social institutions which he has been taught to use and trust does in practice work.

But while education reveals how largely independent reasoning has been superseded by the authority of the past reasoning of the race, it also discloses the immense number of beliefs, equally instilled by authority, in which the race reasons unceasingly, but is divided, more or less, as to premises and conclusions—the

opinions of religious and social cliques, of literary critics, of art critics, of political parties, of philosophical schools.

But here, again, if the individual reason for the moment regards itself as having an open field in which it may and must reason independently, it soon finds that, up to a certain point, trustworthy authority exists, although reason has to detect *where* it exists and to amend its expression. Underlying the Babel of philosophic discussion in any age, definite lines of advance and common conclusions may be detected. Dr. Brown declared that even Hume and Reid came to a common conclusion in their fundamental controversy. Both believed in an external world, and both agreed that no reason could be given for the belief. The Utilitarian and the Intuitionist may seem at first to be hopelessly at variance, and then discover that the Utilitarian is only advocating utility as the test of what *is* moral, and the Intuitionist is only contending that "what is right" is not synonymous with "what is beneficent." So again the Evolutionist view of morality is opposed by the orthodox until he extracts the admission that to explain conscience as due to evolution does not necessarily mean that it contains no new element, any more than to explain sight as due to evolution is simply to identify it with touch. In all such cases reason may detect agreement when at first there appears to be divergence. The authority of common consent may unexpectedly emerge.

And again, in the case of literary or artistic criticism, quite enough may be found of agreement among the leaders, and of the extrinsic marks of genius, to convince us that we are in the presence of trustworthy authority, although we cannot quite determine its limits. A man is pretty certain that he will appreciate the Venetian pictures immensely better by following Ruskin's lead, although he does not feel pledged to accept every opinion in the "Stones of Venice."

What has been called the influence of a "psychological climate" is, from one point of view, the survival in certain spheres of that liability to being influenced by authority which in early childhood is universal. I do not deny its wide operation, and obviously it is, in the case of a developed reason, a usurpation on the part of authority from which, so far as possible, emancipation should be sought, as we emancipate ourselves from the blind trusts of childhood. But this very emancipation must begin by the accurate gauging of the lawful claim of the authority in question—of the qualities or lines of reasoning in virtue of which it has hung together and become a factor in life or thought. Thus even here reason does not act independently of authority, although it may claim superiority to it. There is true philosophy in Mr. Morley's

saying, "We will not refute Christianity, we will explain it." If the influence of Christianity were ultimately that of a psychological climate, permanent emancipation could only be won by first mastering the source of its authority, and then exposing its insufficiency as a rational justification.

The chief work for the individual reason is, then, first to appreciate and share in the reasoning of the community, and secondly to detect its errors and amend its conclusions, thus taking part in the further evolution of the rational knowledge of the race. And this must result in further increasing the sphere of rational authority.

Turning then to the critical question—How can an individual practically ascertain all that he may reasonably believe?—it seems plain that he can only do so by surrendering himself largely to the guidance of Authority. Only thus can he emancipate himself from his own limitations and share the knowledge due to special insight, incommunicable experience, special courses of reasoning or experiment, or special training on the part of others. Only by following the lead of authority can he even make the most of his own capacities. The sum of rational authorities represents the highest attainment of the rational nature of man.

Among the beliefs which we accept in the first instance on authority, and which are largely confirmed by their practical utility, are the religious beliefs of the community. Are these among the beliefs which, as reason grows to maturity, an inquiring mind should place among the acquisitions of the corporate reason of the race? Or should a real philosopher come to regard them as without rational justification—as parallel to those opinions of political parties or social cliques which are due to local or accidental prejudice;—opinions in criticising which he holds that reason should simply emancipate itself from authority? This latter view may well be true if we regard the theological opinions of any particular religious body in their most literal acceptation as the ultimate outcome of the religious beliefs of the community it represents:—for one religious body differs from another.

But it is a different question if we ask—Is there a residuum common to all religions which may be regarded as authoritative? or even if we ask—Can the Church claim to represent the truest development of that residuum? Can it claim to represent more fully the truth which every religion in some degree represents?

Here the answer given will depend partly on the fundamental view as to man's capacities of knowledge.

Mainly it depends on our acceptance or non-acceptance of the initial proposition that all religions *do* represent some truth—that

they evince the existence of some real faculty in man for the apprehension (however dim) of a Reality. The agnostic maintains in Tyndall's words that we have "neither a faculty nor the rudiment of a faculty" for apprehending God. He regards theological controversies as simply so much waste of energy, issuing in nothing, corresponding to no subject matter on which the human mind can have any knowledge.

The position maintained in the present paper is the opposite one—that the rudiment of a faculty is precisely what we have;—that the rational and moral nature of man—the highest development yet reached in that unfolding of the faculties of the sentient being to external Reality, which we can trace step by step from the lowest forms of conscious life,—themselves point to a further evolution in the apprehension of Reality. Religious faiths have all, at the lowest, been attempts to express this initial apprehension. The test of the claim of a rudimentary faculty of knowledge—that it gives an initial apprehension of truth, and is not a mere source of illusions—must be indirect. The faculty does not come to be explicit and fully rational until it has ceased to be rudimentary; therefore, direct rational justification is impossible. If it claims to be the instinctive continuance of an explicitly rational process, like the insight of the scientific discoverer, it must justify its claim by success. If its efforts to realize itself issue in nothing coherent, in no line of development, it fails to justify itself. If its activity, however confused, does show, like rudimentary sight, some coherent though inexact perception, it justifies its reality, though not its accuracy. Accuracy, like direct rational analysis, can only come with full development. I should maintain that in point of fact the intimations of the rudimentary faculty for the apprehension of the ultimate Reality represented by religion, have developed enough to justify its claim, in spite of the largely barren controversies which have accompanied the line of development. In organic evolution immense waste has ever been the concomitant of real advance. The very formula of "the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest" reminds us of the tremendous waste of life which was the condition for the perpetuation of a higher type. It is not in the sight of the struggle that we have the evidence of advance. It is in tracing the successive types which survived, and in which we see a gradual development of sensible endowment, and a growing consistency in the conceptions formed thereby of the phenomenal world. What is rudimentary and indefinite in one stage is developed and coherent in the next.

I suggest then—not as a mere analogy,¹ but as an induction from the laws observable in the process of evolution in the past, as an argument from one stage to another of the single process of ever growing knowledge of reality—that belief in Theism presents features which justify us in regarding it as an approach towards the apprehension of that Reality of which conscience makes human beings more dimly aware.

When in the development of sensible perception sight gave new coherence to conceptions of magnitude and distance, which even after the fullest developments of touch would have remained obscure, while it explained the past, it gave the first glimpses at the future ampler revelations of sight itself. The developed eye of the mammal gave in turn some sensible knowledge of that solar system which it needed the whole Copernican theory to explain with any approximate adequacy. The reality of sensible knowledge is more and more confirmed in the course of evolution by the fertility of the field of coherent discovery it opens, and the consistency of the system it reveals.

May it not then be maintained that similarly the rational and moral faculties of man, while they explain lower stages of experience, likewise suggest further and higher stages? that while they explain the past, they forecast the future? that while they explain phenomena of which sensible knowledge by itself gave only an initial apprehension, they give likewise an initial apprehension of a further Reality, full knowledge of which would, in turn, complete their somewhat indefinite intimations? Is not this an intelligible explanation of the appearance, at the highest stage of evolution hitherto reached, of conscience and the religious consciousness? And when—in spite of the theological logomachies which represent partly, as I have said, the waste incident to evolution—men of religious genius one after another give a more coherent account of the Being to whose existence all religions point, have we not that growth in consistency which justifies faith or trust, and is the first test that we are on the track to more systematic knowledge? When the Elohim who created heaven pass into the Jehovah the personal God—yet conceived partly as tribal and not without human passions; and the Jehovah Himself becomes more definitely moral in the teaching of the Prophets, until he passes into the Christian God clearly conceived as the embodiment of holiness; and that conception itself becomes gradually more de-

¹ I say this lest anyone should suppose that I accept as arguments the analogies used by Professor Drummond. The argument in the text is an extension and application of that used by Dr. Martineau in his *Types of Ethical Theory* (voll. ii. pp. 384-406).

finite as the content of the moral law is more clearly seen and the remnant of anthropomorphism is driven out by a more spiritual conception, have we not, in this definite line of advance, good cause for believing that we are witnessing a further unfolding of knowledge, an advance in the perceptions of the race, and not merely bitter wrangling over a fantastic illusion of the brain—an ironical reversal of the development of the sentient and rational nature towards wider knowledge?

And when the Christian revelation comes to us ultimately on the authority of One who lays claim to a supernatural inspiration, to an actual experience of the spiritual world, which ordinary man has not, are we not justified in accepting His teaching by at least two of the tests which guide us in accepting, in the course of the evolution of scientific knowledge, a great unifying hypothesis framed by genius, (1) because it develops further what our own moral faculties suggested, and thus gives us trust in the insight and veracity of the teaching authority, (2) because it is found to work in practice as affording a basis for moral action? Descartes included in his *morale par provision*—the rules he followed while his methodic doubt was in process of being resolved by philosophy—adherence on authority to the religion of his birth. I maintain the philosophical value of this view over and above its ethical convenience. For only by its acceptance can we find whether the religion in question does or does not supply the clue to the normal development of the transcendental intimations contained in ethical experience.

I submit, then, that while the ground for trust in the authority of the Christian Church is not similar to the ground for trusting a scientific teacher which is supplied by an elaborated discovery to a mind which is capable of verifying it in detail, it has a real similarity to that ground which is regarded as an adequate working philosophy by a man of average intelligence, who can sufficiently understand the discovery, to trust in the discoverer's higher knowledge, and whose trust is practically confirmed by finding that the discoverer's hypothesis explains the facts of experience.

And the claim of revelation that it appeals to faith rather than to scientific knowledge, and that we see "through a glass darkly," is, at all events, an evidence that there has been throughout in the exponents of Christinanity themselves a latent recognition of this element of rational trust as distinguished from complete reasoning, which separates the motive assignable for our acceptance of religious truths from the grounds producible by mankind for accepting the truths of science. No one denies that a knowledge of the Reality or Realities represented by religion far more logically ex-

plicit than we possess is conceivable, and we should be very glad to have it. The question is which is the greater paradox, to deny that the highest development of the rational and moral nature is pointing to a truth at all, or to assume that it must be, and acting on that assumption to adopt the best clue we can find towards its further explanation.

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WAGES AND THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE.

1. The title which heads this article brings us face to face with the most important problem of the social question. It is, we may say, the pivot on which a sound system of economics turns, and is in fact the cause of the existence of a social question at all. The strikes with which we are all familiar, during the last few years, arose from the unsatisfactory condition of the wage-earner, and it is the aim of all reformers to readjust in some way the unstable condition of the toiler. Whether their efforts are rightly directed or opportune, it is beyond the scope of this paper to inquire. We shall merely consider wages from the standpoint of justice, leaving aside all minor issues that properly belong to the domain of the Economist.¹ Neither is it our intention to discuss the fluctuations to which wages are subject, nor to establish a law, which might be calculated to determine the amount which the labourer is entitled to in the different phases of the labour market, which the economist is bound to face; but by a study of the stable principles of justice, it will be our aim to formulate some conclusions which these principles abundantly justify.

2. The question of wages may be approached in two ways; for it is one thing to consider what is expedient for the welfare of society and its individual members, another what, according to the principles of strict justice, is due to the labourer for the work he does for his employer. An essay on wages studied under the latter aspect, must be more or less abstract, but as the principles of justice are stable and permanent, much useful and practical knowledge may be derived from a thorough mastery of them in their relations

¹ In speaking of wages we shall take the term in its widest signification, and it shall include industrial and non-industrial wages and all those other divisions which economists make use of for the sake of clearness. It shall also include what is commonly called salary, as distinguished from wages, and we may define this broad acceptation of wages—The remuneration received by him who hires out his services, of whatever kind, to an employer who is willing to pay a just recompense.

with wages. We shall take the principles of justice as expounded by S. Thomas, and shall not broach any conclusion that does not follow logically from their enunciation.

Wages, according to S. Thomas, are "A due recompense for a service rendered,"² or in other words, wages are the recompense to which the labourer is entitled for services which he places at the disposal of his employer. If we analyze this definition it is clear that wages are not to be determined by the probable dividend that the industry in which the labour is expended yields, but by the principles of strict justice to which the toiler has an inalienable right, which remains intact, whether the industry fail or prosper. If a workman were forced to accept wages altogether incommensurate with his labour, or an employer to pay a wage in excess of the work done, in both cases the principles of justice are violated. In the first case the wage is inadequate, in the second, it is excessive.

In order to avoid ambiguity we must have recourse to the old distinction, formulated by Aristotle,³ adopted by S. Thomas and all theologians, of *commutative* and *distributive* justice, which has its foundations in the very nature of society. There is a species of justice, says S. Thomas,⁴ which the individuals of society must observe, in their relations one with another, and this is called *commutative* justice; and there is also another kind of justice which society, as a moral unit, is bound to observe in transactions with the individual members of which it is composed, and this is called *distributive* justice. To discuss adequately the labour problem, we must study it in its relations to both commutative and distributive justice; for we can conceive—and in fact it happens—a workman tendering his services freely for a sum insufficient to supply his own wants, and incommensurate with the energies he expends and the amount of work he does: though we should have here a material injustice, because the recompense is not in proportion to the work—it is not a due recompense—yet we cannot say there is in the relations of the employer and the workman any formal injustice, since the latter entered into a free and formal contract. It is manifest that in such a case commutative justice is at fault, and no extension of its principles will enable us to wipe out the material injustice to which the labourer is subjected.

3. As we said commutative justice governs the mutual transactions of the individual members of society, and the object of justice is equality. "That," says S. Thomas, "is said to be just in our transactions with another which corresponds in the relation of equality, as a due recompense for a service rendered,"⁵ and the just

² 2a. 2ae. q. 57, a. 1.

³ Eth. 1. 5, c. 3.

⁴ 2a. 2ae. q. 61, a. 1.

⁵ 2a. 2ae. q. 57, a. 1, c.

mean at which commutative justice arises is equality or proportion, not moral nor geometrical, but arithmetical proportion.⁶ Each of the contracting parties should receive what is his due, as much as he has given away, or as much as has been taken from him: if he has received less than he has given, justice is violated, because equality has disappeared and the object and the mean of justice are no longer observed.

It is evident that the question of wages is a question principally of justice,⁷ as it is primarily concerned with buying and selling transactions, from which every kind of exchange originates. Two individual members of society are brought into relation in some exchange transaction; one desires to sell, the other wishes to buy; the labourer hires out his energy and skill to the employer, for a definite purpose, at a fixed sum, which the employer binds himself to pay when the work is executed. Here we have an exchange transaction, and it has all the elements of a commutative and bilateral contract: there is on the one hand the labourer who sells what belongs to him—his energies and skill—freely, for a definite sum, and on the other the employer who accepts his conditions and promises to pay the sum stipulated for, when the work shall be completed. The contract which is entered into between the employer and the labourer justifies the latter in exacting only the sum that was agreed upon, but it by no means settles the amount of wages to which the labourer is entitled in strict justice. Free will entering into a contract makes it a *formally* just transaction, while *materially* its elements may be altogether inconsistent with the principles of commutative justice. It is well to keep this distinction in mind, as its neglect is often the fruitful source of error and misunderstanding. If strict justice is to be observed, it is not sufficient that the labourer receive wages, it is besides absolutely necessary that these shall not fall below a certain standard. Though in practice, it is very difficult to determine this standard and complications arise on every side, still, in theory, the principles on which wages are based are comparatively clear.

4. What then is the supreme criterion which shall act as a guide in determining the amount of wages to which the labourer is entitled, and which the employer, objectively speaking, is in strict justice bound to pay? In other words according to the principles of commutative justice, what is the supreme criterion which is to guide

⁶ Accipitur medium in commutationis justitia secundum arithmetican proportionem, 2a. 2ae. q. 61, a. 1.

⁷ Wages, in the opinion of S. Thomas, are so evidently connected with justice, that he mentions them as a typical example in treating of the object of justice, 2a. 2ae. q. 57, a. 1.

the employer and the labourer as such in their relations one with another? As we have already said, commutative justice strikes a medium or equality not moral but arithmetical. "But the just," says Aristotle, "which exists in transactions is something equal, and the unjust something unequal; but not according to geometrical but arithmetical proportion."⁸ And since the just is found in the medium, the guiding light in all labour contracts is to be looked for in the mean of commutative justice, or, in more explicit terms, in the equality which exists between the energy expended and the wages received, between the value of the one and that of the other. Whatever the labourer receives above what he has a strict right to cannot be called wages; it must be classed under some such heading as liberality, since it is, accurately speaking, an act of liberality on the part of the employer; and in the same way, if the labourer ceded to the employer a portion of what is justly the labourer's due, the transaction passes from the domain of justice to that of liberality; for although liberality is considered by some a potential part of justice, it is not a species of justice. "Liberality," says S. Thomas, "is not a species of justice, because justice gives to another what is his, while liberality gives what belongs to the giver."⁹

Just wages then are those that are in strict equality with the value of the work done. Now the question arises, how are we to determine the value of labour. Here economists confront us with an endless array of laws—formulated to guide the inquirer in solving this difficult question.¹⁰ It is not our intention to discuss them, since the almost infinite fluctuations to which values are subject present a difficulty which it is not easy to grapple with, and which it is not always easy even to determine. There is, however, a value arising from the very nature of things, that is more stable, and which suffices for our present purpose—not a value which may actually exist, but a value which should exist. Every human being is bound by the law of labour, and it is the source from which the means of preserving life are derived directly or indirectly; hence we are justified on *a priori* grounds in holding that labour has a value, independently of the enactments of society, that is commensurate with the needs of man. We must remember in defending this doc-

⁸ Eth. l. 5, c. 4. Cf. S. Thom. in hunc loc.

⁹ 2a. 2ae. q. 117, a. 5, c., Aristotle, Eth. b. 4, c. 2.

¹⁰ Following Adam Smith, economists distinguish between value in use and value in exchange. Air has great value in use, but none in exchange, while precious stones have great value in exchange, but little in use. Marx is of opinion that value in exchange is not value strictly speaking, and value in use should rather be called utility; but as we are living in a society whose transactions are carried on by exchange, it is only through exchange that we can form an exact idea of the nature of value. See Rae, *Contemporary Socialism*, p. 161. Devas—*Political Economy*, b. 1, pp. 4, 5, 117, 192.

trine that the political and economic aspect of the social question can never be separated from the moral aspect, as Leo XIII, in his Encyclical on Labour, has clearly pointed out; they are interdependent one on the other and the summary dismissal of one means the ruin of the other.

5. If labour were always paid in labour, it would be comparatively easy to settle the labour question, but this primitive and patriarchal mode of exchange has long since disappeared, and now work is paid in money, which, though in itself unstable as a standard of value, is more likely to remain stationary than any other commodity, and is more convenient as a means of exchange. S. Thomas defines economic value, "The quantity of a thing which serves for man's use, measured by the price which is given for it, and which is expressed in money."¹¹ From this definition we can gather that the value of a thing, according to the Angelic Doctor, depends on its utility, and this is expressed more forcibly by him where he says that, "the price of saleable commodities is not considered according to the grade of their nature, since a horse is sometimes sold at a higher price than a slave, but according to the measure in which they are useful to man."¹² S. Thomas, in estimating value, avoids the subjective hypothesis into which so many, following the subjectivism of Kant, fall. He lays aside human dignity altogether, takes the question on its own merits and solves it according to the sound principles of economics. If we examine this statement of S. Thomas carefully, we shall find that it contains, in theory at least, the key to the solution of the wage problem. When we compare the work done by a horse in a day with that executed by a man, it at once appears that in point of utility, the latter is far surpassed by the former; and we are inclined to believe that no one will dispute the justice of the comparison, since the *sensus communis* of mankind measures the value of a thing by its utility. In order to avoid misapprehension and confusion of ideas, it is well to distinguish here specific value, from what we shall call individual or numeric value.¹³ For instance, the specific value of air and water is very great, while the numeric value is very small, from the fact that every individual has an abundant supply, and hence they are sometimes styled by economists *free goods*, because the facility with which they are procured renders their numeric value scarcely ap-

¹¹ 2a. 2ae. q. 77, a. 1.

¹² Ibidem ad 3, Cf. S. Aug. De Civitate Dei, c. 16.

¹³ We understand by specific value, the capacity which anything possesses to be estimated as desirable for the support and continuance of life. It does not follow that everything which has a specific value has an exchange value, but everything that has an exchange value must have some specific value. Numeric or individual value is sometimes called by economists *value in personal use*.

preciable, and their utility is hardly apparent. Value is always in proportion to utility, and though this statement may seem a paradox, yet if we examine it, we shall find that it is perfectly true. The measure of utility itself is the good or gratification it procures the individual, and though things in themselves have scarcely any specific utility, their numeric value may be very great, inasmuch as they procure some gratification which enhances their worth in the estimation of those who desire them. A rare plant has no perceptible specific value, as its objective utility is hardly measurable, but it has a value in the estimation of the botanist who is willing to purchase it at a large sum.

Marx is of opinion that utility should be excluded from the right estimation of value. Exchange value, according to him, is the ratio in which one kind of useful commodity exchanges against another kind of useful commodity; but as he remarks this ratio does not in the least depend on the *usefulness* of the respective commodities or their capacity of gratifying any particular want. He seeks for one attribute which all values possess in common, and that attribute is labour. Diversity thus vanishes, and the labour itself is not discriminated; it is merely human labour in the abstract, incorporated, absorbed, congealed in exchangeable commodities. This labour is measured by the duration of the exertion, and consequently by the time expended in producing it. Marx accordingly defines value to be an immanent relation of a commodity to time of labour, and the secret of exchange is that, "a day's labour of given length always turns out a product of the same value." Such is the theory of value which Marx proposes: but strange to say though he excludes all consideration of utility from his notion of value, he introduces it, as Rae remarks,¹⁴ under a disguised form. If value is independent of utility and dependent on time, the value of the output, be this great or small, is still the same, though one workman may turn out five times as much as another in a given space. Marx makes several distinctions, strikes averages, distinguishes value and price, to defend his theory, but he is compelled in the end to introduce utility as the principal element in determining value. Hence we are not surprised to find him saying that, "Nothing can have value without being useful." Value then is not the inherent relation of a commodity to labour; it is rather a social estimate of the relative importance of commodities to the society that uses them, and this estimate is determined precisely by their utility.¹⁵

6. These principles are of great service in ascertaining the eco-

¹⁴ Contemporary Socialism, p. 162.

¹⁵ Cf. Rae, Contemporary Socialism, passim.

conomic value of labour. It does not matter what energy is expended nor what time is spent, if the labour is not productive of utility, its value is very small, for it is not the time, the energy, nor the skill employed that gives commodities their economic value, but the utility and benefits they procure, either for the labourer or the employer.

What then is the utility of human labour? If we consider labour in its widest sense it is evident that it is of immense value, and combined with the gifts of the Creator, is the universal source from which proceed all riches and material prosperity, and it has moreover *a priori* claims to be considered as the principal factor in the production of wealth. It is of its nature remunerative and should repay its agent for the expenditure of the energies employed in its production. If a machine has cost \$200, it is natural to suppose, if we are to escape the law of diminishing returns, that the output of which it is capable shall compensate the buyer for his outlay; shall recoup him for the incidental expenses necessary to keep it in a state of efficiency, and supply the wages of those employed in driving it. The same economic law applies when there is question of what is frequently too truly called the human machine, for man surely should not be in a worse position than a mere mechanical contrivance. His lot is cast upon the earth through no fault of his; the Creator has made him a social being with all the wants of a rational creature; he requires society, food, clothing and all those other necessities that become his high dignity as the noblest creature on earth; his labours should repay him for all the initial expenses required for his years of apprenticeship, which was necessary for the right production of labour, should provide his keep, supply him with clothing, and enable him to exercise all his rights as a member of society. From these principles based on the natural constitution of man, it is but just to conclude that the utility of his labour should be respectively equal and proportioned to his support and dignity.¹⁶ This law of equality between the utility and consequently value of labour and the requirements of the labourer is a fundamental law, prior to the existence of society, universal and founded on the principles of our nature. The Creator has supplied every other creature with the necessities of life, the means of propagating and preserving their several kinds, and we must neces-

¹⁶ In speaking of human dignity we would not be understood to mean that the value of labour is to be estimated according to the dignity of its agent. Human labour has in itself a moral value far superior to that of any other creature in as much as man leaves the impress of his mind on whatever he does, and his work is thereby enhanced in the eyes of the Christian and the Philosopher; but this is a seductive theory which can be traced to the erroneous doctrine of subjectivism, which makes man the source and measure of all truth. In speaking of value we must set aside, to a certain extent, man's dignity and examine his work solely from the point of its utility.

sarily infer that man is created in a no worse condition than they. The fact that man has fulfilled the command of his Creator—"In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread"—proves abundantly that labour is remunerative, since he was placed on the earth without any other resource than labour, and he has increased and multiplied and filled the earth, in spite of every opposing influence he has had to contend against; while from this fact we are further authorized in supposing that the remuneration of labor must be sufficient to supplying all his needs.

7. As we said above man is a social being,¹⁷ and there devolves upon him the office of propagating the human species—*crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram*—consequently he has the right independently of all social institutions, of bringing up a family which, by his labour, he is bound to nourish and support; and hence the fruits of his toil should be adequate to the due fulfilment of this office. In solving the wage problem we must not consider man in the abstract, nor separate him from those to whom, in accordance with a law of nature, he has united himself, but as he is in reality—in *rerum naturae*. The law of labour is binding on every individual of the human species, but we must not infer from the principles we have been enunciating that the wages of the labourer should be sufficient to support the whole family, if the conclusion is to contain only what the premises warrants. In propagating the human species both man and woman are employed, and their conjoint labour should, in strict justice, be sufficient to supply their own needs and those of their children, at least during the years that these are unable to work for themselves: for since there has been imposed on man an office, it is but lawful to infer that the means of fulfilling it have not been denied him.—"Quod dat alicui aliquod principale, dat eidam omnia quas consequuntur ad illud."¹⁸ We shall speak of this point more fully in treating of wages in their relation to distributive justice. This conclusion founded on the utility which nature has given to labour rests upon two foundations already pointed out. The first is the equality between labour, which has *a priori* claims to utility, and the cost of its production, and this cost is estimated at as much as is necessary for the support of life and strength, and for the provision of all those accessories that are in keeping with human dignity. The second is the law of labour imposed on the human species in its struggle for existence and propagation—*Crescite et multiplicamini . . . In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane*.

¹⁷ Cf. S. Thom. De reg. Princip. l. 1, c. 1.

¹⁸ S. Thom. Cont. Gent. l. 3, c. 59.

Though this doctrine is based on a solid foundation, it does not follow that it is realized in fact; for it often happens that the wage is altogether insufficient for personal needs, and wholly inadequate for the maintenance of the family: while on the other hand it is sometimes in excess of personal and even family wants, and not only supplies a competency, but even enables the earner to accumulate riches, though the work is comparatively easy and the amount of energy expended is reduced to a minimum. The theory of utility explains this fact; for the recovery of health by medical skill—to use an apposite illustration—or success in litigation through the ability of an eminent lawyer, are generally considered as of maximum utility, without a violation of justice, a recompense out of all proportion, and consequently doctors and lawyers can demand, without a violation of justice, a recompense out of all proportion with the labour which their actual efforts entail.¹⁹ The supreme criterion then of wages which can be approximately traced, from the aspect of commutative justice is that, the wages shall equal the utility and the advantages which the work procures.

As things have a utility and consequently a value, antecedently to the existence of any exchange transaction whatever, there must be some objective standard to which every contract should conform, if it is to be in itself just. S. Thomas seems to refer to this object standard when he says, "If the price exceeds the quantity of the value, or conversely if the commodity exceeds the price, the equality of justice disappears."²⁰ But as this objective value is fluctuating, a certain latitude is allowed to the buyer and the seller to fix the conditions of their exchange transaction by a contract which should be shaped, however, in accordance with the objective criterion formulated above. The employer is not bound to give wages in excess of the certain or probable profits which the labourer's work is likely to realize, or, as Walker expresses it, "It is the value of the product such as it is likely to prove which determines the amount of the wages that are to be paid."²¹ To avoid an error into which socialists fall, we must distinguish between the profits of labour as such, and the profits of the total enterprise, which includes the capital, the time, anxieties and abilities of the employer, since

¹⁹ *Advocato licet vendere justum patrocinium, medico consilium sanitatis et magistro officium doctrinae.*—2a. 2ae. q. 100, a. 3, ad 3.

²⁰ 2a. 2ae. q. 78, a. c.

²¹ *Political Economy*, p. 88. Rae in his splendid work on *Contemporary Socialism* says, that value in every object is constituted by its possession of two qualities—a, its social utility, and b, that it costs labour or trouble to procure it. Every object that lacks either of these two characteristics has no value, and no commodity which possesses them lacks value. The social utility of any commodity turns on two considerations, first the importance of the want the commodity satisfies, and secondly the number of persons who share the want. See pp. 165 and 166.

it would be absurd to suppose that labour, though it is an important factor in the production of wealth, is the complete cause of it. Wages are therefore not to be reckoned by the profits of the whole enterprise, but by the profits of the labour as such.

8. So far we have considered the principles on which fair wages are based from an objective standpoint; we shall now briefly consider them in their subjective aspect. As we hinted in the beginning of this paper, wages can be just in two ways, objectively and subjectively—*secundum aequalitatem rei*, and *ex libera acceptatione dantis*. If a contract be unjust it must be against the will of either of the contracting parties, because "*nullus patitur injustum nisi nolens*."²² If the labourer consents to work for a remuneration incommensurate with the work he does, since its utility is in excess of the wage, his acceptance of the terms by no means renders the contract unjust: but it would be in case the employer deceived him, or in case he entered into the contract through ignorance of the utility of his work, and consequently stipulated for a sum under the measure of its true value. An ordinary cause of wage-depression is the abundant supply of labour, and employers not unfrequently take advantage of this position to lower the wages of those they employ. This is clearly an injustice. Labour in itself has a high specific utility, and where the employer finds a market for its productions, he does the labourer an injustice, if the work done is paid below its true value: for since labour has a high specific utility, its value is rather enhanced than diminished by its abundance. The capital of the employer is rendered productive by the exertions of the workman, and the former pockets the returns of the industrial capital plus the amount of which he defrauds the latter. Here equality is destroyed and commutative justice violated. There is another cause of wage-depression—the superabundant supply of labour on the one hand, and on the other a proportionate scarcity of employment, due to trade depression or some other cause. In this case the labour of the individual becomes less useful; for though its specific value is not diminished, its numeric or individual value decreases, since from the superabundance of proffered labour, the work of the individual loses in utility in relation to the employer, who is not bound in justice, no matter what number of men he employs, to pay a wage in excess of the aggregate of utility which their labour produces, and if he takes advantage of the congested state of the labour market to pay a lower wage, he violates no principle of justice, nor would he be, in any way, bound to restitution. We can conceive a third case of wage-depression, which is the free accept-

²² 2a. 2ae. q. 59, a. 3, c.

ance by the labourer of the conditions of the employer, in order to obtain the preference, in a congested state of labour. Here there can be no formal justice, as the employer is not bound to consult the interests of those he does not employ, nor is he the cause of the conditions from which he gains the advantage. The wages he pays, though materially unjust, are just formally, according to the recognised principle, *scienti et volenti non fit injuria*.

9. It would be an error to suppose that an employer is justified in making the most of this state of things we have been describing. There is a minimum wage below which he cannot go. This doctrine is clearly laid down by Leo XIII, in his encyclical on labour, in which he states that there is a natural limit to the lowering of wages, even with the consent of the labourer, and this limit the toiler himself has no right to overstep. Every man is bound to provide for his personal wants, and also to fulfil his personal obligations; when therefore there is the accomplishment of a rigorous duty dependent on his reception of a fair and just wage, he is strictly bound as far as it is in his power to enforce its payment. A father is bound to support his children in their tender years; this is a law of nature that he may not transgress, and if by omitting lawful means, he cedes to the employer a portion of the wages to which he is justly entitled, he violates a law of nature and sins against justice. S. Thomas does not hesitate to condemn an alms given to those who are in great need, if this act of liberality entailed a serious personal injury to the giver. "If," he says, "any one, in case of necessity, having only sufficient wherewith to support himself, his children and those dependent on him, should give an alms, he would take away his own life and the lives of those he is bound to support."²³ If the employer knowing the circumstances in which the labourer is placed and the obligations he is bound to fulfil, should accept his services at a price far below their true value, he would be strictly bound to restitution—*secundum aequalitatem rei*.

These remarks suggest another possible case. Let us suppose the employer, in order to avoid the payment of a fair wage to labourers, on whom needy families are dependent, hires others who have no such obligation to meet, and who are willing to work for a wage inferior to the value of their labour, either because they have some other source of income or have their domestic wants supplied by their families. Examining this hypothesis by the principles of commutative justice, it does not appear that the employer is bound to restitution, however he may offend against charity; for on the one hand he owes nothing to those who do not work for him, and

²³ 2a. 2ae. q. 32, a. 6, c.

on the other those who do work for him, in the given case, have a right to sell their labour at a figure below its true value, and the preference they obtain compensates them for the low wages. Such conduct on the part of an employer, should be stigmatized. It is prompted by avarice, and is opposed to every law of charity, and since great enterprises are rendered possible only by an abundance of proffered labour, such a selection would sooner or later render industry on an extensive scale impossible.

10. It is a strange fact that employers and labourers persist in pursuing a short sighted policy one with the other. The labourer is determined that he shall do as little as he can, while the employer is as determined that he shall have as much as he can out of the labourer at the lowest possible cost. Present advantage blinds both of them to prospective gain. If the labourer would only realize the fact that the greater his output, the greater in the end will be his remuneration, and that by limiting the general rate of production he reduces the general rate of wages, he would be acting most wisely for himself and his class generally. In labour requiring physical strength, as that in which navvies are engaged an extra dollar or two will make a material difference in the output, as better food can be procured, and a state of efficiency and fitness maintained. When a workman has a prospect of a decent remuneration for his labour, he works with greater cheerfulness and requires less superintendence; he is in a better condition to develop his intelligence and resourcefulness and consequently his efficiency increases, and this will be, generally speaking, in precise ratio with the comfort his wages procure. It can hardly be expected that men can take an interest in their work when they live from hand to mouth, when they are unable to provide any of those enjoyments on which habits of intelligence, in a great measure, depend, or to participate in the culture that is going on around them. If the sordid greed of capitalists were less and Christian charity greater, the wage problem would be well on the way to a satisfactory solution.

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Dublin.

EPISTOLA SANCTI PATRIS.

LEO XIII AD AMERICANOS.

TRACTAT DE OPINIONIBUS NOVIS, DE VIRTUTE, NATURA ET GRATIA,
DE VITA RELIGIOSA NONNULLA ETIAM DE
"AMERICANISMO."*Dilecto Filio Nostro Iacobo Tit. Sanctae Mariae Trans Tiberim S. R. E.
Presbytero Cardinali Gibbons Archiepiscopo Baltimorensi*

LEO PP. XIII.

DILECTE FILI NOSTER,
SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTONEM.

TESTEM benevolentiae Nostrae hanc ad te epistolam mittimus, eius nempe benevolentiae, quam, diuturno Pontificatus Nostri cursu, tibi et Episcopis collegis tuis ac populo Americae universae profiteri nunquam destitimus, occasionem omnem libenter a vobis recteque gestis ad catholicorum rationes tutandas et evahendas. Quin imo saepe etiam accidit egregiam in gente vestra indolem suspicere et admirari ad praeclara quaeque expectant, atque ad ea proseguenda, quae humanitatem omnem iuvant splendoremque civitatis. Quamvis autem non eo nunc spectet epistola ut alias saepe tributas laudes confirmet, sed ut nonnulla potius cavenda et corrigenda significet; quia tamen eadem apostolica caritate conscripta est, qua vos et prosequuti semper et alloquuti saepe fuimus, iure expectamus, ut hanc pariter amoris Nostri argumentum censeatis; idque eo magis futurum confidimus quod apta nataque ea sit ad contentiones quasdam extinguendas, quae, exortae nuper in vobis, etsi non omnium, at multorum certe animos, haud mediocri pacis detrimento, perturbant.

Compertum tibi est, dilecte Fili Noster, librum de vita *Isaaci-Thomae Hecker*, eorum praesertim opera, qui aliena lingua edendum vel interpretandum susceperunt, controversias excitasse non modicas ob invectas quasdam de ratione christiane vivendi opiniones. Nos igitur, ut integritati fidei, pro supremo Apostolatus munere, prospiciamus et fidelium securitati caveamus, volumus de re universa fusiori sermone ad te scribere.

Novarum igitur, quas diximus, opinionum id fere constituitur fundamentum: quo facilius qui dissident ad catholicam sapientiam traducantur, debere Ecclesiam ad adulti saeculi humanita-

tem aliquanto propius accedere, ac, veteri relaxata severitate, recens invectis populorum placitis ac rationibus indulgere. Id autem non de vivendi solum disciplina, sed de doctrinis etiam, quibus *fidei depositum* continetur, intelligendum esse multi arbitrantur. Opportunum enim esse contendunt, ad voluntates discordium allciendas, si quaedam doctrinae capita, quasi levioris momenti, praetermittantur, aut molliantur ita, ut non eundem retineant sensum quem constanter tenuit Ecclesia. Id porro, dilecte Fili Noster, quam improbando sit consilio excogitatum, haud longo sermone indiget; si modo doctrinae ratio atque origo repetatur, quam tradit Ecclesia. Ad rem Vaticana Synodus: "Neque enim fidei doctrina, quam Deus revelavit, velut philosophicum inventum proposita est humanis ingeniis perficienda, sed tamquam divinum depositum Christi Sponsae tradita fideliter custodienda et infallibiliter declaranda. * * * Is sensus sacrorum dogmatum perpetuo est retinendus, quem semel declaravit Sancta Mater Ecclesia, nec unquam ab eo sensu altioris intelligentiae specie et nomine recedendum."¹

Neque omnino vacare culpa censendum est silentium illud, quo catholicae doctrinae principia quaedam consulto praetereuntur ac veluti oblivione obscurantur. Veritatum namque omnium, quotquot christiana disciplina complectitur, unus atque idem auctor est et magister, *Unigenitus Filius qui est in sinu Patris*.² Easdem vero ad aetates quaslibet ac gentes accommodatas esse, perspicue ex verbis colligitur, quibus ipse Christus apostolos est alloquutus: *Euntes docete omnes gentes * * * docentes eos servare omnia quaecumque mandavi vobis; et ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus, usque ad consummationem saeculi*.³ Quapropter idem Vaticanum Concilium: "Fide divina, inquit, et catholica ea omnia credenda sunt, quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito continentur, et ab Ecclesia, sive solemnii iudicio sive ordinario et universali magisterio, tamquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur."⁴ Absit igitur ut de tradita divinitus doctrina quidpiam quis detrahat vel consilio quovis praetereat; id enim qui faxit, potius catholicos seiungere ab Ecclesia, quam qui dissident ad Ecclesiam transferre volet. Redeant, nil enim Nobis optatius, redeant universi, quicumque ab ovili Christi vagantur longius; non alio tamen itinere, quam quod Christus ipse monstravit.

Disciplina autem vivendi, quae catholicis hominibus datur, non eiusmodi est, quae, pro temporum et locorum varietate, temperationem omnem reiiciat. Habet profecto Ecclesia, inditum ab Auctore suo, clemens ingenium et misericors; quam ob causam, inde a sui exordio, id praestitit libens, quod Paulus Apostolus de se

¹ Const. de Fid. cath. c. IV.

² Matth. xxviii, 19 s.

³ Ioann. I, 18.

⁴ Const. de Fid. cath. c. III.

profitebatur: *Omnibus omnia factus sum, ut omnes facerem salvos.*⁵ Aetatum vero praeteritarum omnium historia testis est, Sedem hanc Apostolicam, cui, non magisterium modo, sed supremum etiam regimen totius Ecclesiae tributum est, constanter quidem in eodem dogmate eodem sensu eademque sententia⁶ haesisse; at vivendi disciplinam ita semper moderari consuevisse, ut, divino incolumi iure, diversarum adeo gentium, quas amplectitur, mores et rationes nunquam neglexerit. Id si postulet animorum salus, nunc etiam facturam quis dubitet? Non hoc tamen privatorum hominum arbitrio definiendum, qui fere specie recti decipiuntur; sed Ecclesiae iudicium esse oportet: in eoque acquiescere omnes necesse est, quicumque Pii VI decessoris Nostri reprehensionem cavere malunt. Qui quidem propositionem LXXVIII synodi Pistoriensis "Ecclesiae ac Spiritui Dei quo ipsa regitur iniuriosam *edixit*, quatenus examini subiiciat disciplinam ab Ecclesia constitutam et probatam, quasi Ecclesia disciplinam constituere possit inutilem et onerosiorem quam libertas christiana patiatur."

In causa tamen de qua loquimur, dilecte Fili Noster, plus affert periculi estque magis catholicae doctrinae disciplinaeque infestum consilium illud, quo rerum novarum sectatores arbitrantur libertatem quandam in Ecclesiam esse inducendam, ut, constricta quodammodo potestatis vi ac vigilantia, liceat fidelibus suo cuiusque ingenio actuosaeque virtuti largius aliquanto indulgere. Hoc nimirum requiri affirmant ad libertatis eius exemplum, quae, recentius invecata, civilis fere communitatis ius modo ac fundamentum est. De qua Nos fuse admodum loquuti sumus in iis Litteris, quas de civitatum constitutione ad Episcopos dedimus universos; ubi etiam ostendimus, quid inter Ecclesiam, quae iure divino est, intersit ceterasque consociationes omnes, quae libera hominum voluntate vigent. Praestat igitur quandam potius notare opinionem, quae quasi argumentum affertur ad hanc catholicis libertatem suadendam. Aiunt enim, de Romani Pontificis infallibili magisterio, post solemne iudicium de ipso latum in Vaticana Synodo, nihil iam oportere esse sollicitos; quam ob rem, eo iam in tuto collocato, posse nunc ampliorem cuivis ad cogitandum atque agendum patere campum. Praeposterum sane arguendi genus: si quid enim ex magisterio Ecclesiae infallibili suadet ratio, hoc certe est, ut ab eo ne quis velit discedere, imo omnes eidem se penitus imbuedos ac moderandos dent, quo facilius a privato quovis errore serventur immunes. Accedit, ut ii, qui sic arguunt, a providentis Dei sapientia discedant admodum; quae, quum Sedis Apostolicae auctoritatem et magisterium affirmata solemniori iudicio voluit, idcirco

⁵ I Cor. IX, 22.

⁶ Conc. Vatic. Ibid. c. IV.

voluit maxime, ut pericula praesentium temporum animis catholicorum efficacius caveret. Licentia quae passim cum libertate confunditur; quidvis loquendi obloquendique libido; facultas denique quidlibet sentiendi litterarumque formis exprimendi, tenebras tam alte mentibus obfuderunt, ut maior nunc quam ante sit magisterii usus et necessitas, ne a conscientia quis officioque abstrahatur. Abest profecto a Nobis ut quaecumque horum temporum ingenium parit, omnia repudiemus; quin potius quidquid indagando veri aut enitendo boni attingitur, ad patrimonium doctrinae augendum publicaeque prosperitatis fines proferendos, libentibus sane Nobis, accedit. Id tamen omne, ne solidae utilitatis sit expers, esse ac vigere nequaquam debet, Ecclesiae auctoritate sapientiaque posthabita.

Sequitur ut ad ea veniamus quae ex his, quas attigimus, opinionibus consecraria veluti proferuntur; in quibus si mens, ut credimus, non mala, at certe res carere suspicione minime videbuntur. Principio enim externum magisterium omne ab iis, qui christianae perfectioni adipiscendae studere velint, tamquam superfluum, immo etiam minus utile, reiicitur: ampliora, aiunt, atque uberiora nunc quam elapsis temporibus, in animos fidelium Spiritus Sanctus influit charismata, eosque, medio nemine, docet arcano quodam instinctu atque agit. Non levis profecto temeritatis est velle modum metiri, quo Deus cum hominibus communicet; id enim unice ex eius voluntate pendet, estque ipse munerum suorum liberrimus dispensator. *Spiritus ubi vult spirat.*⁷ *Unicuique autem nostrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi.*⁸ Ecquis autem repetens Apostolorum historiam, exordientis Ecclesiae fidem, fortissimorum martyrum certamina et caedes, veteres denique plerasque aetates sanctissimorum hominum foecundissimas, audeat priora tempora praesentibus componere eaque affirmare minore Spiritus Sancti effusione donata? Sed, his omissis, Spiritum Sanctum secreto illapsu in animis iustorum agere eosque admonitionibus et impulsione excitare, nullus est qui ambigat; id ni foret, externum quodvis praesidium et magisterium inane esset. "Si quis * * * salutari, id est evangelicae praedicationi consentire posse confirmat, absque illuminatione Spiritus Sancti, qui dat omnibus suavitatem in consentiendo et credendo veritati, haeretico fallitur spiritu."⁹ * * * Verum, quod etiam experiendo novimus, hae Sancti Spiritus admonitiones et impulsiones plerumque, non sine quodam externi magisterii adiumento ac veluti comparatione, persentiuntur. "Ipse, ad rem Augustinus, in bonis arboribus cooperatur fructum, qui et forinsecus rigat atque excolit per quemlibet

⁷ Ioann. iii, 8.⁸ Eph. iv, 7.⁹ Conc. Arausic. ii, can. vii.

ministrum, et per se dat intrinsecus incrementum.”¹⁰ Scilicet ad communem legem id pertinet, qua Deus providentissimus, uti homines plerumque fere per homines salvandos decrevit, ita illos, quos ad praestantiorē sanctimoniae gradum advocat, per homines eo perducendos constituit, “ut nimirum, quemadmodum Chrysostomus ait, per homines a Deo discamus.”¹¹ Praeclarum eius rei exemplum, ipso Ecclesiae exordio, positum habemus: quamvis enim Saulus, *spirans minarum et caedis*,¹² Christi ipsius vocem audivisset ab eoque quaesivisset: *Domine quid me vis facere*; Damascum tamen ad Ananiam missus est: *Ingredere civitatem, et ibi dicetur tibi quid te oporteat facere*. Accedit praeterea, quod qui perfectiora sectantur, hoc ipso quod ineunt intentatam plerisque viam, sunt magis errori obnoxii, ideoque magis quam ceteri doctore ac duce indigent. Atque haec agendi ratio iugiter in Ecclesia obtinuit; hanc ad unum omnes doctrinam professi sunt, quotquot, decursu saeculorum, sapientia ac sanctitate floruerunt; quam qui respuant, temere profecto ac periculose respuent.

Rem tamen bene penitus consideranti, sublato etiam externo quovis moderatore, vix apparet in novatorum sententia quorsum pertinere debeat uberior ille Spiritus Sancti influxus, quem adeo extollunt. Profecto maxime in excolendis virtutibus Spiritus Sancti praesidio opus est omnino: verum qui nova sectari adamant, naturales virtutes prae modum efferunt, quasi hae praesentis aetatis moribus ac necessitatibus respondeant aptius, iisque exornari praestet, quod hominem paratiorē ad agendum ac strenuiores faciant. Difficile quidem intellectu est, eos, qui christiana sapientia imbuantur, posse naturales virtutes supernaturalibus anteferre, maioremque illis efficacitatem ac foecunditatem tribuere.—Ergone natura, accedente gratia, infirmior erit, quam si suis ipsa viribus permittatur? Num vero homines sanctissimi, quos Ecclesia observat palamque colit, imbecillos se atque ineptos in naturae ordine probavere quod christianis virtutibus excelluerunt? Atqui, etsi naturalium virtutum praeclaros quandoque actus mirari licet, quotus tamen quisque est inter homines qui naturalium virtutum habitu reapse polleat? Quis enim est, qui animi perturbationibus, iisque vehementibus non incitetur? Quibus constanter superandis, sicut etiam universae legi in ipso naturae ordine servandae, divino quodam subsidio iuvare hominem necesse est. Singulares vero actus, quos supra innuimus, saepe, si intimius perspiciantur, speciem potius virtutis quam veritatem prae se ferunt. Sed demus tamen esse: si *currere in vacuum* quis nolit aeternamque oblivisci beatitatem, cui nos benigne destinat Deus, ecquid naturales virtutes

¹⁰ De Grat. Christi c. xix.¹¹ Hom. i, in Inscr. altar.¹² Act. Ap. c. ix.

habent utilitatis, nisi divinae gratiae munus ac robur accedat? Apte quidem Augustinus: "Magnae vires et cursus celerrimus, sed praeter viam."¹³ Sicut enim praesidio gratiae natura hominum, quae, ob communem noxam, in vitium ac dedecus prolapsa erat, erigitur novaque nobilitate evehitur ac roboratur; ita etiam virtutes, quae non solis naturae viribus, sed eiusdem ope gratiae exercentur, et foecundae fiunt beatitatis perpetuo mansurae et solidiores ac firmiores existunt.

Cum hac de naturalibus virtutibus sententia, alia cohaeret admodum, qua christianae virtutes universae in duo quasi genera dispartiantur, in *passivas*, ut aiunt, atque *activas*; adduntque, illas in elapsis aetatibus convenisse melius, has cum praesenti magis congruere. De qua quidem divisione virtutum quid sentiendum sit, res est in medio posita; virtus enim, quae vere *passiva* sit, nec est nec esse potest. "Virtus, sic sanctus Thomas, nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem; finis autem potentiae actus est; et nihil est aliud actus virtutis, quam bonus usus liberi arbitrii;"¹⁴ adiuvante utique Dei gratia, si virtutis actus supernaturalis sit. Christianas autem virtutes, alias temporibus aliis accommodatas esse, is solum velit, qui Apostoli verba non meminerit: *Quos praescivit, hos et praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui.*¹⁵ Magister et exemplar sanctitatis omnis Christus est; ad cuius regulam aptari omnes necesse est, quotquot avent beatorum sedibus inseri. Iamvero, haud mutatur Christus progredientibus saeculis; sed *idem heri et hodie et in saecula.*¹⁶ Ad omnium igitur aetatum homines pertinet illud: *Discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde;*¹⁷ nulloque non tempore Christus se nobis exhibet *factum obedientem usque ad mortem;*¹⁸ valetque quavis aetate Apostoli sententia: *Qui sunt Christi carnem suam crucifixerunt cum vitiis et concupiscentiis suis.*¹⁹ Quas utinam virtutes multo nunc plures sic colerent, ut homines sanctissimi praeteritorum temporum! Qui demissione animi, obedientia, abstinencia, *potentes fuerunt opere et sermone*, emolumento maximo nedum religiosae rei sed publicae ac civilis.

Ex quo virtutum evangelicarum veluti contemptu, quae perperam *passivae* appellantur, pronom erat sequi, ut religiosae etiam vitae despectus sensim per animos pervaderet. Atque id novarum opinionum fautoribus commune esse, coniecimus ex eorum sententiis quibusdam circa vota quae Ordines religiosi nuncupant. Aiunt enim, illa ab ingenio aetatis nostrae dissidere plurimum, utpote quae humanae libertatis fines coerceant; esseque ad infirmos animos magis quam ad fortes apta; nec admodum valere ad christianam perfectionem humanaeque consociationis bonum, quin potius

¹³ In Ps. xxxi, 4.¹⁴ I. II. a. 1.¹⁵ Rom. xiii, 29.¹⁶ Hebr. xiii, 8.¹⁷ Matth. xi, 29.¹⁸ Philip. ii, 8.¹⁹ Galat. v, 24.

utriusque rei obstare atque officere. Verum haec quam falso dicantur, ex usu doctrinaeque Ecclesiae facile patet, cui religiosum vivendi genus maxime semper probatum est. Nec sane immerito: nam qui, a Deo vocati, illud sponte sua amplectantur, non contenti communibus praeceptorum officiis, in evangelica euntes consilia, Christo se milites strenuos paratosque ostendunt. Hocne debilius esse animorum putabimus? aut ad perfectiorem vitae modum inutile aut noxium? Qui ita se votorum religione obstringunt, adeo sunt a libertatis iactura remoti, ut multo pleniore ac nobiliore fruantur, ea nempe qua *Christus nos liberavit*.²⁰

Quod autem addunt, religiosam vivendi rationem aut non omnino aut parum Ecclesiae iuvandae esse, praeter quamquod religiosis Ordinibus invidiosum est, nemo unus certe sentiet, qui Ecclesiae annales evolverit. Ipsae vestrae foederatae civitates num non ab alumniis religiosarum familiarum fidei pariter atque humanitatis initia habuerunt? quorum uni nuper, quod plane vobis laudi fuit, statum publice ponendam decrevistis. Nunc vero, hoc ipso tempore, quam alacrem, quam frugiferam catholicæ rei religiosi coetus, ubicumque ii sunt, navant operam! Quam pergunt multi novas oras Evangelico imbuere et humanitatis fines propagare; idque per summam animi contentionem summaque pericula! Ex ipsis, haud minus quam e clero cetero, plebs christiana verbi Dei praecones conscientiaeque moderatores, iuventus institutores habet, Ecclesia, denique omnis sanctitatis exempla. Nec discrimen est laudis inter eos qui actuosum vitae genus sequuntur, atque illos, qui, recessu delectati, orando afflictandoque corpori vacant. Quam hi etiam praeclare de hominum societate meruerint, mereant, ii norunt profecto qui, quid ad placandum conciliandumque Numen posset *deprecatio iusti assidua*,²¹ minime ignorant, ea maxime quae cum afflictatione corporis coniuncta est.

Si qui igitur hoc magis adamant, nullo votorum vinculo, in coetum unum coalescere, quod malint, faxint; nec novum id in Ecclesia nec improbabile institutum. Caveant tamen ne illud prae religiosis Ordinibus extollant; quin potius, cum modo ad fruendum voluptatibus proclivius, quam ante, sit hominum genus, longe pluris ii sunt habendi, qui, *relictis omnibus, sequuti sunt Christum*.

Postremo, ne nimis moremur, via quoque et ratio, qua catholici adhuc sunt usi ad dissidentes revocandos, deserenda edicitur aliaque in posterum adhibenda. Qua in re hoc sufficit advertisse, non prudenter, dilecte Fili Noster, id negligi quod diu experiendo antiquitas comprobavit, apostolicis etiam documentis erudita. Ex Dei verbo habemus,²² omnium officium esse proximorum saluti iuvandae

²¹ Iac. v. 16.²⁰ Galat. iv. 31.²² Eccli. xvii. 4.

operam dare, ordine graduque quem quisque obtinet. Fideles quidem hoc sibi a Deo assignatum munus utillime exequuntur morum integritate, christianae caritatis operibus, instante ad Deum ipsum assidueque prece. At qui e clero sunt idipsum praestent oportet sapienti Evangelii praedicatione, sacrorum gravitate et splendore, praecipue autem eam in se formam doctrinae exprimentes, quam Tito ac Timotheo Apostolus tradidit. Quod si, e diversis rationibus verbi Dei eloquendi, ea quandoque praeferenda videatur, qua ad dissidentes non in templis dicant sed privato quovis honesto loco, nec ut qui disputent sed ut qui amice colloquantur; res quidem reprehensione caret: modo tamen ad id muneris auctoritate Episcoporum ii destinantur, qui scientiam integritatemque suam antea ipsis probaverint. Nam plurimos apud vos arbitramur esse, qui ignoratione magis quam voluntate a catholicis dissident; quos ad unum Christi ovile facilius forte adducet, qui veritatem illis proponat amico quodam familiarique sermone.

Ex his igitur, quae huc usque disseruimus, patet, dilecte Fili Noster, non posse Nobis opiniones illas probari, quarum summam *Americanismi* nomine nonnulli indicant. Quo si quidem nomine peculiaria animi ornamenta, quae, sicut alia nationes alias, Americae populos decorant, significare velint; item si statum vestrarum civitatum, si leges moresque quibus utimini, non est profecto cur ipsum reiiciendum censeamus. At si illud usurpandum ideo est, ut doctrinae superius allatae, non indicentur modo, immo vero etiam cohonestentur; quodnam est dubium, quim Venerabiles Fratres Nostri Episcopi Americae, ante ceteros, repudiaturi ac damnaturi sint utpote ipsis totique eorum genti quam maxime iniuriosum? Suspicionem enim id incit esse apud vos, qui Ecclesiam in America aliam effingant et velint, quam quae in universis regionibus est. Una, unitate doctrinae sicut unitate regiminis, eaque catholica est Ecclesia: cuius quoniam Deus in Cathedra Beati Petri centrum ac fundamentum esse statuit, iure Romana dicitur; *ubi enim Petrus, ibi Ecclesia*.²³ Quam ob rem quicumque catholico nomine censi vult, is verba Hieronymi ad Damasum Pontificem usurpare ex veritate debet: "Ego nullum primum, nisi Christum, sequens, beatitudini tuae, idest Cathedrae Petri communione consocior: super illam petram aedificatam Ecclesiam scio; quicumque tecum non colligit, spargit."

Haec, dilecte Fili Noster, quae, singularibus litteris, officio muneris ad te damus, ceteris etiam foederatarum civitatum Episcopis communicanda curabimus; caritatem iterum testantes, qua gentem vestram universam complectimur: quae sicut elapsis temporibus

²³ S. Ambr. in Ps. xi, 57.

multa pro religione gessit, maiora etiam in posterum, Deo feliciter opitulante, praestituram portendit. Tibi autem et fidelibus Americae omnibus Apostolicam benedictionem, divinorum subsidiorum auspicem, amantissime impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die XXII mensis Ianuarii MDCCCXCIX, Pontificatus Nostri anno vicesimo primo.

LEO PP. XIII.

TRANSLATION OF LETTER OF OUR HOLY FATHER.

LEO XIII TO AMERICANS.

CONCERNING NEW OPINIONS, VIRTUE, NATURE AND GRACE,
WITH REGARD TO "AMERICANISM."

To Our Beloved Son, James, Cardinal Gibbons, Cardinal Priest of the Title Sancta Maria, Beyond the Tiber, Archbishop of Baltimore:

LEO XIII, Pope—*Beloved Son, Health and Apostolic Blessing:* We send to you by this letter a renewed expression of that good will which we have not failed during the course of our pontificate to manifest frequently to you and to your colleagues in the episcopate and to the whole American people, availing ourselves of every opportunity offered us by the progress of your church or whatever you have done for safeguarding and promoting Catholic interests. Moreover, we have often considered and admired the noble gifts of your nation which enable the American people to be alive to every good work which promotes the good of humanity and the splendor of civilization. Although this letter is not intended, as preceding ones, to repeat the words of praise so often spoken, but rather to call attention to some things to be avoided and corrected; still because it is conceived in that same spirit of apostolic charity which has inspired all our letters, we shall expect that you will take it as another proof of our love; the more so because it is intended to suppress certain contentions which have arisen lately among you to the detriment of the peace of many souls.

It is known to you, beloved son, that the biography of Isaac Thomas Hecker, especially through the action of those who undertook to translate or interpret it in a foreign language, has excited not a little controversy, on account of certain opinions brought forward concerning the way of leading Christian life.

We, therefore, on account of our apostolic office, having to guard the integrity of the faith and the security of the faithful, are desirous of writing to you more at length concerning this whole matter.

The underlying principle of these new opinions is that, in order to more easily attract those who differ from her, the Church should shape her teachings more in accord with the spirit of the age and relax some of her ancient severity and make some concessions to new opinions. Many think that these concessions should be made not only in regard to ways of living, but even in regard to doctrines which belong to the deposit of the faith. They contend that it would be opportune, in order to gain those who differ from us, to omit certain points of her teaching which are of lesser importance, and to tone down the meaning which the Church has always attached to them. It does not need many words, beloved son, to prove the falsity of these ideas if the nature and origin of the doctrine which the Church proposes are recalled to mind. The Vatican Council says concerning this point: "For the doctrine of faith which God has revealed has not been proposed, like a philosophical invention to be perfected by human ingenuity, but has been delivered as a divine deposit to the Spouse of Christ to be faithfully kept and infallibly declared. Hence that meaning of the sacred dogmas is perpetually to be retained which our Holy Mother, the Church, has once declared, nor is that meaning ever to be departed from under the pretense or pretext of a deeper comprehension of them."—*Constitutio de Fide Catholica*, Chapter iv.

We cannot consider as altogether blameless the silence which purposely leads to the omission or neglect of some of the principles of Christian doctrine, for all the principles come from the same Author and Master, "the Only Begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father."—John i, 18. They are adapted to all times and all nations, as is clearly seen from the words of our Lord to His apostles: "Going, therefore, teach all nations; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you, and behold, I am with you all days, even to the end of the world."—Matt. xxviii, 19. Concerning this point the Vatican Council says: "All those things are to be believed with divine and catholic faith which are contained in the Word of God, written or handed down, and which the Church, either by a solemn judgment or by her ordinary and universal magisterium, proposes for belief as having been divinely revealed."—*Const. de fide*, Chapter iii.

Let it be far from anyone's mind to suppress for any reason any doctrine that has been handed down. Such a policy would tend rather to separate Catholics from the Church than to bring in those who differ. There is nothing closer to our heart than to have those who are separated from the fold of Christ return to it, but in no other way than the way pointed out by Christ.

The rule of life laid down for Catholics is not of such a nature

that it cannot accommodate itself to the exigencies of various times and places. The Church has, guided by her Divine Master, a kind and merciful spirit, for which reason from the very beginning she has been what St. Paul said of himself: "I became all things to all men that I might save all."

History proves clearly that the Apostolic See, to which has been intrusted the mission not only of teaching but of governing the whole Church, has continued "in one and the same doctrine, one and the same sense, and one and the same judgment,"—*Const. de fide*, Chapter iv.

But in regard to ways of living she has been accustomed to so yield that, the divine principle of morals being kept intact, she has never neglected to accommodate herself to the character and genius of the nations which she embraces.

Who can doubt that she will act in this same spirit again if the salvation of souls requires it? In this matter the Church must be the judge, not private men who are often deceived by the appearance of right. In this, all who wish to escape the blame of our predecessor, Pius the Sixth, must concur. He condemned as injurious to the Church and the spirit of God who guides her the doctrine contained in proposition lxxviii of the Synod of Pistoia, "that the discipline made and approved by the Church should be submitted to examination, as if the Church could frame a code of laws useless or heavier than human liberty can bear."

But, beloved son, in this present matter of which we are speaking, there is even a greater danger and a more manifest opposition to Catholic doctrine and discipline in that opinion of the lovers of novelty, according to which they hold such liberty should be allowed in the Church, that her supervision and watchfulness being in some sense lessened, allowance be granted the faithful, each one to follow out more freely the leading of his own mind and the trend of his own proper activity. They are of opinion that such liberty has its counterpart in the newly given civil freedom which is now the right and the foundation of almost every secular state.

In the apostolic letters concerning the constitution of states, addressed by us to the bishops of the whole Church, we discussed this point at length; and there set forth the difference existing between the Church, which is a divine society, and all other social human organizations which depend simply on free will and choice of men.

It is well, then, to particularly direct attention to the opinion which serves as the argument in behalf of this greater liberty sought for and recommended to Catholics.

It is alleged that now the Vatican decree concerning the infallible teaching authority of the Roman Pontiff having been proclaimed

that nothing further on that score can give any solicitude, and accordingly, since that has been safeguarded and put beyond question a wider and freer field both for thought and action lies open to each one. But such reasoning is evidently faulty, since, if we are to come to any conclusion from the infallible teaching authority of the Church, it should rather be that no one should wish to depart from it, and moreover that the minds of all being leavened and directed thereby, greater security from private error would be enjoyed by all. And further, those who avail themselves of such a way of reasoning seem to depart seriously from the over-ruling wisdom of the Most High—which wisdom, since it was pleased to set forth by most solemn decision the authority and supreme teaching rights of this Apostolic See—willed that decision precisely in order to safeguard the minds of the Church's children from the dangers of these present times.

These dangers, viz., the confounding of license with liberty, the passion for discussing and pouring contempt upon any possible subject, the assumed right to hold whatever opinions one pleases upon any subject and to set them forth in print to the world, have so wrapped minds in darkness that there is now a greater need of the Church's teaching office than ever before, lest people become unmindful both of conscience and of duty.

We, indeed, have no thought of rejecting everything that modern industry and study has produced; so far from it that we welcome to the patrimony of truth and to an ever-widening scope of public well-being whatsoever helps toward the progress of learning and virtue. Yet all this, to be of any solid benefit, nay, to have a real existence and growth, can only be on the condition of recognizing the wisdom and authority of the Church.

Coming now to speak of the conclusions which have been deduced from the above opinions, and for them, we readily believe there was no thought of wrong or guile; yet the things themselves certainly merit some degree of suspicion. First, all external guidance is set aside for those souls who are striving after Christian perfection as being superfluous or indeed, not useful in any sense—the contention being that the Holy Spirit pours richer and more abundant graces than formerly upon the souls of the faithful, so that without human intervention He teaches and guides them by some hidden instinct of His own. Yet it is the sign of no small over-confidenece to desire to measure and determine the mode of the Divine communication to mankind, since it wholly depends upon His own good pleasure, and He is a most generous dispenser of his own gifts. "The Spirit breatheth whereso He listeth."—John iii, 8.

"And to each one of us grace is given according to the measure of the giving of Christ."—Eph. iv, 7.

And shall any one who recalls the history of the apostles, the faith of the nascent church, the trials and deaths of the martyrs—and, above all, those olden times, so fruitful in saints—dare to measure our age with these, or affirm that they received less of the divine outpouring from the Spirit of Holiness? Not to dwell upon this point, there is no one who calls in question the truth that the Holy Spirit does work by a secret descent into the souls of the just and that He stirs them alike by warnings and impulses, since unless this were the case all outward defense and authority would be unavailing. "For if any persuades himself that he can give assent to saving, that is, to gospel truth when proclaimed, without any illumination of the Holy Spirit, who gives unto all sweetness both to assent and to hold, such an one is deceived by a heretical spirit."—From the Second Council of Orange, Canon 7.

Moreover, as experience shows, these monitions and impulses of the Holy Spirit are for the most part felt through the medium of the aid and light of an external teaching authority. To quote St. Augustine. "He (the Holy Spirit) co-operates to the fruit gathered from the good trees, since He externally waters and cultivates them by the outward ministry of men, and yet of Himself bestows the inward increase."—*De Gratia Christi*, Chapter xix. This, indeed, belongs to the ordinary law of God's loving providence that as He has decreed that men for the most part shall be saved by the ministry also of men, so has He wished that those whom He calls to the higher planes of holiness should be led thereto by men; hence St. Chrysostom declares we are taught of God through the instrumentality of men.—*Homily I in Inscrib. Altar*. Of this a striking example is given us in the very first days of the Church.

For though Saul, intent upon blood and slaughter, had heard the voice of our Lord Himself and had asked, "What dost Thou wish me to do?" yet he was bidden to enter Damascus and search for Ananias. Acts ix: "Enter the city and it shall be there told to thee what thou must do."

Nor can we leave out of consideration the truth that those who are striving after perfection, since by that fact they walk in no beaten or well-known path, are the most liable to stray, and hence have greater need than others of a teacher and guide. Such guidance has ever obtained in the Church; it has been the universal teaching of those who throughout the ages have been eminent for wisdom and sanctity—and hence to reject it would be to commit one's self to a belief at once rash and dangerous.

A thorough consideration of this point, in the supposition that

no exterior guide is granted such souls, will make us see the difficulty of locating or determining the direction and application of that more abundant influx of the Holy Spirit so greatly extolled by innovators. To practice virtue there is absolute need of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, yet we find those who are fond of novelty giving an unwarranted importance to the *natural* virtues, as though they better responded to the customs and necessities of the times and that having these as his outfit man becomes more ready to act and more strenuous in action. It is not easy to understand how persons possessed of Christian wisdom can either prefer natural to supernatural virtues or attribute to them a greater efficacy and fruitfulness. Can it be that nature conjoined with grace is weaker than when left to herself?

Can it be that those men illustrious for sanctity, whom the Church distinguishes and openly pays homage to, were deficient, came short in the order of nature and its endowments, because they excelled in Christian strength? And although it be allowed at times to wonder at acts worthy of admiration which are the outcome of natural virtue—is there anyone at all endowed simply with an outfit of natural virtue? Is there any one not tried by mental anxiety, and this in no light degree? Yet ever to master such, as also to preserve in its entirety the law of the natural order, requires an assistance from on high. These single notable acts to which we have alluded will frequently upon a closer investigation be found to exhibit the appearance rather than the reality of virtue. Grant that it is virtue, unless we would “run in vain” and be unmindful of that eternal bliss which a good God in his mercy has destined for us, of what avail are natural virtues unless seconded by the gift of divine grace? Hence St. Augustine well says: “Wonderful is the strength, and swift the course, but outside the true path.” For as the nature of man, owing to the primal fault, is inclined to evil and dishonor, yet by the help of grace is raised up, is borne along with a new greatness and strength, so, too, virtue, which is not the product of nature alone, but of grace also, is made fruitful unto everlasting life and takes on a more strong and abiding character.

This overesteem of natural virtue finds a method of expression in assuming to divide all virtues in *active* and *passive*, and it is alleged that whereas passive virtues found better place in past times, our age is to be characterized by the active. That such a division and distinction cannot be maintained is patent—for there is not, nor can there be, merely passive virtue. “Virtue,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, “designates the perfection of some faculty, but the end of such faculty is an act, and an act of virtue is naught

else than the good use of free will," acting, that is to say, under the grace of God if the act be one of supernatural virtue.

He alone could wish that some Christian virtues be adapted to certain times and different ones for other times who is unmindful of the apostle's words: "That those whom He foreknew, He predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son."—Romans viii, 29. Christ is the teacher and the exemplar of all sanctity, and to His standard must all those conform who wish for eternal life. Nor does Christ know any change as the ages pass, "for He is yesterday and to-day and the same forever."—Hebrews xiii, 8. To the men of all ages was the precept given: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart."—Matt. xi, 29.

To every age has He been made manifest to us as obedient even unto death; in every age the apostle's dictum has its force: "Those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with its vices and concupiscences." Would to God that more nowadays practiced these virtues in the degree of the saints of past times, who in humility, obedience and self-restraint were powerful "in word and in deed"—to the great advantage not only of religion, but of the state and the public welfare.

From this disregard of the vangelical virtues, erroneously styled *passive*, the step was a short one to a contempt of the religious life which has in some degree taken hold of minds. That such a value is generally held by the upholders of new views, we infer from certain statements concerning the vows which religious orders take. They say vows are alien to the spirit of our times, in that they limit the bounds of human liberty; that they are more suitable to weak than to strong minds; that so far from making for human perfection and the good of human organization, they are hurtful to both; but that this is as false as possible from the practice and the doctrine of the Church is clear, since she has always given the very highest approval to the religious method of life; nor without good cause, for those who under the divine call have freely embraced that state of life did not content themselves with the observance of precepts, but, going forward to the evangelical counsels, showed themselves ready and valiant soldiers of Christ. Shall we judge this to be a characteristic of weak minds, or shall we say that it is useless or hurtful to a more perfect state of life?

Those who so bind themselves by the vows of religion, far from having suffered a loss of liberty, enjoy that fuller and freer kind, that liberty, namely, by which Christ hath made us free. And this further view of theirs, namely, that the religious life is either entirely useless or of little service to the Church, besides being injurious to the religious orders cannot be the opinion of anyone who

has read the annals of the Church. Did not your country, the United States, derive the beginnings both of faith and of culture from the children of these religious families? to one of whom but very lately, a thing greatly to your praise, you have decreed that a statue be publicly erected. And even at the present time wherever the religious families are found, how speedy and yet how fruitful a harvest of good works do they not bring forth! How very many leave home and seek strange lands to impart the truth of the gospel and to widen the bounds of civilization; and this they do with the greatest cheerfulness amid manifold dangers! Out of their number not less, indeed, than from the rest of the clergy, the Christian world finds the preachers of God's word, the directors of conscience, the teachers of youth and the Church itself the examples of all sanctity.

Nor should any difference of praise be made between those who follow the active state of life and those others who, charmed with solitude, give themselves to prayer and bodily mortification. And how much, indeed, of good report these have merited, and do merit, is known surely to all who do not forget that the "continual prayer of the just man" avails to placate and to bring down the blessings of heaven when to such prayers bodily mortification is added.

But if there be those who prefer to form one body without the obligation of the vows let them pursue such a course. It is not new in the Church, nor in any wise censurable. Let them be careful, however, not to set forth such a state above that of religious orders. But rather, since mankind are more disposed at the present time to indulge themselves in pleasures, let those be held in greater esteem "who having left all things have followed Christ."

Finally, not to delay too long, it is stated that the way and method hitherto in use among Catholics for bringing back those who have fallen away from the Church should be left aside and another one chosen, in which matter it will suffice to note that it is not the part of prudence to neglect that which antiquity in its long experience has approved and which is also taught by apostolic authority. The scriptures teach us that it is the duty of all to be solicitous for the salvation of one's neighbor, according to the power and position of each. The faithful do this by religiously discharging the duties of their state of life, by the uprightness of their conduct, by their works of Christian charity and by earnest and continuous prayer to God. On the other hand, those who belong to the clergy should do this by an enlightened fulfillment of their preaching ministry, by the pomp and splendor of ceremonies especially by setting forth that sound form of doctrine which Saint Paul inculcated upon Titus and Timothy. But if, among the different ways of preaching the

word of God that one sometimes seems to be preferable, which is directed to non-Catholics, not in churches, but in some suitable place, in such wise that controversy is not sought, but friendly conference, such a method is certainly without fault. But let those who undertake such ministry be set apart by the authority of the bishops and let them be men whose science and virtue has been previously ascertained. For we think that there are many in your country who are separated from Catholic truth more by ignorance than by ill-will, who might perchance more easily be drawn to the one fold of Christ if this truth be set forth to them in a friendly and familiar way.

From the foregoing it is manifest, beloved son, that we are not able to give approval to those views which, in their collective sense, are called by some "Americanism." But if by this name are to be understood certain endowments of mind which belong to the American people, just as other characteristics belong to various other nations, and if, moreover, by it is designated your political condition and the laws and customs by which you are governed, there is no reason to take exception to the name. But if this is to be so understood that the doctrines which have been adverted to above are not only indicated, but exalted, there can be no manner of doubt that our venerable brethren, the bishops of America, would be the first to repudiate and condemn it as being most injurious to themselves and to their country. For it would give rise to the suspicion that there are among you some who conceive and would have the Church in America to be different from what it is in the rest of the world.

But the true church is one, as by unity of doctrine, so by unity of government, and she is catholic also. Since God has placed the centre and foundation of unity in the chair of Blessed Peter, she is rightly called the Roman Church, for "where Peter is, there is the church." Wherefore, if anybody wishes to be considered a real Catholic, he ought to be able to say from his heart the self-same words which Jerome addressed to Pope Damasus: "I, acknowledging no other leader than Christ, am bound in fellowship with Your Holiness; that is, with the chair of Peter. I know that the church was built upon him as its rock, and that whosoever gathereth not with you, scattereth."

We having thought it fitting, beloved son, in view of your high office, that this letter should be addressed specially to you. It will also be our care to see that copies are sent to the bishops of the United States, testifying again that love by which we embrace your whole country, a country which in past times has done so much for the cause of religion, and which will by the Divine assist-

ance continue to do still greater things. To you, and to all the faithful of America, we grant most lovingly, as a pledge of Divine assistance, our apostolic benediction.

Given at Rome, from St. Peter's, the 22d day of January, 1899, and the thirty-first of our pontificate.

LEO XIII.

Book Reviews.

LEHRBUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE AUF ARISTOKLISCH-SCHOLASTISCHER GRUNDLAGE. Von *Alfons Lehman*, S. J. I. Band. Herder, Freiburg (St. Louis, Mo.), 1899; pp. xv., 444; pr. \$1.90.

Scholastic philosophy feels itself more at ease in German than in English. This is one reason, though there are other reasons and deeper, why the literature grows apace in the former soil but remains comparatively unadvancing in the latter. Another handbook has just been added to those of Stöckl, Hagemann, Gutberlet, Grimmich, Braig and the rest. Father Lehman has the wants of two classes of readers in view. First, students in college and university wherein Catholic philosophy is taught through the German medium. Second, the general reader who needs and will take guidance through the labyrinth of philosophical opinions and systems. Both classes will find the book well adapted to their purpose. The ground covered in the present volume embraces Dialectics, Critics and Ontology. The matter and method correspond to what is found in the average Latin manual of Catholic philosophy. Another volume to contain the three departments of Special Metaphysics is promised for the end of this year. A feature of the mechanism that will specially commend the book is the list of theses covering Critics and Ontology. The pithy comprehensive propositions, strung in a consecutive chain, put the student at once in sight of the cardinal doctrines and general development of the whole subject.

ORGANIC EVOLUTION CROSS-EXAMINED; or, Some Suggestions on the Great Secret of Biology. By the *Duke of Argyll*, K. G., etc. London: John Murray, 1898; pp. vi. 201.

Of writers who have contributed most to generalize and at the same time popularize the evolutionary hypothesis no one ranks so high as Mr. Herbert Spencer. Taking the old, universally recognized fact of development and lending it the semblance of the novelty that goes with a new—or at least newly applied—appella-

tive, *Evolution*, he has carried the idea, into which the fact of *development* has been made to pass, into every department of phenomena. Under the searching light of an evolutionary conception he has seen the homogeneous mass of the original "fiery cloud" slowly unfold through an ever increasing complexity into heterogeneous combinations—nuclei and revolving masses—until the planetary and the stellar world stood out in the spaiat universe. By means of the same luminous idea he has watched the disintegration and redistribution of the inanimate molecules into the simplest forms of life, and thence onwards through the ascending scale of plant and animal organisms into the marvellously complex structure—*homo sapiens*—and thence still forwards and upwards throughout all the spheres of man's intellectual, moral, religious, social and industrial activity. One need not be a disciple of Mr. Spencer to appreciate the indefatigable research, unsurpassed industry, far reaching mastery of facts, unparalleled skill and ingenuity in organization of material that were needed to rear so colossal a structure as the *Synthetic Philosophy*. That there are flaws here and there in the immense edifice might have been taken for granted, and it has been no wonderful feat in the critics to have discovered and pointed them out. But what if the whole fabric rests on a theory that a deeper insight shall show to be but a bed of sand and crumbling rock which is steadily being loosened and carried away under the elemental action of scientific research and philosophical criticism? What if the majestic castle that lifts itself with such fair proportions on the intellectual heights be found on closer approach to be after all but the airy fabric of a dream, a thing of no substantial consistency, a creation of cloud and sunlight and fancy?

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Warnings as to the weakness of the foundation and the general instability of the *Synthetic Philosophy* have not been lacking of late years in the book and review worlds. Of those who have given utterance to such warnings few, if any, deserve a more attentive hearing than the Duke of Argyll. To a familiarity with scientific data hardly if at all inferior to that of Mr. Spencer, he unites an equal power of philosophical analysis and insight, and if anything a superior mastery of expression. Some two years ago he contributed to the *Nineteenth Century* a critique of Mr. Spencer's evolutionary theory. The three papers in which the criticism was contained are now given a more enduring, and it may be added,

a most readable and attractive shape in the present volume. The work is not, of course, intended as anything like an exhaustive study of the Spencerian philosophy. It is simply an examination of some of Mr. Spencer's principal arguments and general methods of argumentation for organic evolution. This is not the place to follow the critic's strictures. Students interested in the subject will find the work well worth reading. Though it does not contain a great deal that is not to be found in the cognate literature, the author's clear, happy style lends a special force and interest to his polemic. Some remarks on Mr. Spencer's system in general are deserving of quotation: "Mr. Spencer has vehemently denied that his philosophy is materialistic. But he has denied it on the ground that, as between Materialism and Spiritualism, his system is neither the one nor the other. He says expressly of his own reasonings that 'their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic, and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic. Any argument which is apparently furnished to either hypothesis is neutralized by as good an argument furnished to the other.' This may be true of the results in his own very subtle mind, but it is certainly not true of the effect of his presentations on the minds of others. Nor is it true in the natural and only legitimate interpretation of a thousand passages" (p. 194).

As an illustration of (at least) implied materialism the author cites and comments on Mr. Spencer's assertion that "what exists in consciousness in the form of feeling is transformable into an equivalent of mechanical motion." (Ib.)

His Grace then concludes: "But even if it were true that Mr. Spencer's writings are as neutral as he asserts them to be, nothing in favour of their reasonings would be gained. A philosophy which is avowedly indifferent on the most fundamental of all questions respecting the interpretation of the Universe, cannot properly be said to be a philosophy at all, still less can it claim to be pre-eminently 'synthetic.' It may have made some—and even large—contributions to philosophy, but the contributions are very far indeed from having been harmonized into any consistent system. On the contrary, very often any close analysis of its language and of its highly artificial phraseology will be found to break it up into incoherent fragments. Such at least has been my experience; and I am glad to think that in a line of interpretation which leads up to no conclusion, and to no verdict, on the one question of deepest interest in science and philosophy—namely, whether the Physical Forces are the masters or the servants of that House in which we live—no man is ever likely to succeed where Mr. Herbert Spencer has broken down" (p. 200).

F. P. S.

SOCIALPOLITIK UND MORAL. Eine Darstellung ihres Verhältnisses. Von Dr. Franz Walter. Herder, Freiburg (St. Louis, Mo.), 1899; pp. xv 347; pr. \$1.30.

Four years ago the author of this work published an essay—crowned by the Munich University—on Property according to the teaching of St. Thomas and Socialism. The burden of the argumentation therein lay upon the ethical bases of property-right. In the present work those bases are proved to be the deepest support of the entire economical order. The German compound *Socialpolitik* is by no means an unequivocal term. There is practically no undisputed definition to be found; each writer on the general subject formulating his meaning from his individual viewpoint. Indeed, as Sombart, complains, the vogue is nowadays to write whole books on *Socialpolitik* without furnishing a clear conception of the term's supposition. Dr. Walter, after going over a number of the proposed definitions, adopts as his own—"the content of governmental measures (Innbegriff der staatlichen Masznahmen) that concern the organization of economical life" within the body politic. The formula is not dazzlingly luminous. Somewhat recast it may mean the aggregate of governmental functions relating to the promotion of industry. Thus taken it would stand for things objective. Subjectively it would imply the science or systematized truths expressing the said functions. The trend throughout modern scientific classification is to divorce more and more the unity;" the successsion of the intruding bird who by force has settled sciences that centre in man from ethics, and ethics is to be studied without any theological "implications"—just as psychology has come to be constructed "without a soul." One of the most noteworthy advocates of the divulsion of *Social-politics*, in the sense above given, indeed of all economics, from ethical considerations is Sombart, whose recent work *Die Ideale der Socialpolitik* is a brief for such a divorce. The primary plea is based on the "Ideals" of the two orders—the ethical and the economical. Ethics should aim at right conduct and concern the interior man. Economics should aim at production of wealth and concern the business—the exterior—man. Patently there is and must be a *logical distinction* between the two orders and the two sciences, but a *real separation* implies at once a false psychology—the sundering of the unity of man's personality—and a false, or rather no, theology, the swerving aside of industrial activity to other ends than that to which the whole finite order is essentially related, i. e., to God.

Dr. Walter has selected Sombart's work for criticism, but his purpose is mainly positive, i. e., to demonstrate the necessarily ethical foundations of Economics, Sociology and the Science of Government. The work is written in a style that adapts it to the

general reader but it will be found especially helpful to the serious student both of ethics and of the social sciences, by reason of its abundant references to the modern literature—particularly German—pertinent to the two departments of moral science. F. P. S.

INSTITUTIONES THEOLOGIAE MORALIS GENERALIS. Auctore G. Bernardo Tepe, S. J. Vol. I., pp. 361. Vol. II., pp. 412. Parisus: P. Lethielleux, Via "Cassete," 10, 1899.

Students of theology will be interested in finding that Fr. Tepe has added to his Institutes of Dogmatics the present work on General Moral Theology. In the voluminous *Carsus* built by the great Catholic divines of a century and more ago on the basis of the mediaeval *Summae*, Dogmatics and Morals are generally united. The subsequent separation of the two branches has had its advantages, but the coordination of truths into a scientific system and the development of a full theological habit are best subserved by their union, especially when the two departments are combined by a hand having the mastery of both such as is controlled by the writer of these Institutes. Moral subjects do not yield themselves so readily as dogmatic to rigidly scientific moulding, but in the present work they are brought into a shape as clear cut and as methodically arranged as are their sister truths in the author's preceding work on Dogma. The formulation of the leading thoughts and their unbroken sequence from first to last are almost mathematical. If theology can be made easy, the author has here given an object lesson of the process. The work can be called "easy," however, only to such as bring to its reading a training in its groundwork—scholastic philosophy. The student thus trained will find it most satisfactory. The matter covered in the first volume embraces "human acts" and laws; in the second, sin, the virtues, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and in an appendix, "the spiritual life." The work may be called the theological philosophy of the moral life, and as such is the crown of the preceding work—the theological philosophy of revealed truth. F. P. S.

1. ARS LIBERALIS SEN RHETORICA POLITICO-SACRA EX PROBATIONIBUS AUCTORIBUS COMPENDIOSE COLLECTA.

2. THEOLOGIAE NATURALIS INSTITUTIONES IN COMPENDIUM REDACTAE. pp. 50.

3. TRACTATUS DE DEO TRINO PERBREVE COMPENDIUM. pp. 27.

4. COMPENDIO DEI PRIMA IV, TRATTATI DELLA THEOLOGIA DOGMATICA. Vol. II., pp. 186. Vol. III., IV., pp. 129.

Omnes ad Bern. Skulík, D. D. Senis (Milwaukee, Wis.), 1897-98.

The author of these theological opuscula, a priest in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is president of the Society *Sedes Sapientiae*, an organi-

zation for the spread of Catholic truth, chiefly by the medium of sound literature, amongst those outside the Church. Besides the good work he is accomplishing through this Society in both hemispheres, he is striving to be helpful as well to the laity by his numerous minor publications in Polish, Italian and German, and to Seminarians preparing for the priesthood by his various theological pamphlets. Four such opuscula are here presented. The first, a compendium of Rhetoric, will be of service in the closing year of the Latin course in preparatory Seminaries and in colleges in which Rhetoric can be studied through a Latin medium. In the seminary it might also be useful as a special preparation for the study of Logic, a number of whose processes it briefly yet clearly explains, and thus initiates the young mind into operations introductory to philosophy.

The second opusculum is a very compact digest of Theodicy. The author has managed to compress in a very small bulk all the leading truths of this department of metaphysics without mutilating or blurring them in the least. The same is true of the third brochure on the mystery of the Bl. Trinity. Of course the value of these compendia will be best appreciated by students who have made some progress in the study of the corresponding subjects in larger works. To them they will serve as aids in reviewing. Readers, whether lay or clerical, who are versed in Italian, will find in the last two opuscula a clear, methodical and suggestive summary of the opening tracts of Dogma. The treatise on the True Religion, the first of the Italian series, was not sent us. It can doubtless be obtained with the others from the author.

BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE CATHOLIC HIERARCHY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1784-1898. By *Francis X. Reuss*. 8vo, pp. 129. Milwaukee: Wiltzius & Co.

This is an excellent book of reference. It contains the names, with the dates of birth, ordination, appointment, and consecration of all the Bishops, Abbots, and Monsignori, who have lived in this country since 1784. In it one can find answers to those questions which are constantly arising, and which seem simple enough until we need the information. It might be possible to get it from different sources, but the difficulties in the way are greater and more numerous than one would imagine. The writer of this notice recently tried to get information concerning an American Bishop, and he found three historical works disagreeing as to the proper spelling of his name.

A work of this kind requires patience and perseverance: these two qualifications are possessed by Mr. Reuss. He tells us that he spent all his leisure time for eight years in preparing it, and that

he wrote over four thousand letters to different parts of the world. In each instance he quotes his authority, and his book is a valuable contribution to what may be called the "fundamenta" of history.

LEGAL FORMULARY; or, a collection of Forms to be used in the exercise of Voluntary and Contentious Jurisdiction. To which is added an Epitome of the Laws, Decisions and Instructions pertaining thereto. By the Rev. Peter A. Baart, A. M., S. T. L. 12mo, pp. 500. New York: Pustet & Co.

When books like this one come from the press, our first thought is one of surprise that they have not appeared sooner. The Church has grown so rapidly in this country, and is so fast assuming a permanent canonical form that the necessity for transacting the business of the organization in strictly legal form is becoming more urgent each day. This necessity has long existed, and as it is practically impossible for busy men engaged in the active work of the ministry to prepare the proper forms for transacting their ecclesiastical business quickly and correctly, and equally impossible for them to search through foreign works for the information that they require, they must hail with delight Father Baart's book. It gives to us all necessary forms for the conduct of diocesan affairs in so far as they pertain to bishops and priests, and to their official relations. It gives them to us in the language of the country and the language of the Church. In preparing the work the Reverend Author has searched the best authorities, and the results of his labors are founded on them and on the general laws of the Church, especially are they all adapted to the needs of this country.

Father Baart is particularly well fitted for work of this kind, both by learning and by experience. His "Formulary" will expedite business, prevent serious mistakes, and in some instances validate acts that would be invalid because of irregularity of form.

EXPOSITION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE; by a Seminary Professor. Intermediate Course. Part II.—Moral. Authorized English version. John Joseph McVey, Philadelphia, Pa., 1899. Price, \$2.25.

This "course of Religious Instruction" aims at imparting a deeper knowledge of Christianity, in its triple aspect of Dogma, Morals and Worship. Clearness, exactness and method are the author's three watchwords, and to secure these ends he employs the catechetical method in the body of each chapter, and adds at the close of the chapter a well digested summary and a clear-cut synopsis (in diagram).

The first eleven chapters are devoted to the General Principles and is already in its second edition. The present volume, *Morals*, is of 617 well-filled pages, clearly printed and elegantly, as well as substantially, bound.

The first eleven chapters are devoted to the General Principals

of Morality, and to the Nature of Virtue and Sin. Then follow thirteen chapters on the Commandments of God and of the Church. The closing section considers, in three well-divided chapters, the Evangelical Counsels and Beatitudes.

The whole work is conceived on broad lines. The mode of treatment aids the pupil by its catechetical form and offers great help to the catechist and advance student by the Summaries and Synopes. It is also a convenient and clear reference book that should have a place in the "religious library" of the Catholic home. There is a slight lack of editing in the chapter on Superstition; physiognomy, phrenology and chiromancy are mentioned in the same category of divination as sorcery and necromancy. The example moreover of *mental restriction* given in the Article on Equivocation is to our thinking an unhappy one. Correction in future editions of oversights of this kind will place the work in the front rank of religious doctrinal literature.

H. T. D.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

- THE CATECHISM OF RODEZ. Explained in form of sermons. By the *Abbe Luche*. Translated and adapted to the wants of the American Public by Rev. John Theim, of the Diocese of Cleveland. 8vo, pp. 328. St. Louis: B. Herder & Co.
- CHRISTIANITY AND AGNOSTICISM. By the *Abbe Louis Picard*. Authorized translation. Revised by the Rev. J. G. Macleod, S. J. 8vo, pp. 633. London: Sands & Co. Received from Benziger Brothers, New York.
- THE VENERABLE JULIE BILLIART, Servant of God, Foundress and First Superior General of the Institute of Sisters of Notre Dame. By a member of the same Congregation. Edited by Father Clare, S. J. 8vo, pp. 403. London: Art and Book Co. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- THE SCIENCE OF SPIRITUAL LIFE ACCORDING TO THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES. By *Father Clare, S. J.* New and enlarged edition. 12mo, pp. 668. London: Art and Book Co. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- HARD SAYINGS. A Selection of Meditations and Studies. By *George Tyrrell, S. J.* 12mo, pp. 469. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co.
- LIFE OF ST. EDMUND OF ABINGDON, Archbishop of Canterbury. By *Frances de Paravicini*, author of the Early History of Balliol College. 12mo, pp. 290. London, Burns & Oates. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- HISTORIC NUNS. By *Bessie R. Belloc*. 12mo, pp. 223. London: Duckworth & Co. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- THE FOUR GOSPELS, a New Translation from the Greek Text direct, with reference to the Vulgate, and to the ancient Syriac Version. By *Very Rev. Francis Aloysius Spencer, O. P.* Preface by *His Eminence James, Cardinal Gibbons*. 12mo, pp. 280. New York: Wm. H. Young & Co.
- THE SACRED HEART, or Incidents showing how those who honor the Sacred Heart of Jesus are assisted and helped by its power and love; together with lives of B. Margaret Mary, and Venerable P. De La Colombieri. Selected from the German of Rev. Joseph A. Keller, D. D. 12mo, pp. 255. London: R. & T. Washbourne. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- MEDITATIONS ON THE INCARNATION AND LIFE OF OUR LORD. By *Cardinal Wiseman*. 12mo, pp. 275. London: Burns & Oates. New York: Benziger Brothers.
- THE DIVINITY OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, from Pascal. A Commentary by *William Bullen Morris*, of the Oratory. 12mo, pp. 196. London: Burns & Oates. Dublin: Gill & Son.
- A HARP OF MANY CHORDS. A Novel. By *Mary F. Nixon*. 12mo, pp. 232. St. Louis: B. Herder & Co.

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